Rodick v. City of Schenectady

• Decision Date: 24 June 1994
• Docket Number: No. 90-CV-937.,90-CV-937.
• Citation: 856 F. Supp. 105
• Parties: John C. RODICK, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF SCHENECTADY; Kevin Coker; Brian Carroll; Robert P. McHugh; Eric Yager and John Falvo, Jr., individually and as agents, servants and/or employees and police officers of the City of Schenectady and City of Schenectady Police Department, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of New York

856 F. Supp. 105

John C. RODICK, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF SCHENECTADY; Kevin Coker; Brian Carroll; Robert P. McHugh; Eric Yager and John Falvo, Jr., individually and as agents, servants and/or employees and police officers of the City of Schenectady and City of Schenectady Police Department, Defendants.

No. 90-CV-937.

United States District Court, N.D. New York.

June 24, 1994.

Tobin & Dempf, Albany, NY, for plaintiff; Kevin A. Luibrand, of counsel.

Michael R. Cuevas, Corp. Counsel, City of Schenectady, Schenectady, NY, for defendant City of Schenectady; L. John Van Norden, Asst. Corp. Counsel, of counsel.

Grasso & Grasso, Schenectady, NY, for defendant police officers; Jane K. Finin, of counsel.

MEMORANDUM, DECISION & ORDER

McAVOY, Chief Judge.

The plaintiff moves pursuant to Fed. R.Civ.P. 59(e) for modification of the jury award of October 21, 1993 in the remand trial on damages for malicious prosecution. Plaintiff seeks: (1) modification of the judgment so as to award the plaintiff prejudgment interest on the lost income award at a rate of 9% per annum calculated from September 15, 1989, an intermediate date pursuant to CPLR § 5001(b), to the date of judgment entry; (2) modification of the judgment to award plaintiff prejudgment interest on the expenses of defending against criminal prosecution at a rate of 9% per annum calculated from April 4, 1990, the date the criminal trial ended, to the date of judgment entry; (3) modification of the judgment to award plaintiff prejudgment interest on the remainder of the compensatory judgment calculated at 9% per annum from March 26, 1992, the date liability was first determined for malicious prosecution, to the date of judgment entry; and (4) modification of the judgment directing that interest on the entire compensatory judgment award for malicious prosecution accrue at 9% per annum from the date judgment was entered until the date paid in full.

On remand from the Second Circuit Court of Appeals 1 F.3d 1341 on the issue of damages for malicious prosecution liability, the plaintiff was awarded $2,838,650, including $38,650 for expenses incurred in defending himself during criminal proceedings, $300,000 for lost income, and $2,000,000 for injury to reputation, inconvenience, anguish, humiliation and loss of liberty. The jury also awarded $500,000 for future injury to reputation, inconvenience, anguish and humiliation.

The defendants seek a judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 50, remittitur, or alternatively, a new trial pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 59. Defendants assert that the testimony presented at trial does not support the damages award granted by the jury. The court will address these motions seriatim.

DISCUSSION

I. Motion Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e)

A. Prejudgment Interest

The issue of the appropriateness of awarding prejudgment interest is to be decided on the basis of state law. Mallis v. Bankers Trust Co., 717 F.2d 683, 692 n. 13 (2d Cir.1983). In New York, whether prejudgment interest is recoverable in a particular action is based on CPLR § 5001. CPLR § 5001(a) reads:

Interest shall be recovered upon a sum awarded because of a breach of performance of a contract, or because of an act or omission depriving or otherwise interfering with title to, or possession or enjoyment of, property, except that in an action of an equitable nature, interest and the rate and date from which it shall be computed shall be in the court's discretion.

N.Y.Civ.Prac.L. & R. 5001(a) (McKinney's Supp.1993). Because this jury verdict was intended as compensatory relief for the malicious prosecution of Mr. Rodick, including his lost income and litigation expenses, and not as compensation for breach of contract or for interference with property, prejudgment interest is not proper under New York law. Furthermore, it is clear that property, as the term is used in CPLR § 5001(a), does not refer to lost wages. In re Brooklyn Navy Yard Asbestos Litig., 971 F.2d 831, 852 (2d Cir.1992); Gordon v. Board of Educ., 52 Misc.2d 175, 274 N.Y.S.2d 543, 546 (Sup.Ct. Kings Co.1966). "The right to interest is purely statutory and in derogation of the common law and it cannot be extended beyond the statutory regulations or limitations." Gordon, 274 N.Y.S.2d at 545. Thus, plaintiff's motion for prejudgment interest on the jury verdict is denied.

