Rodgers v. Curators of University of Missouri
| Decision Date | 03 February 1998 |
| Docket Number | No. 96-2989,96-2989 |
| Parties | Matthew Duke RODGERS, Appellant, v. The CURATORS OF the UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI; Charles Geiss; James Parker; Ray Dockweiler; Jenice Stewart, Jo Behymer; Suzanne Holland; Wanda Kent, Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit |
Thomas C. Jones, Kansas City, MO, argued (Bryan E. Round, on the brief), for Appellant.
Ann Mesle, Kansas City, MO, argued (J.A. Felton, William J. Powell and Sandra Colhour, on the brief), for Appellees.
Before McMILLIAN, FLOYD R. GIBSON and JOHN R. GIBSON,
Matthew Duke Rodgers ("appellant") appeals from a final order of the district court 1 dismissing his action with prejudice pursuant to Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure for failure to prosecute and follow court orders, and awarding attorneys' fees in favor of The Curators of the University of Missouri, Charles Geiss, James Parker, Ray Dockweiler, Jenice P. Stewart, Jo Behymer, Suzanne Holland, and Wanda Kent (collectively, "appellees"). For reversal, Rodgers argues that the district court (1) abused its discretion in failing to consider lesser sanctions and (2) erroneously found that his conduct was "wilful." For the reasons discussed below, we affirm the order of the district court.
Jurisdiction was proper in the district court based upon 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367. Jurisdiction on appeal is proper based upon 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The notice of appeal was timely filed under Rule 4(a) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure.
The following facts are derived from the findings of the district court and the record on appeal. On May 14, 1989, appellant, then a student at the University of Missouri at Columbia ("University"), was in an automobile accident in which he suffered serious head injuries. Upon returning to the University in 1990, Rodgers requested accommodation for his injury-related learning difficulties.
On July 11, 1994, appellant filed suit in federal district court against appellees alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 701 et seq. In brief, appellant claimed that the University neglected his needs and failed to provide the accommodations that he requested or, alternatively, provided inadequate accommodations. On June 10, 1996, the district court dismissed appellant's action with prejudice, pursuant to Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and awarded attorneys' fees in favor of appellees. 2
The circumstances which occasioned the district court's dismissal occurred over a two-year period (following the filing of appellant's complaint) in which appellant repeatedly disregarded orders of the district court. First, appellant failed to comply in a timely fashion with the district court's order to produce certain material documents (, bank and income tax records) that appellees had sought unsuccessfully from appellant since 1995. Instead, appellant sporadically produced selected documents, some of which were not produced until March 29, 1996, the day of the hearing on the district court's order to show cause why the action should not be dismissed for appellant's violation of discovery orders.
Second, appellant failed to appear at a properly-noticed, court-ordered deposition. On April 12, 1996, appellees informed the district court that appellant had been only partially deposed and certain aspects of the litigation required further inquiry. The district court subsequently ordered appellant to complete his deposition with appellees on April 22, 1996. 3 However, appellant failed to appear at his deposition.
Finally, appellant violated a court order prohibiting him from firing his fourth set of counsel. Specifically, during a scheduling conference on October 5, 1995, the district court forewarned appellant via his then-current counsel, Lynn Bratcher, that his case would be dismissed with prejudice if he should fire her. The following exchange occurred:
Joint Appendix ("J.A.") at 119 (). Bratcher subsequently informed appellant in writing that her withdrawal would trigger the dismissal of his case with prejudice. Specifically, Bratcher wrote: J.A. at 213 (Exhibit E of Motion to Reconsider, Letter from Bratcher to appellant of Oct. 6, 1995, at 1).
Despite this warning, on April 21, 1996, appellant fired Bratcher. By that time, four sets of counsel had withdrawn and been replaced as attorneys-of-record in appellant's suit. As a result of these changes in counsel and the new issues raised in appellant's amended complaints, the district court extended the discovery cut-off date five times and reset the trial date three times.
