Rodell v. Objective Interface Sys., Inc.
| Decision Date | 30 September 2015 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 14-cv-01667-MSK-MJW |
| Parties | DR. JOHN RODELL, Plaintiff, v. OBJECTIVE INTERFACE SYSTEMS, INC., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Colorado |
THIS MATTER comes before the Court on Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (#58), Plaintiff's Response (#63) and Defendant's Reply (#64). Also at issue is Defendant's Motion to Strike Plaintiff's Jury Demand (#30) and the Plaintiff's Response (#31). The Court exercises jurisdiction in this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
The following is a summary of the pertinent undisputed facts. Where the facts are in dispute, the Court has construed them most favorably to the non-movant, Dr. Rodell. As necessary, there may be further elaboration in the Courts analysis.
Plaintiff, Dr. John Rodell, was employed by Defendant, Objective Interface Systems, Inc. (OIS), from October of 2007 through September of 2012. Dr. Rodell is over forty years old.
On October 17, 2007, OIS sent Dr. Rodell a letter offering him a position at OIS. As relevant here, Dr. Rodell's offer letter included a provision that after six months of employment, he would be entitled to receive a stock option for 50,000 shares in OIS.
On October 22, 2007, Dr. Rodell accepted employment with OIS. Several terms of a written employment agreement, executed by Dr. Rodell and OIS, are important to this dispute. First, the agreement made no mention of Dr. Rodell's entitlement to stock options. Second, it did not include any representation regarding his compensation. In fact, Provision 3(a) allowed OIS to adjust Dr. Rodell's compensation as it deemed appropriate, and Provision 3(c) allowed OIS to terminate Dr. Rodell without cause upon 30 days' notice, or alternatively, without notice if he was paid for 30 days in accordance with his current salary. Provision 3(d) permitted OIS to fire him for cause without notice or severance. Dr. Rodell also received an employee manual, in which OIS agreed not to discriminate against its employees based on age or other attributes.
In April of 2008, Dr. Rodell had been employed for six months, but had not received the incentive stock option. Dr. Rodell testified that around this time he asked William Beckwith, the CEO of OIS, about the stock option, and was told that OIS was in the process of revamping its employee stock option plan. Eventually, in February of 2011, OIS offered Dr. Rodell a stock option to purchase 155,000 shares under a new plan.1
From 2007 through mid-2011, Dr. Rodell's employment ran smoothly. Beginning in mid-2011, circumstances shifted. In July of that year, Dr. Rodell states that Mr. Beckwith instructed him to "make false promises to a government contractor." Mr. Beckwith directed Dr. Rodell to contact Jenny Gregg, an employee of Scientific Research Company (SRC), with whom OIS did business, regarding two missing documents that OIS was supposed to deliver. Mr. Beckwith toldDr. Rodell to inform Ms. Gregg that the relevant content of the missing documents had been included and incorporated into other documents OIS previously provided to SRC. Dr. Rodell did so per Mr. Beckwith's instructions. Dr. Rodell later learned that his representations to Ms. Gregg and SRC were false. Dr. Rodell expressed concerns with OIS's false representations to Mr. Beckwith, but does not elaborate as to how or if this situation was ever resolved.
In the fall of 2011, Mr. Beckwith spoke with Dr. Rodell regarding his commissions. Mr. Beckwith indicated that some of Dr. Rodell's sales commission should be split with, or allocated to Brian Caughel, a salesman who worked with Dr. Rodell. Mr. Beckwith asked Dr. Rodell to come up with a fair percentage to give to Mr. Caughel, but before Dr. Rodell gave Mr. Beckwith a figure, Mr. Beckwith allocated more to Mr. Caughel than what Dr. Rodell believed was fair.
Dr. Rodell's responsibilities at OIS changed in 2012. Early that year, OIS hired an employee named Charlie Booth2 to take over sales, and Dr. Rodell was demoted. Specifically, he was directed to only pursue new sales. OIS also issued a new compensation plan to Dr. Rodell that unfavorably changed his pay structure. Dr. Rodell believed the pay cut was unfair, and when he asked his supervisors why he was "asked to take a pay cut when no one else is," he was not given an explanation. Dr. Rodell testifies that he raised his concerns to Mr. Beckwith and Mr. Booth several times throughout 2012 and was told to put his concerns in writing.