B. Postjudgment Interest

The appropriateness of post-judgment interest is determined by federal rather than state law. See U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. Federal Ins. Co., 670 F.Supp. 1191, 1199 (S.D.N.Y.1987) (noting that the rate of post-judgment interest is set by 28 U.S.C. § 1961); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1961 (stating that "interest shall be allowed on any money judgment in a civil case recovered in a district court"). 28 U.S.C. § 1961(a) sets post-judgment interest at a rate "equal to the coupon issue yield equivalent (as determined by the Secretary of the Treasury) of the average accepted auction price for the last auction of fifty-two week United States Treasury bills settled immediately prior to the date of judgment." 28 U.S.C. § 1961(a). Thus, the court will use this rate to determine the proper interest and not the 9% per annum sought by the plaintiff.

The plaintiff correctly requests that the postjudgment interest run from the date the judgment was entered. Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. v. Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827, 835-37, 110 S.Ct. 1570, 1576, 108 L.Ed.2d 842 (1990). Since the judgment in this case was entered on April 13, 1992, the proper interest rate is that set by the Treasury on April 2, 1992 which was 4.55%.

II. Alteration of the Jury Verdict

The defendants seek judgment as a matter of law on the amount of the jury award of damages for malicious prosecution, or alternatively, a new trial on the issue of damages for malicious prosecution pursuant to Fed. R.Civ.P. 59, or remittitur. A judgment as a matter of law is only appropriate when there is "such a complete absence of evidence supporting the verdict that the jury's finding could only have been the result of sheer surmise and conjecture." King v. Macri, 800 F.Supp. 1157, 1160 (S.D.N.Y.1992), quoting, Sorlucco v. New York City Police Dept., 971 F.2d 864, 871 (2d Cir.1992). The standard for granting a new trial is lesser for the court may grant a new trial any time it becomes convinced that the jury has "reached a seriously erroneous result or that the verdict is a miscarriage of justice." King, 800 F.Supp. at 1160, quoting, Sorlucco, 971 F.2d at 875. Remittitur, on the other hand, is essentially a "statement by the court that it is shocked by the jury's award of damages." The standard of review in deciding whether to grant remittitur is "whether the award is so high as to shock the judicial conscience and constitute a denial of justice." King, 800 F.Supp. at 1161, quoting, Zarcone v. Perry, 572 F.2d 52, 56 (2d Cir.1978). It is in light of these standards that the court examines the defendants' motions.

A. Lost Income

The jury awarded plaintiff $300,000 in lost income and did not award any damages for future lost income. Defendants claim that Mr. Rodick's records show that he never earned more than $37,000 per year in any year either before or after the malicious prosecution took place. Defendants also claim that plaintiff's earnings after the malicious prosecution were not significantly lower than his previous earnings and that the jury must have been confusing loss of personal income and business loss in its verdict. Thus, defendants assert that the jury verdict for lost income is not supported by the evidence presented.

Plaintiff argues, on the other hand, that the trial record supports the determination of lost income. He points to the jury charge which clearly shows that members of the jury were instructed that they could award damages to the plaintiff for "any loss of income from his employment" they found he may have sustained. (Pltf.Exh. B at 10). Additionally, the plaintiff argues that evidence presented at trial supports the $300,000 lost income award. Plaintiff notes that including benefits, he made $7,500 in 1986, $43,500 in 1987, and $54,500 in 1988. Plaintiff notes that his salary dropped to $14,000 during the 14 months of malicious prosecution and that he could have earned approximately $25,000 in 1990. Plaintiff also claims that testimony was presented that show he had almost no income in 1991 and from 1992 until the trial.

Upon review of the record, the court finds that the jury verdict of $300,000 for lost income is supportable by the testimony presented at trial. Therefore, the court denies the defendants' motion to alter the amount of the judgment based on lost income by judgment as a matter of law, new trial, or remittitur.

B. Injury to Reputation and Loss of Liberty

The defendants seek separate alterations of the jury's verdict for injury to reputation and loss of liberty. However, on the verdict sheet supplied to the jury, one award was made for loss of liberty, injury to reputation, inconvenience, anguish, and humiliation combined and a separate award was made for the same categories of future damages. It is therefore impossible for the court to determine how much of the award was related to each category of injury.

At common law, malicious prosecution is assumed to be harmful to an individual's reputation. Nonetheless, it is necessary to make "an objective showing of the victim's reputation before the false arrest and malicious prosecution, versus its damaged condition afterwards." Papa v. City of New York, 194 A.D.2d 527, 598 N.Y.S.2d 558, 563 (2d Dept.1993). The plaintiff's own testimony that he had lost a certain respect due to the prosecution is not enough without other objective evidence of such loss. Papa, 598 N.Y.S.2d at 563.

In this case, as stated before, the jury awarded $2,000,000 for injury to reputation, inconvenience, anguish, humiliation and loss of liberty. It also awarded $500,000 for future injury to reputation,...