On April 29, 1996, appellees moved to dismiss appellant's action with prejudice pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b). 4 The next day, appellant obtained his fifth and current set of counsel. On June 10, 1996, the district court granted appellees' motion, finding that appellant had deliberately violated court orders and engaged in dilatory conduct, that appellant's conduct had prejudiced appellees by inhibiting their preparation for trial and compelling the expenditure of scarce educational resources, that the imposition of lesser sanctions would be ineffective and unjustified, and that appellant's conduct was conscious, intentional, taken deliberately for tactical gain, and had the effect of attacking the integrity of the court. More specifically, the district court found that appellant was dilatory in his prosecution of the case based on his filing a second amended complaint, which significantly expanded the scope of the litigation, and his repeated change of counsel. J.A. at 119-20 (Order at 3-4).
On June 25, 1996, appellant filed a motion for reconsideration of the district court's order of dismissal. Appellant's motion was denied on July 15, 1996. This appeal followed.
Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a district court may dismiss a case for failure to prosecute a claim or comply with court orders; unless otherwise specified, such dismissal operates as an adjudication on the merits. Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b); Brown v. Frey, 806 F.2d 801 (8th Cir.1986) (Brown ). This court reviews a Rule 41(b) dismissal under an abuse of discretion standard. Wright v. Sargent, 869 F.2d 1175, 1176 (8th Cir.1989) (per curiam). When reviewing under this standard, this court employs a balancing test that focuses foremost upon "the degree of egregious conduct which prompted the order of dismissal and to a lesser extent upon the adverse impact of such conduct upon both the defendant and the administration of justice in the district court." Omaha Indian Tribe v. Tract I--Blackbird Bend Area, 933 F.2d 1462, 1468 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 942, 112 S.Ct. 379, 116 L.Ed.2d 331 (1991) (Omaha Tribe ) (citations omitted). Moreover, the sanction imposed by the district court must be proportionate to the litigant's transgression. See Mann v. Lewis, 108 F.3d 145, 147 (8th Cir.1997) (citing Moore v. St. Louis Music Supply Co., Inc., 539 F.2d 1191, 1194 (8th Cir.1976) (Moore )).
"Dismissal with prejudice is an extreme sanction and should be used only in cases of wilful disobedience of a court order or ... persistent failure to prosecute a complaint." Givens, 751 F.2d at 263 (emphasis added). Thus, where, as here, a case has been dismissed with prejudice, this court considers "whether in the particular circumstances of the case the needs of the court in advancing a crowded docket and preserving respect for the integrity of its internal procedures are sufficient to justify the harsh consequences of forever denying a litigant his day in court." Moore, 539 F.2d at 1193. However, the district court need not have found that appellant acted in bad faith, only that he acted intentionally as opposed to accidentally or involuntarily. E.g., Welsh v. Automatic Poultry Feeder Co., 439 F.2d 95, 97 (8th Cir.1971).
The district court's determination that appellant wilfully disregarded court orders and engaged in intentional delay is a finding of fact, and hence is subject to the clearly erroneous standard of review. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(a). The clearly erroneous standard applies "even when the district court's findings do not rest on credibility determinations, but are based instead on physical or documentary evidence or inferences from other facts." Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 574, 105 S.Ct. 1504, 1511-12, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985) (Anderson ); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(a). Thus, we may not overturn the district court's factual findings merely because we might have concluded differently had we initially decided the issue. Rather, a finding is clearly erroneous only when, "even though there is evidence in the record to support it, the reviewing court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed." Anderson, 470 U.S. at 573, 105 S.Ct. at 1511.
Appellant argues that the district court abused its discretion in dismissing his action with prejudice and thereby permanently barring him from pursuing his claims against appellees. Specifically, Rodgers charges that dismissal was inappropriate because the court's decision was based, in part, on the erroneous finding that his conduct was wilful. In addition,...
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