THOMAS, Judge.
Dawn Elizabeth Rodgers ("the wife") and Robert Joseph Rodgers ("the husband") were married in December 1991. The parties have two children. The parties separated in May 2012, when the wife moved out of the marital residence; however, the testimony at trial established that the parties had not had marital relations in quite some time before the wife left the marital residence.
The wife filed in the Madison Circuit Court a complaint seeking a divorce in August 2014. The parties settled several aspects of the divorce, including dividing the husband's various retirement and/or investment accounts, the parties' several automobiles, and their personal property. At the trial, which was held in April 2015, the trial court considered, among other things, the issues of custody, child support, periodic alimony, and the division of the marital residence. On July 1, 2015, the trial court entered a judgment of divorce, which, among other things, incorporated the parties' settlement agreement, awarded the parties joint custody of the children, ordered the husband to pay $1,418 per month in child support, ordered the marital residence to be sold and the proceeds, after certain deductions, including an award to the husband of an amount equal to half of the 2015 income-tax refund procured by the wife, to be divided equally. The judgment did not order the husband to pay the wife alimony, reserve the issue of periodic alimony, or require the husband to purchase life insurance naming the wife as beneficiary. The wife filed a postjudgment motion, arguing several issues; the trial court amended the judgment to order the husband to secure life insurance naming the wife as beneficiary and reserved the issue of periodic alimony but left all other aspects of the July 1, 2015, judgment unchanged. The wife has appealed the judgment, arguing that the trial court erred by not awarding her periodic alimony.
"Under Alabama law, periodic alimony consists of regular installment payments made from one spouse to another to enable the recipient spouse, to the extent possible, to maintain his or her standard of living as it existed during the marriage, i.e., the ‘economic status quo.’ Orr v. Orr, 374 So.2d 895, 897 (Ala.Civ.App.1979). A divorcing spouse is not automatically entitled to periodic alimony, Beckwith v. Beckwith, 475 So.2d 575, 577 (Ala.Civ.App.1985) (holding that periodic alimony is not mandatory), but the decision whether to award periodic alimony rests in the sound judicial discretion of the trial court. Bush v. Bush, 784 So.2d 299, 300 (Ala.Civ.App.2000).
"In exercising its discretion, the trial court is guided by equitable considerations. SeeKillingsworth v. Killingsworth, 925 So.2d 977, 983 (Ala.Civ.App.2005). This court and our supreme court have enumerated the many factors trial courts must consider when weighing the propriety of an award of periodic alimony, Edwards v. Edwards, 26 So.3d 1254, 1259 (Ala.Civ.App.2009), which include: the length of the marriage, Stone v. Stone, 26 So.3d 1232, 1236 (Ala.Civ.App.2009) ; the standard of living to which the parties became accustomed during the marriage, Washington v. Washington, 24 So.3d 1126, 1135–36 (Ala.Civ.App.2009) ; the relative fault of the parties for the breakdown of the marriage, Lackey v. Lackey, 18 So.3d 393, 401 (Ala.Civ.App.2009) ; the age and health of the parties, Ex parte Elliott, 782 So.2d 308, 311 (Ala.2000) ; and the future employment prospects of the parties, Baggett v. Baggett, 855 So.2d 556, 559 (Ala.Civ.App.2003). In weighing those factors, a trial court essentially determines whether the petitioning spouse has demonstrated a need for continuing monetary support to sustain the former, marital standard of living that the responding spouse can and, under the circumstances, should meet. SeeGates v. Gates, 830 So.2d 746, 749–50 (Ala.Civ.App.2002) ; Hewitt v. Hewitt, 637 So.2d 1382, 1384 (Ala.Civ.App.1994) (‘The failure to award alimony, although discretionary, is arbitrary and capricious when the needs of the wife are shown to merit an award and the husband has the ability to pay.’).
