Rodgers v. Wright's Provisions, Inc., Civ. A. No. 68-61.

• Court: United States District Courts. 4th Circuit. United States District Court of South Carolina
• Writing for the Court: H. Grady Kirven, Watkins, Vandiver, Kirven, Long & Gable, Anderson, S. C., for defendant
• Citation: 310 F. Supp. 136
• Decision Date: 22 January 1969
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 68-61.
• Parties: Judy Dianne RODGERS, Plaintiff, v. WRIGHT'S PROVISIONS, INC., Defendant.

310 F. Supp. 136

Judy Dianne RODGERS, Plaintiff,
v.
WRIGHT'S PROVISIONS, INC., Defendant.

Civ. A. No. 68-61.

United States District Court, D. South Carolina, Anderson Division.

January 22, 1969.

310 F. Supp. 137

M. A. McAlister, Anderson, S. C., for plaintiff.

H. Grady Kirven, Watkins, Vandiver, Kirven, Long & Gable, Anderson, S. C., for defendant.

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND ORDER

DONALD RUSSELL, District Judge.

This is an action to recover overtime compensation under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C.A. Sec. 201 et seq. The defendant-employer operates a small meat packing plant in Anderson, South Carolina.¹ The plaintiff was, at the time set forth in the complaint, employed in the packing cooler department of such plant. The period for which overtime wages are sought preceded the effective

310 F. Supp. 138

date of the amendment of 1966, reducing the value definition of "enterprise" under the Act, Section 203(r), 29 U.S.C.A.; and, under the statutory definition applicable at the time, the defendant did not fit the definition of "enterprise"

All the facts have been stipulated by the parties and such stipulation is made the Findings of Fact herein. Upon such Stipulation of Facts the cause was heard by me without a jury. The issue posed for resolution is whether plaintiff's employment during the period in question was within the coverage of the Act.

It is well settled that the application of the Fair Labor Standards Act to an employee is governed by the nature of the individual employee's duties and not by the character of the employer's business. Thus, in the oft-cited case of Kirschbaum v. Walling (1942) 316 U.S. 517, 524, 62 S.Ct. 1116, 86 L.Ed. 1638, the Court emphasized that the Act "makes its application dependent upon the character of the employees' activities." The focus of the Act is, as Mr. Chief Justice Warren puts it, "on the activities of the employees and not on the business of the employer." Mitchell v. Lublin, McGaughy & Asso. (1959) 358 U.S. 207, 211, 79 S.Ct. 260, 3 L.Ed.2d 243. Accordingly, the burden rests on any employee seeking relief under the Act "to prove that in the course of performing their (his) services for petitioner (his employer) and without regard to the nature of its (the employer's) business, they (he) were (was), as its employees, engaged in the production of goods, within the meaning of the Act, and that such production was for interstate commerce." Warren-Bradshaw Drilling Co. v. Hall (1942) 317 U.S. 88, 90, 63 S.Ct. 125, 126, 87 L.Ed. 83. To recover, the employee must establish that he was actually engaged in the movement of (interstate) commerce, in its production, or the services he performs must be so closely related thereto as to be for all practical purposes an essential part thereof. Wirtz v. Modern Trashmoval, Inc. (C.C.A. 4 Cir. 1963) 323 F.2d 451, 456-457, cert. denied 377 U.S. 925, 84 S.Ct. 1222, 12 L.Ed.2d 216; Wirtz v. R. E. Lee Electric Company (C.C.A. 4 Cir. 1964) 339 F.2d 686, 689; and New Mexico Public Service Co. v. Engel (C.C.A. 10 Cir. 1944) 145 F.2d 636, 638. It is not sufficient that his activities merely "affect commerce". Mitchell v. Lublin, McGaughy & Asso., supra, 358 U.S. at p. 211, 79 S.Ct. 260. The Court in every case must, therefore, give "independent consideration" to the employee's particular duties and, using "practical considerations" rather than technical considerations to determine whether those individual duties and activities are concerned with commerce as defined in the Act.²

The application of these rules of construction to employees of a meat packing plant such as that of the defendant has been often considered in decisions under the Act. It seems clear from such decisions that where the operations are departmentalized and the activities of the employees segregated, those employees in departments engaged in the production of goods intended for interstate commerce are alone within the coverage of the Act. Thus, in Walling v. Peoples Packing Co. (C.C.A. 10 Cir. 1942) 132 F.2d 236, cert. denied 318 U.S. 774, 63 S.Ct. 831, 87 L.Ed. 1144, the plant was departmentalized. Of the plant's 45 employees, 4 to 7 were involved in the slaughtering of livestock and in removing the hides and the inedible portions of the carcasses. After the hides and inedible portions had been removed, the remaining meat went to the "cooling

310 F. Supp. 139

room," where it was processed and packaged strictly for intrastate distribution. The hides and inedible portions, on the other hand, went into interstate commerce. The 4 to 7 employees engaged in the slaughtering and in the removal of the hides and inedible matter (both of which were intended for interstate commerce) were held covered under the Act. The other employees engaged in the operation of the "cooling room" and its activities were not covered, the Court observing, "The Act, of course, does not apply to the employees of the Peoples Company not engaged in production for commerce." (Note 9, p. 240 of 132 F.2d)

The necessary implications of Wirtz v. G & W Packing Company (C.C.A. 4 Cir. 1963) 324 F.2d 802 are to the same effect. In a meat packing plant operated similarly to that involved in the Peoples Packing Case, the Administrator took the position that all employees were within the Act. The District Court held none of the employees were covered (210 F.Supp. 726). On appeal the Administrator restricted his claim of coverage to the employees whose activities embraced the slaughtering and removal of hides and offal preliminary to the delivery of "the carcasses to the cooling rooms", thereby conceding that the other employees were without the Act. With the issue thus limited, the Circuit Court of Appeals modified the holding of the District Court to sustain the application of the Act merely to the two employees engaged in slaughtering and the removal of hides and offal, thus permitting the decision of the District Court that all other employees were not covered to stand.

Brooks Packing Co. v. Henry (1943) 192 Okl. 533, 137 P.2d 918, and its two companion cases involving the same employer, Brooks Packing Co. v. Mathis (1943) 192 Okl. 537, 538, 137 P.2d 922 and Brooks Packing Co. v. Willis (1943) 192 Okl. 538, 137 P.2d 923, make clear the distinctions to be followed in determining who among the employees of a small meat packing plant, such as that with which we are here concerned, are covered by the Act. The plant in the Brooks Packing Case processed its hides and inedibles for movement in interstate commerce but,...