Rodgers v. Comso, Inc.
| Decision Date | 03 April 2020 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. ELH-19-3268 |
| Parties | KRISTIN RODGERS Plaintiff, v. COMSO, INC., et al., Defendants |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Maryland |
In a First Amended Complaint alleging employment discrimination, plaintiff Kristin Rodgers has sued COMSO, Inc. ("COMSO"); Eagle Alliance ("EA"); CSRA, Inc. ("CSRA"); and General Dynamics Information Technology ("General Dynamics" or "GDIT"). ECF 13 (the "Amended Complaint"). She asserts that she was "jointly employed by COMSO and EA/CSRA." Id. at 4. Further, she alleges that EA/CSRA is "now GDIT." See id. ¶ 40.
In particular, Rodgers alleges claims of sex discrimination (Count I) and retaliation (Count II), in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. According to plaintiff, she worked for defendants as a Service Desk Technician with respect to a contract with the National Security Agency ("NSA"); she was terminated because of her gender; and defendants prevented her from obtaining any other work opportunities, in retaliation for engaging in civil rights activities protected under Title VII.
COMSO has moved to dismiss the Amended Complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). ECF 19.1 The motion is supported by a memorandum (ECF 20) (collectively, the "Motion") and one exhibit. ECF 20-1. Plaintiff opposes the Motion (ECF 23,the "Opposition") and has submitted two exhibits. ECF 23-1 and ECF 23-2. Defendant has replied. ECF 31.
The Motion is fully briefed, and no hearing is necessary to resolve it. See Local Rule 105.6. For the reasons that follow, I shall grant the Motion.
According to plaintiff, COMSO is incorporated and headquartered in Maryland. ECF 13, ¶ 15. And, at the relevant time, EA was owned by CSRA. Further, she asserts that in April 2018, General Dynamics, a Virginia corporation headquartered in Virginia, id. ¶18, "acquired CSRA (and therefore EA) . . . ." Id. ¶ 17. Therefore, she asserts that GDIT is liable for damages caused by EA and CSRA. Id.
During the relevant time, COMSO and EA/CSRA had a contract with the NSA. See id. ¶ 19. EA/CSRA was allegedly the "prime contractor on the NSA contract," id. ¶ 20, while COMSO was a "subcontractor." Id. ¶ 21.3
On August 27, 2013, COMSO hired Ms. Rodgers to serve as a Service Desk Technician with respect to the NSA contract. Id. ¶¶ 19, 22. Although COMSO paid plaintiff's salary, she was supervised by employees of both COMSO and EA/CSRA, including an EA/CSRA Manager and Operations Lead, and she performed her work at an EA/CSRA facility. Id. ¶ 22.
Plaintiff claims that she performed her job satisfactorily and never received any disciplinary infractions from either COMSO or EA/CSRA. Id. ¶ 23. However, on August 5, 2016, COMSO informed Ms. Rodgers that EA/CSRA had terminated her employment, effective immediately. Id. ¶ 24. COMSO allegedly "did not contest EA/CSRA's decision to fire Ms. Rodgers." Id. ¶ 28.
At the time, COMSO offered no grounds for the termination. Id. A few days later, COMSO told Ms. Rodgers that she had been fired because she was often late, had a "bad attitude," and was not completing work tickets. Id. ¶ 25. According to plaintiff, this explanation is "false and prextext for discrimination." Id.
Ms. Rodgers asserts that, around the time of her termination, EA/CSRA also fired another female Service Desk Technician. Id. ¶ 26. Yet, EA/CSRA did not terminate two male Service Desk Technicians, notwithstanding that these employees had been "written up for multiple infractions." Id. ¶ 27. Instead, EA/CSRA placed the male employees on a two-week probationary period. Id. Further, plaintiff alleges that her EA/CSRA manager "had a history of inappropriate behavior towards women and displayed an animus towards women." Id. ¶ 30.
Ms. Rodgers advised COMSO's Program Manager toward the end of August 2016, that she planned to file a Charge of Discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). Id. ¶ 31. In response, COMSO's Program Manager allegedly said, "'I wish you wouldn't do that or you'll get blackballed.'" Id.
Plaintiff submitted an EEOC Intake Questionnaire on September 2, 2016. Id. ¶ 4; ECF 23-1 ("EEOC Questionnaire"). Soon after, on September 8, 2016, Ms. Rodgers completed an intake interview with an EEOC employee. ECF 13, ¶ 5. The same day, she filed a Charge of Discrimination, alleging sex discrimination. Id. ¶ 6. She identified EA/CSRA as her employer.Id. According to plaintiff, COMSO and EA/CSRA received notice of her charge of discrimination shortly thereafter. Id. ¶ 33.
In response to plaintiff's charge, COMSO and EA/CSRA allegedly "prevented" plaintiff "from obtaining another position on the NSA contract." Id. ¶ 34. According to plaintiff, beginning in September 2016, COMSO told her "that they recommended her for several administrative positions on EA/CSRA contracts," yet she was "turned down for each position." Id. ¶ 35. Further, in November 2016, COMSO told plaintiff that it had recommend her for a systems administrator position on a different EA/CSRA contract. Id. ¶ 36. But, COMSO told plaintiff that EA/CSRA "was not interested because they knew who she was, and that [she] was not allowed to return to EA/CSRA." Id. Plaintiff also alleges that in August 2019, EA/CSRA claimed that COMSO had disqualified her from positions, not EA/CSRA. Id. ¶ 37.
