Rodgers v. Saxton
| Decision Date | 04 December 1931 |
| Docket Number | 277 |
| Citation | 158 A. 166,305 Pa. 479 |
| Parties | Rodgers (et ux., Appellant), v. Saxton |
| Court | Pennsylvania Supreme Court |
Argued May 26, 1931
Appeal, No. 277, Jan. T., 1931, by plaintiff, from judgment of the Superior Court, Oct. T., 1930, No. 297, reversing judgment of C.P. Franklin Co., Oct. T., 1929, No. 254, in case of Louis M. Rodgers et ux., and his minor children Joseph Rodgers, by his father and next friend, Louis M Rodgers, and Kitty Lou Rodgers, by her father and next friend, Louis M. Rodgers v. Fred F. Saxton. Reversed.
Appeal from Superior Court.
The opinion of the Supreme Court states the facts.
Judgment of common pleas reversed by Superior Court. Catherine G. Rodgers, the wife, appealed.
Error assigned, inter alia, was judgment of Superior Court, quoting it.
The judgment of the Superior Court is reversed and the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County is reinstated and affirmed.
Edmund C. Wingerd, with him J. Glenn Benedict, for appellant. -- The owner of any automobile is not liable for its negligent use to the injury of a stranger, by one to whom he has loaned it and who was in complete control of its operation, although the owner was, at the time of the accident, present in the machine as a guest: Hariety v. Miller, 130 N.W. 336; Scheel v. Shaw, 252 Pa. 451.
The fact that a wife is riding in her automobile with her husband, who is driving, does not of itself show either the relation of principal and agent or of joint enterprise. One who avers a fact to excuse his own misfeasance must prove it: Beatty v. Gilmore, 16 Pa. 462.
The mere fact that the driver of an automobile and a person riding with him are going to the same place does not constitute a joint enterprise so as to make the contributory negligence of the driver imputable to the other: Hoffman v. R.R., 278 Pa. 246; McLaughlin v. R.R., 252 Pa. 32; Dunlap v. P.R.T. Co., 248 Pa. 130; Martin v. P.R.T. Co., 265 Pa. 282.
The extent to which one riding as an invited guest in an automobile should anticipate an impending peril and act in relation thereto depends on the facts of each case and is ordinarily a question for the jury. It is only where the evidence is clear that the court should say, as a matter of law, that the guest was negligent.
Paul M. Crider, with him William S. Hoerner and T. Z. Minehart, for appellee. -- The case in the Supreme Court, which, both by its facts and by its law, rules the case in hand in favor of defendant is that of Strohl v. Levan, 39 Pa. 177. See also Cox v. Wells, 37 Montg. 64; Crouse v. Lubin, 260 Pa. 329; Smith v. Jamison, 89 Pa.Super. 99.
Catherine G. Rodgers would have been held negligent personally under the circumstances had she been a guest and not the owner of the car: Davis v. Ice Co., 285 Pa. 177; Alperdt v. Paige, 292 Pa. 1; Joseph v. Ry., 294 Pa. 315; Martin v. R.R. Co., 265 Pa. 282.
Before FRAZER, C.J., WALLING, SIMPSON, KEPHART, SCHAFFER and MAXEY, JJ.
