Rodeo Sanitary Dist. v. Board of Supervisors

• Decision Date: 10 May 1999
• Docket Number: Nos. A082232,A082245,s. A082232
• Citation: 71 Cal.App.4th 1443,84 Cal.Rptr.2d 601
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: , 1999 Daily Journal D.A.R. 4389 RODEO SANITARY DISTRICT, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. BOARD OF SUPERVISORS of the County of Contra Costa, Defendant and Respondent. Mt. View Sanitary District, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Board of Supervisors of the County of Contra Costa, Defendant and Respondent.

Page 601

84 Cal.Rptr.2d 601

71 Cal.App.4th 1443, 1999 Daily Journal D.A.R. 4389

RODEO SANITARY DISTRICT, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. BOARD OF SUPERVISORS of the County of Contra Costa, Defendant and Respondent.

Mt. View Sanitary District, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Board of Supervisors of the County of Contra Costa, Defendant and Respondent.

Nos. A082232, A082245.

Court of Appeal, First District, Division 5, California.

May 10, 1999.

Review Denied Aug. 18, 1999.

David J. Levy; Marchmont J. Schwartz; and Bryce C. Anderson, Concord, for Petitioner.

Victor J. Westman, County Counsel, and Bernard Knapp, Deputy County Counsel, for Respondent.

STEVENS, J.

In these consolidated appeals, the appellant sanitary districts contend the Board of Supervisors of Contra Costa County, within which the districts lie, could not forbid them from continuing to carry out their traditional function of collecting and disposing of solid waste. The dispositive issues presented are (1) whether the county's actions were a proper exercise of its police power, and (2) whether its actions were authorized by the California Integrated Waste Management Act of 1989 (Pub. Resources Code, § 40000 et seq.). The sanitary districts' contentions have merit, and we therefore reverse the trial court's judgment.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The Rodeo Sanitary District and the Mt. View Sanitary District (the districts) are public corporations organized under the provisions of the Sanitary District Act of 1923 (the 1923 Act) (Health & Saf.Code, § 6400 et seq.). The districts have operated for at least the past 50 years, collecting and disposing of garbage within their respective district boundaries, which lie within unincorporated areas of Contra Costa County (the county). In 1985 and 1986, both districts entered into long-term, exclusive garbage collection contracts with Pleasant Hill Bayshore Disposal (Bayshore). Under those contracts, Bayshore was to collect garbage within the districts into the next century.

In 1989, the Legislature passed the California Integrated Waste Management Act of 1989 (the 1989 Act) (Pub. Resources Code, § 40000 et seq.), which we discuss in the next section of this opinion. In 1991, and purportedly under the authority of the 1989 Act, the county's board of supervisors adopted a new Ordinance, 91-31 (the 1991 Ordinance), which requires that any person providing solid waste collection or disposal services within unincorporated areas of the county must have an agreement directly with the county, not the districts. The 1991 Ordinance also envisioned that the county and the local districts would enter into a memorandum of understanding with reference to garbage collection, but apparently any negotiations between the districts and the county proved unsuccessful.

Pursuant to the 1991 Ordinance, and despite the opposition of the districts, the county in 1996 granted to Bayshore the county's own exclusive garbage collection franchises covering the districts' service areas, and directed that all proceeds should be paid to the county, not the districts. In essence, although the districts continue to exist on paper, the county assumed the districts' major function of collecting garbage within each district.

The districts brought suit against the county, challenging these actions. It was their contention that the county had no legal authority to take over their garbage collection operations, had engaged in an inverse condemnation of the districts' operations, and had interfered with their economic relationships with Bayshore. The districts' complaints sought declaratory and injunctive relief.

Arguing it had the legal authority to supersede the districts' authority by granting exclusive franchises for garbage collection within the territories of the two districts, the county successfully obtained summary judgment. The districts brought separate timely appeals from the resulting judgments. We have ordered the districts' appeals to be consolidated for purposes of briefing, argument, and the issuance of this opinion.

II. DISCUSSION

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review a summary judgment de novo. (Environmental Protection Information Center v. Department of Forestry & Fire Protection (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 1011, 1015-1016, 50 Cal.Rptr.2d 892.) To determine whether a summary judgment was proper we follow the same approach required of the trial court. (AARTS Productions, Inc. v. Crocker National Bank (1986) 179 Cal.App.3d 1061, 1064-1065, 225 Cal.Rptr. 203.) Here, only legal issues are presented, and we simply determine whether the county was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c.)

