Roddey v. Lyle
Decision Date | 19 April 1977 |
Docket Number | No. 20407,20407 |
Citation | 268 S.C. 424,234 S.E.2d 236 |
Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
Parties | Jean R. RODDEY, Appellant, v. David LYLE et al., Respondents. |
David A. White, of Roddey, Sumwalt & Carpenter, Rock Hill, for appellant.
C. W. F. Spencer, Jr., of Spencer & Spencer, Rock Hill, for respondents.
Appellant instituted this action against the City of Rock Hill for alleged damages occasioned by the construction of a by-pass through her property. The trial court granted an order of summary judgment in favor of the City of Rock Hill. We affirm.
Appellant executed a right of way directly to the South Carolina Highway Department for the construction of the by-pass through her property which was within the corporate limits of the City. It is undisputed that the Highway Department exclusively performed all of the construction work and the City's sole basis for liability is its approval of the construction plans. Appellant asserts that the alteration of the terrain has resulted in damage to the remainder of her property and maintained this action independently against the City.
Alleged liability on the part of the City is duly premised on Section 47-1327, Code of Laws, 1962, and the case of Willimon v. City of Greenville, 243 N.C. 82, 132 S.E.2d 169 (1963). The former provides:
Section 47-1327, Code of Laws, 1962.
As is apparent from the foregoing statute, independently it is applicable only to affirmative construction effectuated by the municipality. Exclusively, the statute does not justify municipal liability for delicts of other entities. This construction is explicitly recognized in the Willimon decision where other conjunctive authority provided municipal liability. The single issue before this Court is whether such authority continues to exist today.
Willimon also involved alleged damages due to alterations in city streets exclusively performed by the State Highway Department. The foundation of municipal liability was its approval of the construction plans. However, the issue presented in Willimon was not the threshold question of ultimate liability but the extent of liability:
"Appellants contended that they are not liable under Section 47-1327 as they assumed, under Section 33-173, Code of Laws of South Carolina, 1962, only such liability as the Highway Department might have had as the result of the alteration of Highway 291 and that the Highway Department is not subject to suit for such damages under Section 47-1327; and there being no liability against the Highway Department, the City could not assume something which did not exist." 243 S.C. at 86, 132 S.E.2d at 170.
Basic assumption of liability on the part of the City was uncontested because of the following statutory scheme which existed when Willimon was decided:
§ 33-172: "All work to be performed by the Department on State highways within a municipality shall be with the consent and approval of the proper municipal authorities."
§ 33-173: (Emphasis added).
§ 33-174: (Emphasis added).
§ 33-229: "Damage claims against the State Highway Department authorized for (a) defects in State highways (b) the negligent repair of State highways or (c) the negligent operation of vehicles in charge of the Department."
§ 33-234: (Emphasis added). 1
By Act No. 162 of 1969 the legislature drastically reformed the whole statutory design for liability arising from state highway construction within municipalities. Of the aforementioned statutes upon which Willimon was predicated, only one section 2 remains inviolate and all of the foregoing emphasized language has been repealed. The liability blueprint as a result of Act No. 162 of 1969 is now as follows:
§ 33-172: (Unchanged)
§ 33-173: (Language providing for municipal assumption of liability by approving plans...
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McCall by Andrews v. Batson
...272 S.C. 168, 249 S.E.2d 900 (1978). 12. Wright v. City of Charleston, 271 S.C. 515, 248 S.E.2d 480 (1978). 13. Roddey v. Lyle, 268 S.C. 424, 234 S.E.2d 236 (1977). 14. Boyce v. Lancaster County National Gas Authority, 266 S.C. 398, 223 S.E.2d 769 (1976). 15. Hazard v. S.C. State Highway De......
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