On August 8, 1928, Louis M. Rodgers was driving eastward on the Lincoln Highway near Chambersburg a sedan owned by his wife, Catherine, who sat in the front seat with him and their two children. All were going to Atlantic City on a vacation, though their immediate destination was Gettysburg. About 3 p.m. this car approached the intersection of the Mercersburg Road with the Lincoln Highway. The estimate of Rodgers' speed varied from his own estimate of 30 or 35 miles an hour to the estimate of others of 50 or 60 miles an hour. The defendant, Fred F. Saxton was driving at the same time a Chevrolet sedan west on the Lincoln Highway. Opposite the intersection of the Mercersburg Road he turned his car to the left across the Lincoln Highway southward and the two cars collided at a point about 18 inches south of the white line in the center of the road. The testimony as to whether Saxton gave any signal or sign of his intention to cross the highway was contradictory. The Saxton car remained in the road and the Rodgers car veered to the right and struck a telephone pole, damaging the car and injuring Mrs. Rodgers, one of the plaintiffs, the present appellant. Mrs. Rodgers testified that she noticed the Saxton car turning toward the Mercersburg Road just as the Rodgers car reached the intersection, and she then said to her husband, "Watch him, Lou." The collision immediately followed and Mrs. Rodgers was rendered unconscious. The jury in their verdict declared that they found Fred F. Saxton guilty of negligence and they found Louis M. Rodgers' negligence contributed to the accident. They returned a verdict for Catherine G. Rodgers, plaintiff, in the sum of $1,527.09. The defendant moved for judgment n.o.v. on the ground that the contributory negligence of Louis M. Rodgers was imputable to her. The court below refused the motion and entered judgment for Mrs. Rodgers on the verdict. An appeal was taken to the Superior Court, which court reversed the court below and entered judgment for the defendant. The case is now before us on appeal from the judgment of the Superior Court.
The Superior Court based its judgment on two propositions: (1) That Mrs. Rodgers and her husband had joint control of the car, not from the fact alone that they were husband and wife, but from "the further proof that she was the owner and an occupant of the car." The Superior Court said on this point: (2) That since Mrs. Rodgers (the passenger) and her husband (the driver) were engaged in the prosecution of a joint enterprise or adventure at the time of the accident, the negligence of Rodgers, the driver, was imputable to his wife, the passenger. The Superior Court said on this point: "At the time of the accident the wife and husband were jointly engaged in a common purpose -- they were mutually interested in going to Gettysburg; that constituted a joint enterprise."
With these two propositions we disagree. A joint or shared control of an automobile in which one is riding as a passenger does not necessarily arise from the passenger's marital relationship with the driver or from the fact that the passenger is the car's owner. The inference that the owner of the car was the bailor and the driver was the bailee is an equally logical inference, and upon a rule for judgment for defendant, n.o.v., the plaintiff must be given the benefit of every fact and inference of fact pertaining to the issues involved which may be reasonably deduced from the evidence: Guilinger v. P.R.R., 304 Pa. 140. Mrs. Rodgers' presence in the car does not exclude, as appellee contends, the theory of bailment. If she delivered that car to her husband, or he took it with her consent, for the purpose of the trip, he was the bailee of it and she was bailor and guest. There is no rule of law which makes a bailment terminable upon the bailor's sharing with the bailee the use and enjoyment of the subject of the bailment. The owner of an automobile is not liable for its negligent use to the injury of a stranger by one to whom he had loaned it and who was in complete control of its operation, although the owner is at the time of the accident present in the machine as a guest: Hartley v. Miller, 130 N.W. 336 (Mich.); Scheel v. Shaw, 252 Pa. 451, 454.
That the relation of principal and agent does not arise from the marital relationship is well settled. "The relation of agency cannot be inferred from mere relationship or family ties unattended by conditions, acts, or conduct clearly implying an agency": 2 Corpus Juris, section 35, page 440. "The agency of the husband for the wife is not to be implied, inferred, or presumed from, or deemed to be created or established by, the marital relation alone; there must be other proof": 30 Corpus Juris, section 171, page 623.
The relation of principal and agent or that of master and servant does not necessarily arise from the fact that the wife owns the car which her husband is driving and in which she is a passenger. It is not unusual for a husband to buy a car for his wife or his child. He may do so merely to give them the pleasure of seeing their initials painted on the door. The husband and father who makes such a gift does not thereby abdicate his legal or factual headship of the family, nor is he excluded from the control of that car when he is sitting in the driver's seat of authority, even though the wife or child who may be the nominal owner is at his side. Nor is the husband-driver necessarily the agent or servant of his wife-passenger even in those cases where the wife herself has purchased the car with her own funds and has registered her ownership. The husband is still...
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