Rodman v. D & R Apartments

• Court: Court of Appeal of Missouri (US)
• Citation: 18 S.W.3d 570
• Parties: (Mo.App. W.D. 2000) Phillip and Jerii Rodman, Respondent, v. Charles R. Schrimpf d/b/a D and R Apartments, Appellants. WD56320 0
• Decision Date: 30 May 2000

18 S.W.3d 570 (Mo.App. W.D. 2000)

Phillip and Jerii Rodman, Respondent, v. Charles R. Schrimpf d/b/a D and R Apartments, Appellants.

WD56320

Missouri Court of Appeals Western District

05/30/2000

Appeal From: Circuit Court of Cole County, Hon. Thomas Lloyd Sodergren

Counsel for Appellant: James W. Riner

Counsel for Respondent: David G. Bandre

Opinion Summary: The tenants filed a claim for damages against the landlord for problems in their rental home. After judgment for the landlord, the tenants filed a motion for new trial. The motion for new trial was granted, but the judgment failed to state the grounds upon which the motion had been granted. Following, the case was assigned to a new judge, and the landlord filed an appeal. The tenants then filed a motion to amend the judgment granting their motion for new trial, which motion was granted by the original trial judge.

Court holds: The trial court lacked jurisdiction to grant the motion to amend the judgment because (1) the matter had been transferred to a new judge, and (2) the landlord had filed an effective notice of appeal. Subsequently, the court examined the original grant of the tenants' motion for new trial and, finding the tenants failed to carry their burden of proving the order was legitimately supported, reversed that judgment.

Harold L. Lowenstein, Judge

This appeal emanates from a simple lawsuit, initially filed in the Small Claims Court in Cole County, that has finally landed here in a terrible procedural snarl. The Rodmans (here the respondents, but who will be referred to as Tenants) filed a one page claim for damages against Schrimpf (here the appellant, who will be referred to as Landlord) for problems encountered in a rental home in Jefferson City. These problems included sewer gas entering the home causing health problems and forcing the Tenants to spend time out of the premises, squirrels in the attic and insufficient air conditioning. A judgment was entered for the Tenants for $1,000.

Landlord filed for a trial de novo in circuit court, and after a bench trial in front of Judge Sodergren, judgment was entered on May 13, 1998, in favor of Landlord. Tenants pled and offered evidence that Landlord had breached the implied warranty of habitability.

On June 9, Tenants filed a new trial motion based on the following reasons:

(1) Because the Court erred in finding for Defendants (Landlord) and against Plaintiffs; (2) Because the finding and judgment of the Court are without support in the evidence; (3) Because the finding and judgment of the Court are against the weight of the credible evidence; and (4) Because the finding and judgment of the Court are contrary to the law. The next pertinent event occurred on August 24, when the court granted Tenant's motion for new trial "for good cause shown" and transferred the case to the presiding judge for assignment for the new trial. No reasons or grounds for sustaining the new trial motion were stated in the order. The case was assigned that day to Judge Brown.

On August 26, Landlord filed a notice of appeal to this court. On September 18, Tenants filed in the trial court a "Motion to Amend Judgment" to allow them, under Rule 73.01(a)(5), to amend the August 24th judgment "to conform with Rule 78.03 which states: 'Every Order allowing a new trial shall specify of record the ground or grounds on which said new trial is granted'."

On September 23, Judge Sodergren sustained Tenant's motion to amend the judgment. The judge ruled the specific reason the motion for new trial had been granted was that the trial court erred by determining the Tenants had not properly "invoked the implied warranty of habitability (sic)."

While this case continued on the circuit court's docket for the new trial, Landlord filed for extraordinary relief seeking a ruling that the trial court's efforts to amend were void because the case had been assigned to a new judge and because Landlord had filed an appeal. Landlord's efforts were denied, and Landlord's appeal on the grant of Tenant's amended motion for new trial was argued before this court. In this posture, this appeal presents two questions to be resolved.

I. Did the Trial Court Have Jurisdiction in September to Amend Its August 24th Judgment Granting a New Trial "For Good Cause Shown"?