Plaintiff contacted the EEOC on November 3, 2016, due to "concerns of retaliation." Id. ¶ 7. Plaintiff alleges that the EEOC "drafted a separate charge" for her, based on retaliation, and again listed EA/CSRA as her employer. Id. She signed that Charge on the same date. Id.
On February 2, 2017, the EEOC transferred Ms. Rodger's case to the Maryland Commission on Civil Rights ("MCCR"). Id. ¶ 8. During its investigation, MCCR allegedly determined that the charges drafted by the EEOC should have included COMSO as one of plaintiff's joint employers. Id. ¶ 9. MCCR drafted a third Charge on September 29, 2017, specifically "naming COMSO as an employer." Id. ¶ 10. Plaintiff signed it on September 29, 2017. Id.; see ECF 20-1 ("MCCR Charge").
Plaintiff alleges that the EEOC issued a Notice of Right to Sue on February 22, 2019, but she never received it. ECF 13, ¶ 11; ECF 23-2 at 8. Plaintiff contacted the EEOC to inquire and,on August 15, 2019, EEOC Investigator George Collins confirmed her call. ECF 13, ¶ 12; ECF 23-2 at 4. He also provided her with a copy of the right-to-sue letter. ECF 23-2 at 4.
This lawsuit was filed on November 13, 2019. ECF 1. Plaintiff asserts that the EEOC issued a Second Notice of Right to Sue, which she received on December 26, 2019. ECF 13, ¶¶ 12, 13.
Additional facts are included, infra.
Under Rule 12(b)(1), the plaintiff bears the burden of proving, by a preponderance of evidence, the existence of subject matter jurisdiction. See Demetres v. E. W. Const., Inc., 776 F.3d 271, 272 (4th Cir. 2015); see also The Piney Run Preservation Ass'n v. Cty. Comm'rs of Carroll Cty., 523 F.3d 453, 459 (4th Cir. 2008); Evans v. B.F. Perkins Co., 166 F.3d 642, 647 (4th Cir. 1999). A challenge to subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) may proceed "in one of two ways": either a facial challenge or a factual challenge. Kerns v. United States, 585 F.3d 187, 192 (4th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted); accord Hutton v. Nat'l Bd. of Exam'rs Inc., 892 F.3d 613, 620-21 (4th Cir. 2018); Durden v. United States, 736 F.3d 296, 300 (4th Cir. 2013).
In a facial challenge, "the defendant must show that a complaint fails to allege facts upon which subject-matter jurisdiction can be predicated." Hutton, 892 F.3d at 621 n.7 (citing Beck v. McDonald, 848 F.3d 262, 270 (4th Cir. 2017)); see also Kerns, 585 F.3d at 192. Alternatively, in a factual challenge, "the defendant maintains that the jurisdictional allegations of the complaint are not true." Hutton, 892 F.3d at 621 n.7 (citing Beck, 848 F.3d at 270). In that circumstance, the court "may regard the pleadings as mere evidence on the issue and may consider evidence outside the pleadings without converting the proceeding to one for summary judgment." Velascov. Gov't of Indonesia, 370 F.3d 392, 398 (4th Cir. 2004); see also Beck, 848 F.3d at 270; In re KBR, Inc., Burn Pit Litig., 744 F.3d 326, 333 (4th Cir. 2014); Evans, 166 F.3d at 647.
COMSO challenges the Court's subject matter jurisdiction on the ground that plaintiff failed to exhaust her administrative remedies. ECF 20 at 7-15. However, a plaintiff's failure to exhaust her administrative remedies before filing a Title VII claim does not strip a court of jurisdiction. In the case of Fort Bend County v. Davis, ___ U.S. ___, 139 S. Ct. 1843 (2019), the Supreme Court held that exhaustion under Title VII is not jurisdictional. Id. at 1846. Instead, the Court explained that administrative exhaustion is a "claim-processing rule[] that must be timely raised to come into play." Id. Accordingly, whether plaintiff has satisfied the exhaustion requirement is not properly assessed under Rule 12(b)(1).
A defendant may test the legal sufficiency of a complaint by way of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). Paradise Wire & Cable Defined Benefit Pension Plan v. Weil, 918 F.3d 312, 317 (4th Cir. 2019); In re Birmingham, 846 F.3d 88, 92 (4th Cir. 2017); Goines v. Valley Cmty. Servs. Bd, 822 F.3d 159, 165-66 (4th Cir. 2016); McBurney v. Cuccinelli, 616 F.3d 393, 408 (4th Cir. 2010), aff'd sub nom., McBurney v. Young, 569 U.S. 221 (2013); Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 243 (4th Cir. 1999). A Rule 12(b)(6) motion constitutes an assertion by a defendant that, even if the facts alleged by a plaintiff are true, the complaint fails as a matter of law "to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
Whether a complaint states a claim for relief is assessed by reference to the pleading requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P....
To continue reading
Request your trial