Rodgers v. Commercial Cas. Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 16 February 1939
• Docket Number: 4 Div. 74.
• Citation: 186 So. 684,237 Ala. 301
• Parties: RODGERS v COMMERCIAL CASUALTY INS. CO.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

186 So. 684

237 Ala. 301

RODGERS v COMMERCIAL CASUALTY INS. CO.

4 Div. 74.

Supreme Court of Alabama

February 16, 1939

Appeal from Circuit Court, Houston County; D. C. Halstead, Judge.

Action on a policy of accident insurance by Robert H. Rodgers against the Commercial Casualty Insurance Company. From a judgment for defendant, plaintiff appeals.

Transferred from Court of Appeals under Code 1923, § 7326.

Affirmed.

Martin & Jackson, of Dothan, for appellant.

Tompkins & Ramsey, of Dothan, for appellee.

GARDNER Justice.

Plaintiff was the husband of Helen R. Rodgers, and the named beneficiary in an accident insurance policy, which contained the following clause:

"Section C. Or against loss of life.... $250.00 provided bodily injury effected as stated herein shall be the sole cause of the death of the insured within thirty days from the date of the event causing such injury and occurs:

"By being struck or knocked down or run over while walking across a public highway, on regular crossings at highway intersections only, by a vehicle propelled by steam cable, electricity, naphtha, gasoline, horse, compressed air or liquid power, excluding injuries sustained while on a railroad roadbed in violation of any statute or of any regulation of the railroad company".

Insured was killed when struck by an automobile a short distance from Ariton, Alabama, while walking on what is known as the Bee Line Highway, and at the time was on the pavement of said highway, some few feet from its south side. The highway runs east and west. Insured and her husband were driving west, and parked the car on the right or north side of the highway, a short distance from an abandoned filling station, which was on the north side of the highway. Diagonally across the highway, in a southeasterly direction and on the south side was a toilet for ladies (so designated), and insured was crossing the highway on her way to the toilet when struck by the automobile.

The trial judge, upon conclusion of the evidence, gave for the defendant the affirmative charge upon the theory the place where insured met her death was not such a location as came within the coverage of the above noted clause of the policy. We are persuaded he correctly so determined.

Plaintiff lays much stress upon the accepted rule that doubtful terms in an insurance policy are to be construed favorably to the insured. 32 Corpus Juris 1147; John Hancock Life Ins. Co. v. Schroder, 235 Ala. 655, 180 So. 327.

But we have often had occasion to observe that true intent governs insurance contracts the same as others, and that though doubtful terms are to be construed in favor of the insured, yet no strained construction should be indulged to raise doubt. Life & Casualty Ins. Co. v. Bottoms, 225 Ala. 382, 143 So. 574; Hill v. Ocean Accident & G. Corp., 230 Ala. 590, 162 So. 376.

The policy here sued upon, as disclosed upon the face, is a "limited policy." It was issued upon consideration of a premium of one dollar a year, and the company's liability is hedged about by many limitations. Illustrative of these restrictions upon such liability is the provision embraced in the clause C here involved as to death by drowning. For liability to attach the insured must have been drowned at a public bathing beach or public swimming pool "while a life guard is on duty." If no life guard, there is no liability. Our cases recognize the same right of insurance companies (statutory provisions to one side) as individuals to limit their liability and to impose such conditions as they wish upon their obligations, not inconsistent with public policy, and that the courts are without right to add to or subtract therefrom. The companies have a right to write contracts with narrow coverage, and a small premium fixed on careful calculation of the hazard assumed. And we have said, speaking of such contracts, that "they should be enforced, not a new or enlarged contract made for the parties." Loveman, Joseph and Loeb v. Amsterdam Cas. Co., 233 Ala. 518, 173 So. 7, 10.

The policy here sued upon is of this character--one with very limited coverage, and we think it would be a strained and unreasonable interpretation of the contract to hold the place where insured was killed was within the meaning of the language of clause C of the policy. To the south of the highway was a path about three feet in width, which ran a length of forty feet to the toilet. It had been used by the public for twelve years. On the north side of the highway around the filling station, the ground was clear and no path appeared. There was of course no marking of any character on the pavement. True, people doubtless traveled across the highway from the filling station into the path to the toilet but neither the surface of the...