Rodiboux v. Uniroyal, Inc.

• Decision Date: 03 July 1979
• Docket Number: No. 77-240-A,77-240-A
• Citation: 403 A.2d 262,121 R.I. 796
• Parties: Lucien J. RODIBOUX v. UNIROYAL, INC. ppeal.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

Page 262

403 A.2d 262

121 R.I. 796

Lucien J. RODIBOUX v. UNIROYAL, INC.

No. 77-240-Appeal.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

July 3, 1979.

[121 R.I. 802] Abedon, Stanzler, Biener, Skolnik & Lipsey, Richard A. Skolnik, Lynette Labinger, Providence, for petitioner.

Robert K. Argentieri, Providence, for respondent.

OPINION

DORIS, Justice.

This is an appeal from a decree of the Workers' Compensation Commission denying compensation. This is the second time this case has been before us. Previously in Robidoux v. Uniroyal, Inc., 116 R.I. 594, 359 A.2d 45 (1976) (Robidoux I ), we had remanded this case to the commission for further proceedings consistent with our directives in that opinion. However, because the subsequent findings of fact made by the commission are inadequate in certain areas to support its most recent decree, we believe that this case must again be remanded.

For clarity we will again outline the pertinent facts. On May 5, 1960, the employee, Lucien Robidoux, broke his wrist and left ankle while working at Uniroyal, Inc. As a result of these injuries, he received compensation based on an average weekly wage of $136. During the following 14 years, Robidoux worked for various employers and apparently had recurring problems with his ankle.

In September 1973, Robidoux began a desk job with the Woonsocket Redevelopment Authority. On or about January 2, 1974, Robidoux entered the hospital for surgery on his left ankle. On or about January 13, 1974, Robidoux left the hospital and went home to recuperate. He returned to work on January 23, 1974. For approximately the next three weeks, Robidoux worked on a part-time basis. ¹

At a hearing before the trial commissioner he testified that during this part-time period he would generally work about two hours in the morning and two hours in the afternoon. The rest of the day he spent receiving whirlpool treatments at the hospital or resting his ankle at home. On March 19, Robidoux ceased working and requested a two-month leave of absence for medical reasons. Three days later, for reasons not explained, he requested instead to be laid off for lack of work, which request was granted. ²

Robidoux admitted that from the day he entered the hospital on January 2, until the day he eventually stopped working on March 19, he continued to receive his regular weekly salary of $200 from the Redevelopment Authority. According to Robidoux, this was accomplished by exhausting his accumulated sick leave and vacation time.

Robidoux petitioned for compensation for three different periods:

1. January 3 to January 23, 1974 total incapacity;

2. January 23 to March 19, 1974 partial incapacity;

3. March 19, 1974 and continuing total incapacity.

The commission, in its first decision on Robidoux's petition, denied compensation. The commission ruled that because Robidoux had received a salary in excess of his preinjury weekly wage, he had not suffered a loss of earning capacity.

On appeal to this court we reversed and remanded. We initially noted that a remand was necessary because the commission had not made specific findings regarding Robidoux's petition for total disability benefits for the period after March 19, when he was no longer employed and receiving salary. We also stated that the commission had erred by assuming that wages received for sick and vacation time must necessarily be included in a calculation of earning capacity. For those reasons we remanded for a hearing "to afford the employee an opportunity to establish to what extent, if at all, the payments he received should be excluded in determining his earning capacity." 116 R.I. at 598, 359 A.2d at 48.

On remand to the commission, both counsel were afforded the opportunity to present additional evidence to a trial commissioner. Each declined. The trial commissioner then issued a new decree based on the original record and on his interpretation of our opinion in Robidoux I. His decree, however, did not distinguish between the three time periods for which various amounts of compensation full and partial were sought. Moreover, the trial commissioner chose to disregard entirely the salary received from January 3 to March 19 in his calculation of earning capacity. Instead, his decree awarded benefits for total incapacity from January 3 to April 17, 1974. From this decree, both the employee and the employer appealed to the full commission; the employer from the entire decree and the employee from the denial of benefits after April 17, 1974.

Rejecting the conclusions of the trial commissioner, the commission ruled that the trial commissioner had not followed the directives of our opinion in Robidoux I. The commission stated that additional testimony should have been taken and appropriate findings made concerning the employee's earning capacity during the period he received full salary. Consequently, the commission issued a new decree denying benefits based on the finding that "the petitioner has failed to prove by a fair preponderance of the reasonable evidence that he sustained or suffered any loss of earning capacity commencing January 2, 1974 and subsequent, thereto, as a result of his injury of May 5, 1960."

Before us, the employee contends that the competent evidence in the record does not support this finding. Evaluating this contention, we first examine the commission's decree as it relates to the employee's claim of total disability from January 3, 1974 to January 23, 1974. During this time period the employee received weekly wages of $200 which were in excess of his preinjury weekly wage of $136. On the face of this evidence, a rebuttable...