Rodgers v. State
| Decision Date | 26 October 2006 |
| Docket Number | No. SC04-1425.,SC04-1425. |
| Parties | Theodore RODGERS, Jr., Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
James S. Purdy, Public Defender and James R. Wulchak, Chief, Appellate Division, Seventh Judicial Circuit, Daytona Beach, Florida, for Appellant.
Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Barbara C. Davis, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, Florida, for Appellee.
Theodore Rodgers appeals from his judgment of conviction of first-degree murder and sentence of death. We have jurisdiction, see art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. For the reasons explained below, we affirm both.
Based on the testimony presented below, the jury found Theodore Rodgers guilty of the first-degree murder of his wife, Teresa Henderson, and following the penalty phase the court sentenced Rodgers to death.
The testimony and evidence presented during the guilt phase of trial established the following. Theodore Rodgers, then sixty years old, was self-employed in Orlando, installing lawn irrigation systems and doing other plumbing work. On the morning of February 14, 2001, he took his stepson to a court appearance and then went to work on a plumbing job at a customer's (the Jacksons) home. After determining that he needed more supplies, Rodgers drove to the daycare business that his wife Teresa operated and where he stored some materials. As he walked down the interior hallway, his wife's ex-husband ran past him, wearing only a pair of pants and carrying his shirt and shoes. Rodgers confronted his wife, saying that he was leaving her. Then he loaded his supplies and returned to his earlier job.
Later, Rodgers drove to Kissimmee, where he met his longtime friend and occasional business partner James Corbett. Together they estimated a job for a potential client. Rodgers acted normally and did not mention the morning's incident to Corbett. Afterwards, Rodgers drove to his mechanic's shop to discuss a problem with his work truck, and then called Verna Fudge, another longtime friend and former girlfriend. He wanted to talk to her about finding a place to stay, but she was working and told him to call later. Rodgers again returned to his customer's home to complete the job. The Jacksons, who had known Rodgers for many years, testified that he did not seem upset and was "just the same Ted [they had] always known."
Rodgers went home and talked to Corbett on the phone about a job. Later, Rodgers called Corbett and said that he was going to kill his wife because he was "tired of her doing what she's doing"; he was "fixing to take care of this problem." Rodgers drove to the daycare. Three young children present there witnessed what happened next. Teresa unlocked the door and admitted Rodgers. They argued and Rodgers slapped and kicked her and knocked her down. Then he walked into a back room of the daycare. Teresa tried to open the front door while talking on the telephone. Rodgers returned with a gun, fired several shots at her, and left.
Meanwhile, Tashunda Lindsey, the victim's daughter, was returning to the daycare after running an errand when she called her mother during the argument. Teresa screamed for help, and as Lindsey approached the daycare, she heard gunshots and saw Rodgers walk to his truck and drive away. She found her mother dying in the doorway of the center.
Rodgers drove to a pool hall, where he encountered two friends—Wendy Hammock and Cleveland Reed—sitting in a car. Rodgers told them, "I just shot my wife," and asked to borrow Hammock's cell phone. He dialed a number and said, He told Hammock and Reed that he killed Teresa because he caught her with another man. He added that he had to kill himself because he could not go to jail. Walking a short distance away, Rodgers shot himself in the head.
Teresa Henderson suffered abrasions to her face and blunt force injuries to her left arm and back, with the latter injuries consistent with being kicked. Gunshots fired into the back of her head and into her back caused her death. The gunshot wound to her head entered and exited above her left ear and damaged her brain. The other bullet entered her back and traveled downward through her body, penetrating the bronchus and lung, pulmonary artery and superior vena cava, and diaphragm and liver, and lodged in her mid-lower back near the spinal column.
Rodgers testified that he killed his wife accidentally in self-defense. According to appellant, after he finished the job for the Jacksons, he went home and discussed business with Corbett on the phone, but did not threaten to kill his wife. Rodgers then received a call from a woman in Rosemont requesting a job estimate. While he was en route to Rosemont, his wife called twice on his cell phone, but he refused her requests to go to the daycare to talk. On an impulse, however, he decided that he would go but did not tell her.