This first question is almost free of debate between the appellant-Landlord and the respondent-Tenants. The answer to whether the September amendment adding specificity to the August judgment was done with jurisdiction is in the negative and for two reasons. First, Missouri case law clearly states that "[o]nce a change of judge has been entered and the case transferred to another judge the disqualified judge has no further authority in the case and any orders made after the disqualification are void." State ex rel. Johnson v. Mehan, 731 S.W.2d 887 (Mo. App. 1987). See also Byrd v. Brown, 613 S.W.2d 695, 699 (Mo. App. 1981). In the case at bar, once Judge Sodergren removed himself from the case, he no longer had jurisdiction in the matter. As the record indicates, the case was assigned to Judge Brown on August 24, 1998. As such, any matters, such as the motion to amend judgment, should have been ruled upon by the new trial judge, Judge Brown.

Under these facts, the second reason why the attempt to modify the original August 24th judgment for new trial was without jurisdiction, is because of the effect of the appeal filed by Landlord on August 26th. "The filing of an effective notice of appeal ordinarily cuts off the trial court's jurisdiction to exercise any judicial function in the case and vests the jurisdiction in the appellate court. The circuit court effectively no longer has an active case pending on its docket, its jurisdiction being limited to the exercise of ministerial functions provided by statute or rules of procedure." Jordan v. City of Kansas City, 972 S.W.2d 319, 323 (Mo. App. 1998) (citation omitted).

The granting of the motion to amend and the subsequent amended judgment of September 23rd were entered without jurisdiction. The amended September judgment will be reversed. The result is that the August judgment which granted the new trial motion without specifying on which grounds it was granted, as required by Rule 78.03, will now be examined.

II. How Does Rule 84.05 Impact the August Judgment Which Did Not Comply with Rule 78.03?

Where the grounds for a new trial are not specified, Rule 84.05 (c) and (d) come into play on appeal. Those two portions of the rule, which, because of the disposition under the previous portion of this opinion, now become applicable here, read as follows:

(c) Where Trial Court Fails to Specify Grounds for the Granting of a New Trial. When a trial court grants a new trial without specifying of record the ground or grounds on which the new trial is granted, the presumption shall be that the trial court erroneously granted the motion for new trial and the burden of supporting such action is placed on the respondent. In such event if the appellant serves on the respondent a statement requesting that respondent prepare the original brief on or before the time when the record on appeal is filed, the respondent shall file the original brief and reply brief, if any, and serve them within the time otherwise required for the appellant to serve briefs. The appellant shall prepare the answer brief and serve it in the time otherwise required for the respondent to serve the respondent's brief.

(d) Where New Trial Is Granted by Trial Court Without Specifying Discretionary Grounds. If the trial court grants a new trial without specifying discretionary grounds, it shall never be presumed that the new trial was granted on any discretionary grounds.

Under normal circumstances, this court's function in cases where a new trial has been granted and grounds have not been specified, is succinctly set out in Stewart v. Stewart, 901 S.W.2d 302, 303 (Mo. App. 1995), where the wife had listed some six reasons for her motion for new trial. Our standard of review is strictly limited due to the fact that the trial court's order granting wife a new trial did not specify the grounds on which it based its decision as required by Rule 78.03. When a court fails to specify the grounds, "the presumption shall be that the trial court erroneously granted the motion for new trial and the burden of supporting such action is placed on the respondent." Rule 84.05(c); Hylton v. Vaught, 780 S.W.2d 367, 367 (Mo. App. 1989). We will not presume that the motion for new trial was granted on discretionary grounds. Northeast Mo. Elec. Power Coop. V. Todd, 401 S.W.2d 161, 162 (Mo. App. 1966); Rule 84.05(c). The wife will meet that burden if she demonstrates that the motion for new trial should have been sustained on some ground alleged therein. C.M. v. K.M., 878 S.W.2d 55, 56 (Mo. App. 1994). In meeting this burden, wife is confined to the errors specified in her motion for new trial and in her...