Rodgers v. Bennett

• Decision Date: 23 July 1963
• Docket Number: No. 17185.,17185.
• Citation: 320 F.2d 83
• Parties: Anthon Jay RODGERS, Appellant, v. John E. BENNETT, Warden, Iowa State Penitentiary, Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

320 F.2d 83 (1963)

Anthon Jay RODGERS, Appellant, v. John E. BENNETT, Warden, Iowa State Penitentiary, Appellee.

No. 17185.

United States Court of Appeals Eighth Circuit.

July 23, 1963.

Anthon Jay Rodgers, pro se.

Evan L. Hultman, Atty. Gen. of State of Iowa, Des Moines, Iowa, for appellee.

Before VOGEL, VAN OOSTERHOUT and RIDGE, Circuit Judges.

RIDGE, Circuit Judge.

Appellant, an inmate of the Iowa State Penitentiary, appeals from an order of the District Court dismissing, without a hearing, his petition for writ of habeas corpus allowed to be filed in forma pauperis.

In 1956, petitioner was convicted on his plea of guilty entered in the District Court for Kossuth County, Iowa, for the crime of robbery, with aggravation, and sentenced to serve not more than twenty-five (25) years as provided by Section 711.2, Code of Iowa, I.C.A. No appeal was taken from that judgment and sentence. However, in 1960, appellant filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the District Court for Lee County, Iowa, seeking release from his sentence on the same grounds that he alleges as his claim of right to a writ in the case at bar. The State court denied his petition and its decision was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Iowa. Rodgers v. Bennett, Warden, 252 Iowa 191, 105 N.W.2d 507 (1960). Appellant's petition for writ of certiorari filed in the Supreme Court of the United States was denied April 17, 1961, 365 U.S. 884, 81 S.Ct. 1035, 6 L.Ed. 2d 194.

In June 1962, appellant filed another petition for writ of habeas corpus, in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa. That petition was denied without a hearing and without any response being required to be made thereto by appellee. It is from that judgment that appellant prosecutes the instant appeal.

It is not deemed necessary to make a detailed statement of the factual allegations as they appear in the petition for writ of habeas corpus as filed in the case at bar. Suffice to say, the crux thereof is, appellant claims he was coerced and induced to enter a plea of guilty to the charge for which he was sentenced, and is now serving, through fraud and trickery by his court-appointed counsel, acting in collusion with the County Sheriff, County Attorney, and a member of the State Bureau of Criminal Investigation, to get him to enter such a plea, and that his sentencing Court was incompetent to give him a fair and impartial hearing and to pass sentence upon him.

From the written memorandum order filed by the District Court denying appellant's petition for writ of habeas corpus, it appears that that Court did recognize some issues raised by appellant in relation to his claim of incompetency of his sentencing Court and petitioner's court-appointed counsel, but it found the same to be factually insufficient to support such issue. It considered that matter to be based on mere conclusions, insufficient to rebut the "presumption of competence" afforded such officers of the State Court under the law. Further, that petitioner's allegation "that fraud and trickery was used to induce him to plead guilty" to the charge made against him was not sustained by "facts alleged other than general claims of collusion and ignorance as to what he was signing" at the time he entered his written plea of guilty. From that premise alone the District Court "found that there was no fraud or trickery used in obtaining (his) plea of guilty such as to warrant the granting of a writ of habeas corpus" as here prayed. Hence, it appears that the District Court in the case at bar did more than merely rule that petitioner's application for a writ was insufficient. It, in fact, adjudicated a matter as to which it had heard no evidence.

Appellant's motion to vacate that judgment was subsequently denied. He then filed in the District Court a motion for leave to appeal in forma pauperis which was granted. In so doing, the Court did not in "express terms issue to appellant a certificate of probable cause" as required by Section 2253, Title 28, U.S. C.A. "Since the order granting leave so to appeal would be without any significance except as it was intended to constitute a certificate of probable cause," this Court in its discretion disregarded that irregularity and in the interests of justice treated the certificate of the District Court "as having been so intended and so implied, and the Clerk of this Court (was) accordingly directed to docket this appeal without payment of (the usual) fee." (Order, October 16, 1962, case at bar.)

In the order by which we so acquired jurisdiction of this appeal it was noted:

"Appellant\'s application for a writ of habeas corpus makes conclusionary allegations which have been expanded into detailed assertions of fact in the brief filed in purported support of (his) application."

However, it appearing that the asserted facts had "not been made the subject of legal responsibility on the part of appellant" through oath made by him and because of the "unusual nature of the statements made," we ordered that this cause be "remanded to the District Court with directions that (it) order appellant to file in that court and have made a part of the record herein an affidavit as to the truth of...