Later in 2012, Dr. Rodell and Mr. Beckwith had a disagreement regarding a candidate for employment. Dr. Rodell testifies that he was asked to interview and hire James Jones, Jr., whose father was a government employee. According to Dr. Rodell, Mr. Jones's father could potentially influence or promote government use of OIS products. Dr. Rodell told Mr. Beckwith he would not hire Mr. Jones because he was not qualified for the position. Dr. Rodell admits that he did not believe hiring Mr. Jones was criminal or in violation of any regulations.
On September 28, 2012, Dr. Rodell expressed concerns about his pay reduction in an email to Mr. Beckwith. He stated, "I believe that I'm . . . being treated unfairly by OIS." He pointed to the fact that when he was hired, his total compensation was $180,000, divided evenly between a base salary, incentive pay, and sales commission, but the new compensation plan combined incentive pay with sales commission, which meant that to make $180,000, he would have to personally sell 3 million dollars' worth of OIS products. On September 29, 2012, the day after Dr. Rodell sent his mail, OIS terminated his employment with OIS. Mr. Beckwith's explanation was that Dr. Rodell he did not meet his quota for 2012, and, as a secondary reason, because Dr. Rodell had a tendency to "stick his heels in the ground" when there were differences of opinion between him and OIS management.
There is no dispute that Dr. Rodell's sales quota for the year was $2.1 million, and that as of September 2012, Dr. Rodell was significantly below his quota (in fact, he had only reached some $205,000). However, Dr. Rodell testified that although the quota would not ordinarily be unreasonable, it was "not achievable because . . . the product" he was asked to sell was not accredited or certified as an IT hardware product for use in government systems. Mr. Booth agrees that Dr. Rodell's sales were low because "OIS's customers were not ready to buy the product because the product still needed work." Mr. Booth further opines that the reason that Dr. Rodell was given for termination - that he was not making his sales quota - was a "guise," and that he was really let go because "he lodged a written concern about his pay structure."
Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits summary judgment where there are no genuine disputes of material fact and a party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). A factualdispute is "genuine" if the evidence presented in support of and in opposition to the motion is so contradictory that, if presented at trial, a judgment could enter for either party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). When considering a summary judgment motion, the Court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, but may disregard "mere allegations," "conclusory and self-serving affidavits" or inadmissible evidence. See Stover v. Martinez, 382 F.3d 1064, 1070 (10th Cir 2004); Murray v. City of Sapulpa, 45 F.3d 1417, 1422 (10th Cir. 1995); Sprague v. Thorn Americas, Inc., 129 F.3d 1355, 1360-61 (10th Cir. 1997); Gross v. Burggraf Const. Co., 53 F.3d 1531, 1541 (10th Cir. 1995).
Substantive law governs the elements that must be proven for a particular claim or defense, the standard of proof, and which party bears the burden of proof. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; Kaiser-Francis Oil Co. v. Producer's Gas Co., 870 F.2d 563, 565 (10th Cir. 1989). If the moving party bears the burden of proof at trial, it must support its motion with credible evidence showing that, if uncontroverted, the moving party would be entitled to a directed verdict. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 331 (1986). The burden then shifts to the non-moving party to produce evidence demonstrating the existence of a genuine factual issue for trial. Id. Similarly, where the moving party does not bear the burden of proof at trial, it must point to an absence of sufficient evidence to establish the claim or claims that the non-moving party is obligated to prove. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1)(A); Perry v. Woodward, 199 F.3d 1126, 1131 (10th Cir. 1999). Once the moving party has met its burden, the responding party must present sufficient, competent, contradictory evidence to establish a genuine factual dispute. See Bacchus Indus., Inc. v. Arvin Indus., Inc., 939 F.2d 887, 891 (10th Cir. 1991); Perry, 199 F.3d at 1131. If there is insufficient evidence from which a reasonable fact-finder could find for the non-moving party as to each element of its claim, summary judgment is proper. Adams v. AmericanGuarantee & Liability Ins. Co., 233 F.3d 1242, 1246 (10th Cir. 2000); White v. York Intern. Corp., 45 F.3d 357, 360 (10th Cir. 1995).
This action was initiated in May of 2014. In his First Amended Complaint (#43), Dr. Rodell asserts seven claims for relief: (1) age discrimination under the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act, C.R.S. § 24-34-401, et seq. (CADA); (2) retaliation under Title VII and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. § 621, et seq.; (3) violation of the Colorado Wage Claim Act, C.R.S. § 8-4-101, et seq.; (4) promissory...
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