B. THE COUNTY DID NOT HAVE GENERAL POLICE POWER OVER THE DISTRICTS

The districts are separate legal entities established by local voters residing within the districts pursuant to state statute, the 1923 Act. This Act specifically grants to sanitary districts the legal authority and power to collect and dispose of waste and garbage within their jurisdictional boundaries. (Health & Saf.Code, § 6518.5.)

Sanitary districts are, therefore, creatures of state law; and as public corporations, they exercise a portion of the police power of the state within their district boundaries, independent of the police power of a city or a county over unincorporated areas, in the event of a direct conflict of laws. (See Cent. Contra Costa Etc. Dist. v. Superior Ct. (1950) 34 Cal.2d 845, 849, 215 P.2d 462; West Bay Sanitary Dist. v. City of East Palo Alto (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d 1507, 1510-1512, 237 Cal.Rptr. 245 (West Bay Sanitary ); see also Cal. Atty. Gen., Indexed Letter, No. IL 9050 (Dec. 4, 1933); 10 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 13 14 (1947); cf. also In re Sozzi (1942) 54 Cal.App.2d 304, 306, 129 P.2d 40.)

The state Constitution also provides that a county has the power to "make and enforce within its limits all local, police, sanitary, and other ordinances and regulations not in conflict with general laws. " (Cal. Const., art. XI, § 7, italics added.) County ordinances and other "[l]ocal legislation in conflict with general law is void." (People ex. rel. Deukmejian v. County of Mendocino (1984) 36 Cal.3d 476, 484, 204 Cal.Rptr. 897, 683 P.2d 1150 (Mendocino ).) Where, as here, a general law of the state grants certain powers to sanitary districts within their boundaries, the county or city may not exercise its police power to override those district powers, because such action would be in conflict with the general laws of the state. (See West Bay Sanitary, supra, 191 Cal.App.3d at p. 1512, 237 Cal.Rptr. 245.)

By way of illustration, in West Bay Sanitary, supra, 191 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1509-1512, 237 Cal.Rptr. 245, Division Four of the First Appellate District held that a city had no power to control a sanitary district's authority over wastewater discharge permits. The issuance of these wastewater discharge permits was a traditional function of the sanitary district, but the city sought to require that the district not issue such permits without first either giving notice to the city and obtaining its consent, or alternatively pursuing the matter to arbitration before a third party. Relying on the powers granted by the Legislature to the district under the 1923 Act, this court condemned the city's attempt to exercise authority over the independent sanitary district, characterizing such action as an attempt to "usurp powers which the Legislature has vested exclusively in the board of the sanitary district." (Id. at p. 1511, 237 Cal.Rptr. 245.)

Consistent with the First Appellate District's holding in West Bay Sanitary, persuasive California Attorney General opinions have also reasoned that a sanitary district's authority will prevail over a county's authority in the event of direct conflict over matters within the district's jurisdiction. In one early opinion which was requested by the District Attorney of San Mateo County, the Attorney General analyzed the statutory power of a sanitary district under the 1923 Act to regulate the collection of garbage within district borders. The Attorney General concluded that San Mateo County had no right to legislate by ordinance upon the subject of dumping or depositing of garbage within the district where the sanitary district had already exercised its regulatory power on the same subject. In the words of that opinion, "the county has no right to legislate upon the subject of the dumping and depositing of garbage within the exterior boundaries of a sanitary district where the district itself has legislated upon the question." (Cal. Atty. Gen., Indexed Letter, No. IL 9050, supra.)

Similarly, guidance from the Attorney General was sought to resolve a conflict over regulations which required fees for building inspections in unincorporated areas of Santa Clara County, which areas were also within the jurisdiction of a sanitary district. The Attorney General again concluded that, in the event of conflict, the sanitary district's regulations requiring fees for building inspections for plumbing connections would prevail over those of the county: "The sanitary districts in question are formed under the provisions of [the 1923 Act]. This is a comprehensive statute giving districts formed thereunder broad powers.... [p] Section 6490 of the [Health and Safety] Code permits sanitary districts to adopt what are termed 'general regulations,' which must be published as provided by the section.... [p] Such regulations or ordinances must, of course, be confined and relate to the carrying out of the powers and duties given by law to such sanitary districts.... [p] These regulations, in our opinion, are paramount within their sphere in the district. That is, if a plumbing regulation should be in direct conflict with the county ordinance, the district ordinance, being a special law applying to that particular locality, will prevail over the more general county ordinance." (10 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen., supra, at p. 14.)

We vie...