"A petitioning spouse proves a need for periodic alimony by showing that without such financial support he or she will be unable to maintain the parties' former marital lifestyle. SeePickett v. Pickett, 723 So.2d 71, 74 (Ala.Civ.App.1998) (Thompson, J., with one judge concurring and two judges concurring in the result). As a necessary condition to an award of periodic alimony, a petitioning spouse should first establish the standard and mode of living of the parties during the marriage and the nature of the financial costs to the parties of maintaining that station in life. See, e.g., Miller v. Miller, 695 So.2d 1192, 1194 (Ala.Civ.App.1997) ; and Austin v. Austin, 678 So.2d 1129, 1131 (Ala.Civ.App.1996). The petitioning spouse should then establish his or her inability to achieve that same standard of living through the use of his or her own individual assets, including his or her own separate estate, the marital property received as part of any settlement or property division, and his or her own wage-earning capacity, seeMiller v. Miller, supra, with the last factor taking into account the age, health, education, and work experience of the petitioning spouse as well as prevailing economic conditions, seeDeShazo v. DeShazo, 582 So.2d 564, 565 (Ala.Civ.App.1991), and any rehabilitative alimony or other benefits that will assist the petitioning spouse in obtaining and maintaining gainful employment. SeeTreusdell v. Treusdell, 671 So.2d 699, 704 (Ala.Civ.App.1995). If the use of his or her assets and wage-earning capacity allows the petitioning spouse to routinely meet only part of the financial costs associated with maintaining the parties' former marital standard of living, the petitioning spouse has proven a need for additional support and maintenance that is measured by that shortfall. SeeScott v. Scott, 460 So.2d 1331, 1332 (Ala.Civ.App.1984).
"Once the financial need of the petitioning spouse is established, the trial court should consider the ability of the responding spouse to meet that need. SeeHerboso v. Herboso, 881 So.2d 454, 458 (Ala.Civ.App.2003). The ability to pay may be proven by showing that the responding spouse has a sufficient separate estate, following the division of the marital property, see § 30–2–51(a), Ala.Code 1975, and/or sufficient earning capacity to consistently provide the petitioning spouse with the necessary funds to enable him or her to maintain the parties' former marital standard of living. Herboso, supra. In considering the responding spouse's ability to pay, the trial court should take into account all the financial obligations of the responding spouse, including those obligations created by the divorce judgment. SeeO'Neal v. O'Neal, 678 So.2d 161, 164 (Ala.Civ.App.1996). The trial court should also consider the impact an award of periodic alimony will have on the financial condition of the responding spouse and his or her ability to maintain the parties' former marital lifestyle for himself or herself. Id. A responding spouse obviously has the ability to pay if the responding spouse can satisfy the entirety of the petitioning spouse's needs without any undue economic hardship. See, e.g., MacKenzie v. MacKenzie, 486 So.2d 1289, 1292 (Ala.Civ.App.1986). In most cases, however, simply due to the fact that, after separation, former spouses rarely can live as well and as cheaply as they did together, Gates, 830 So.2d at 750, a trial court will find that the responding spouse cannot fully meet the financial needs of the petitioning spouse. Walls v. Walls, 860 So.2d 352, 358 (Ala.Civ.App.2003). In those cases, the trial court should endeavor to determine the amount the responding spouse can fairly pay on a consistent basis. SeeRubert v. Rubert, 709 So.2d 1283, 1285 (Ala.Civ.App.1998).
"After being satisfied that the petitioning spouse has a need for periodic alimony and that the responding spouse has some ability to meet that need, the trial court should consider the equities of the case. The length of the marriage does not determine the right to, or amount of, periodic alimony. Hatley v. Hatley, 51 So.3d 1031, 1035 (Ala.Civ.App.2010). However, the longer the parties have maintained certain living and financial arrangements, the more fair it will seem that those arrangements should be maintained beyond the divorce to the extent possible. SeeEdwards v. Edwards, 410 So.2d 91, 93 (Ala.Civ.App.1982). The trial court should also give due regard to the history of the marriage and the various economic and noneconomic contributions and sacrifices made by the parties during the marriage. SeeHanna v. Hanna, 688 So.2d 887, 891 (Ala.Civ.App.1997). In light of those factors, the trial court should endeavor to avoid leaving the parties in an unconscionably disparate financial position. Jones v. Jones, 596 So.2d 949, 952 (Ala.Civ.App.1992). However, the trial court can consider whether the marriage, and its attendant standard of living, ended due to the greater fault of one of the parties, and, if so, the trial court can adjust the award accordingly. Yohey v. Yohey, 890 So.2d 160, 164–65 (Ala.Civ.App.2004). Lastly, the trial court should consider any and all other circumstances bearing on the fairness of its decision. SeeAshbee v. Ashbee, 431 So.2d 1312, 1313–14 (Ala.Civ.App.1983).
"The determination of whether the petitioning spouse has a need for periodic alimony, of whether the responding spouse has the ability to pay periodic alimony, and of whether equitable principles require adjustments to periodic alimony are all questions
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