Rodgers v. 36th Dist. Court
| Decision Date | 03 July 2013 |
| Docket Number | No. 11-2201,11-2201 |
| Parties | ARNETTE RODGERS, CARMEN KNIGHT, TAMIE RICE, KATRINA TATE-ANDERSON, JAUNICE FLOWERS, CHERYL SHARPLEY, ANTHONY COOPER, SARAH JENKINS, WENDELL FINLEY, ARECIA STEVENS, CRYSTAL ALLEN-CRUCE, YOLANDA JOHNSON, KEITH CARTER, DORNITA CLEVELAND, ALVITA MOSS, LAURA HILL, and YVONNE MALVAUX, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. 36TH DISTRICT COURT and MARYLIN E. ATKINS, Defendants-Appellants. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit |
NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
File Name: 13a0628n.06
ON APPEAL FROM THE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT
COURT FOR THE EASTERN
DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
Before: DAUGHTREY, COLE, and GIBBONS, Circuit Judges.
JULIA SMITH GIBBONS, Circuit Judge. Defendant-appellant Marylin E. Atkins, chief judge of Michigan's 36th Judicial District Court ("the 36th District"), appeals the district court's denial of her motion for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. The plaintiffs, who are former employees of the 36th District, sued the 36th District and Atkins pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that they were terminated without due process of law in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. They argue that under the collective bargaining agreement ("CBA") ineffect at the time of their terminations, they could be discharged only for "just cause" and that, as just-cause employees, they had the right to post-termination evidentiary hearings before a neutral decisionmaker, which they did not receive because the 36th District denied their demands for arbitration. Atkins asserts that she is entitled to qualified immunity because it was not clear whether the CBA was in effect at the time the plaintiffs were terminated and, therefore, whether they were just-cause employees with due process rights. The district court denied Atkins's motion for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity as to claims brought against Atkins in her individual capacity, except with regard to three plaintiffs, as to whom the motion was granted. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the district court's order denying Atkins qualified immunity as to the other plaintiffs' claims.
The plaintiffs are former employees of the 36th District who were also members of a collective bargaining unit represented by the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees Council 25 and its affiliated Local 3308 ("AFSCME").
AFSCME entered into a CBA with the 36th District on behalf of court employees. Article 12 of the CBA provided that employees could be disciplined "only for just cause." Article 8 described a five-step procedure by which employees could present grievances to the 36th District. Pursuant to Steps 1 through 3, employees could submit grievances, both orally and in writing, and meet with representatives from the 36th District to discuss their complaints. At Step 4, employees could submit their grievances to the Court Administrator or a designated representative, who would conduct a meeting of the relevant parties. In cases involving suspension or discharge, either partycould request the other party to produce evidence, including witnesses, at the meeting or "as soon thereafter as practicable." If a grievance remained unresolved after Step 4, Step 5 permitted a party to demand arbitration.
The initial term of the CBA was July 1, 2001 to June 30, 2006. Article 50 addressed the CBA's termination:
On March 1, 2006, James Meadows, the 36th District's interim director of human resources, wrote a letter to Beverly Harris, the president of AFSCME, notifying her "of the Court's intent to modify, amend, or terminate all or parts of the [CBA]." The 36th District and AFSCME later disputed whether Meadows's letter was sufficient to terminate the CBA or whether the CBA remained in effect after June 30, 2006. The parties submitted this issue to an arbitrator and litigated the issue in Michigan courts. On February 28, 2012, the Michigan Court of Appeals ruled that Meadows's letter did not terminate the CBA. 36th Dist. Court v. AFSCME Local 917, 815 N.W.2d 494, 507 (Mich. Ct. App. 2012), rev'd in part on other grounds, appeal denied in part, 821 N.W.2d 786 (Mich. 2012). The parties now agree that the CBA did not terminate until June 2009.
Between February 2007 and February 2009, the 36th District terminated the plaintiffs for engaging in a variety of alleged misconduct. The plaintiffs submitted grievances to the 36th District, and the federal district court found that in all but four cases, the plaintiffs' grievances were processed through Step 4. The plaintiffs demanded arbitration, but the 36th District refused to arbitrate. In its communications to the plaintiffs denying arbitration, the 36th District indicated that "[i]t is the Court's position that the March 1, 2006 letter to Local 3308 constituted an effective notice to terminate the Labor Agreement" and that "the Court has no obligation to proceed to arbitration on a termination case, where the termination occurred after the June 30, 2006 termination of the Labor Agreement." The 36th District reiterated this position in its communications with arbitrators requesting that the plaintiffs' grievances not be scheduled for arbitration.
The plaintiffs brought suit in federal district court against the 36th District and Atkins under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that they were terminated from their positions without due process of law. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The district court denied the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment. It granted summary judgment to the 36th District and dismissed claims for damages brought against Atkins in her official capacity on the basis of sovereign immunity. It denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity as to claims brought against Atkins in her individual capacity, except with regard to plaintiffs Yolanda Johnson, Yvonne Malvaux, and Donnita Cleveland, as to whom the motion wasgranted.1 Atkins now appeals the district court's denial of qualified immunity as to the other plaintiffs' claims.
"The appeal of a denial of qualified immunity is an interlocutory appeal that this Court hears as a final decision of the district court under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 pursuant to the 'collateral order' doctrine." Gregory v. City of Louisville, 444 F.3d 725, 742 (6th Cir. 2006) (citing Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 525-27 (1985)). We review a district court's denial of summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity de novo. Walker v. Davis, 649 F.3d 502, 503 (6th Cir. 2011) (citing Harrison v. Ash, 539 F.3d 510, 516 (6th Cir. 2008)). Summary judgment is proper where no genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed R. Civ. P. 56(a). In considering a motion for summary judgment, we construe all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).
Qualified immunity protects government officials from liability "when a reasonable official in the defendant's position would not have understood his or her actions to violate a person's constitutional rights." Meals v. City of Memphis, 493 F.3d 720, 729 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 807 (1982)). "Under the doctrine of qualified immunity, 'government officials performing discretionary functions[] generally are shielded from liability for civil damagesinsofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.'" Id. (quoting Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818).
In Saucier v. Katz, the Supreme Court established a two-step inquiry for determining whether an official is entitled to qualified immunity. 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). A court must consider (1) whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the injured party, a constitutional right has been violated; and (2) whether that right was clearly established. Id. In Pearson v. Callahan, the Supreme Court held that while the sequence set forth in Katz is often appropriate, it is not mandatory, and courts have discretion to decide which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis to address first. 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009).
In Feathers v. Aey, we established a three-part test for evaluating qualified immunity defenses:
First, we determine whether, based upon the applicable law, the facts viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs show that a constitutional violation has occurred. Second, we consider whether the violation involved a clearly established constitutional right of which a reasonable person would have known. Third, we determine whether the plaintiff has offered sufficient evidence "to indicate that what the official allegedly did was objectively unreasonable in light of the clearly established constitutional rights."
319 F.3d 843, 848 (6th Cir. 2003) (quoting Williams v. Mehra, 186 F.3d 685, 691 (6th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (citations omitted)); see also Estate of Carter v. City of Detroit, 408 F.3d 305, 310 n.2 (6th Cir. 2005) ().
Once a defendant raises the qualified immunity defense, the burden is on the plaintiff to...
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