Rodermund v. State
| Decision Date | 20 June 1918 |
| Citation | 168 N.W. 390,167 Wis. 577 |
| Parties | RODERMUND v. STATE. |
| Court | Wisconsin Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from Circuit Court, Dane County; E. Ray Stevens, Judge.
M. J. Rodermund was convicted of having used instruments to procure a miscarriage, and he brings error. Affirmed.
The plaintiff in error (hereafter called defendant) was convicted of the offense of having used instruments in the treatment of a pregnant woman with intent to procure a miscarriage as denounced by the provisions of section 4583, Statutes. The circuit court sentenced the defendant by the imposition of a fine and the costs of the action, and, in default of the payment of such fine and costs, committed him to the county jail for a period not to exceed six months.
Spencer Haven, Atty. Gen., J. E. Messerschmidt, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Harry Sauthoff, Dist. Atty., of Madison, for the State.
SIEBECKER, J. (after stating the facts as above).
The defendant insists that the trial court erred in submitting the question of his guilt or innocence to the jury, and claims that the evidence does not sustain the charge preferred against him of having used and employed instruments upon the person of a pregnant woman with the intent to produce a miscarriage. Upon the motion of the accused for a new trial, the trial court declared that:
The evidence adduced shows that the defendant was on July 27, 1917, consulted for treatment by an unmarried woman of the age of 20 years who had been pregnant for a period of from two to three months. The defendant testified that the woman was then in a cyanous condition and in a critical state of health, which he attributed to her having taken a large quantity of Chichester pills, and that he agreed to give her medical treatment. The evidence of the woman tends to show that defendant at this interview consented to treat her upon condition that she pay him $50 in advance, and that there was some conversation as to the necessity of preventing publicity of the fact of her condition and his treatment of her under these circumstances. The defendant testifies that whatever was said by him on the subject was in response to her request to protect her in her unfortunate situation, while the woman's testimony is in substance that defendant suggested absolute secrecy for his protection against unjust prosecution for rendering her medical aid and assistance in her affliction. By appointments the woman called at defendant's office on the third day after the first interview, and paid him $50, or $35, as defendant testifies; she made a third call three days after the second one. On both of these last occasions defendant used instruments upon her. The woman is unable to state what they were, but testifies that the use of them caused her pain, followed by menstruation; that she went about for three days after the first treatment without much pain or inconvenience; but that the last treatment was accompanied and followed by severe pain and consequent weakness and confinement to her bed. The defendant was called to her bedside on the day after the second treatment, at the home where the woman's sister was employed as a domestic, and was requested by the sister's mistress to remove the woman to a hospital. Defendant removed her from this place to a room in a private home of one of his friends who had cared for some of his patients theretofore. The defendant claims he did this because he had had trouble at the two available hospitals regarding his patients, and that the room in the private home was a comfortable and appropriate one for her care and would not expose her condition to the publicity which would follow had he taken her to a hospital. Two days thereafter the woman was taken to a hospital without the consent or knowledge of the defendant and there received treatment from another doctor and hospital care for about one week. The doctor employed to attend her at the hospital testifies, in substance, that he performed an operation of curettement on her (which was on the third day after the last treatment defendant gave her at his office); that he removed the placenta, found no fœtus, and from appearance it was his opinion that pregnancy had existed from two to three months; that he could not state whether or not the fœtus had been expelled by artificial means; that the use of a speculum and tenaculum forceps in treatments of a pregnant woman would not produce abortion; that he did not know whether this miscarriage was produced by drugs or other means; and that, if the woman was in the condition testified to by the defendant when he treated her, it would indicate that a miscarriage was then in progress. The defendant testified in substance that he found the woman in process of miscarriage, that he rendered proper medical aid for such condition, that he did nothing to produce a miscarriage, that his treatment of her was for alleviating her serious condition and to protect her life, that he did nothing to prevent publicity of his connection with or treatment of her case aside from what proper professional conduct demanded of him in compliance with her wishes, that all of her professional services were rendered for the purpose of giving her proper medical care, and that he had no intent to do anything to procure a miscarriage.
[1][2][3] In order to ascertain the true significance of all the facts and circumstances shown by the evidence requires a consideration of it in all its details that cannot be fully restated here. The proper inference from the evidence is necessarily dependent upon the credibility and weight which is given to the statements of the various persons who testified. The case is therefore one where the jury and the trial court who saw the witnesses on the stand and observed them while testifying could much better ascertain the probative force of the evidence than can be ascertained by a review of the printed record. The facts and circumstances shown are as to their significance and the inferences to be drawn therefrom as to defendant's guilt or innocence peculiarly within the function to be exercised by the triers of fact. The offense charged involves the inquiry: With what intent did the defendant give this woman the treatment he testified to? Such intent is a fact which must be ascertained from a consideration of the facts and circumstances which throw light on defendant's conduct and acts. If he had the felonious intent of producing a miscarriage, then guilt is established though he did not in fact procure a miscarriage. An attentive study of the evidentiary facts in all their bearing upon defendant's acts in relation to the charge...
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...Okl. Cr. 327, 104 Pac. 676; Gather v. State (Tex. Cr. App.) 81 S. W. 717; State v. Miller. 78 Wash. 208, 138 Pac. 896; Rodermund v. State, 167 Wis. 577, 168 N. W. 390; Hardesty v. State, 95 Neb. 889, 140 N. W. It is true, as said by the Georgia court in the case of Rawlins v. State, 124 Ga.......
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...S.) 966;Koepp v. Nat. En. & St. Co., 151 Wis. 302, 306, 139 N. W. 179;Wiese v. Riley, 146 Wis. 640, 644, 132 N. W. 604;Rodermund v. State, 167 Wis. 577, 584, 168 N. W. 390. These statutes require us now to examine the record on the points involved, and refuse to grant a new trial unless fro......
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...In the latter it defines the offense of an act intended to produce miscarriage or one that does produce miscarriage. Rodermund v. State, 167 Wis. 577, 168 N. W. 390. In order to commit such an offense there must be a pregnant woman. A normal pregnancy can exist only where there is embryonic......