When he arrived, his wife was lying on a chair, and he saw that the children were in an adjoining room. He and his wife were talking, not arguing, when his wife walked toward him saying, "You all about to run me crazy." She then fired a gun at him. He reached for the gun, and during their struggle over it, the gun fired several times. Realizing Teresa had been shot, Rodgers took the gun and left because he was "scared and upset." He was not injured in the struggle. Rodgers denied telling Corbett, Hammock, or Reed that he killed Teresa, saying that he told them she was shot when they struggled over a gun.
During the penalty phase, the State introduced Rodgers's 1963 conviction for robbery and his 1979 conviction for manslaughter, and two witnesses testified to the circumstances of the latter conviction, where Rodgers killed his live-in girlfriend.
Dr. Eric Mings, a psychologist, testified for Rodgers, describing Rodgers's difficult youth and inadequate education as one of eight siblings in a family of poor sharecroppers in rural Alabama during the days of segregation. He also described Rodgers's adult life and opined that Rodgers had an IQ of 69 and was mentally retarded. Several other witnesses testified on Rodgers's behalf, including his daughter, two nieces, two former girlfriends, his older brother, and a childhood friend.
Dr. Greg Prichard, a clinical psychologist, examined Rodgers for the State. Although he acknowledged that Rodgers had received little formal education, Prichard found that Rodgers functioned normally in life. Based largely on the results of adaptive skills tests, Prichard concluded that Rodgers was not mentally retarded.
Pursuant to Rodgers's motion for determination of mental retardation, the trial court held a combined Spencer1 and mental retardation hearing. Dr. Mings again testified for Rodgers. Two court-appointed, independent experts testified that Rodgers was not mentally retarded.
The trial court issued a single order addressing mental retardation and sentencing. As to mental retardation, the court concluded that Rodgers is not mentally retarded under section 921.137, Florida Statutes (2003). With regard to sentencing, the order reported that the jury unanimously found the prior violent felony conviction aggravator and recommended death in an eight-to-four vote. The court found the prior violent felony conviction was established and afforded it "extremely great weight." As to mitigation, the court found one statutory mitigator—"any other factor in the defendant's background"— and nonstatutory mitigation.2 The court concluded that the single aggravating factor outweighed the mitigating circumstances and sentenced Rodgers to death.
Rodgers raises the following seven issues for our review: that the trial court erred (A) by excusing a potential juror for cause; (B) by admitting hearsay testimony during the penalty phase; (C) by admitting Rodgers's old IQ scores from Department of Corrections records; (D) in determining that Rodgers is not mentally retarded; (E) in finding the mitigating circumstances, weighing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, and determining proportionality; (F) in denying Rogers's motion for disqualification; and (G) in failing to find Florida's death penalty statute unconstitutional under Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002). We address each in turn below and then whether competent, substantial evidence supports the verdict.
Rodgers contends that the trial court erred in dismissing a potential juror for cause, claiming that the juror testified he could impose the death penalty. A trial court has discretion to exclude a juror for cause if the person's opposition to the death penalty would "prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath." Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424, 105 S.Ct. 844, 83 L.Ed.2d 841 (1985) (quoting Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 45, 100 S.Ct. 2521, 65 L.Ed.2d 581 (1980)); accord Hertz v. State, 803 So.2d 629, 638 (Fla.2001) (citing Wainwright). On review, we will not reverse absent evidence of manifest error. Hertz, 803 So.2d at 638 (citing Fernandez v. State, 730 So.2d 277, 281 (Fla.1999)).
Having reviewed the record, we find that during voir dire questioning the prospective juror repeatedly stated that if given the choice between recommending life or death, he would always choose life in prison and emphasized that this was his "strong personal belief." Accordingly, the prospective juror evidenced a strong opposition to the death penalty, and appellant has not demonstrated that the trial court's decision to excuse the juror was manifest error.
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