Rodman v. Young

• Decision Date: 24 July 1996
• Docket Number: No. 94-830,94-830
• Citation: 679 A.2d 1150,141 N.H. 236
• Parties: Richard L. RODMAN v. Bonnie YOUNG.
• Court: New Hampshire Supreme Court

Page 1150

679 A.2d 1150

141 N.H. 236

Richard L. RODMAN v. Bonnie YOUNG.

No. 94-830.

Supreme Court of New Hampshire.

July 24, 1996.

Richard L. Rodman by brief, pro se.

Bonnie Young, pro se, filed no brief.

Stephen E. Young by brief, pro se.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

PER CURIAM.

The plaintiff, Richard L. Rodman, appeals from an order of the Superior Court (Conboy, J.) dissolving an ex parte attachment. We vacate and remand.

In June 1994, the plaintiff, an attorney, brought suit against the defendant, Bonnie Young, for monies owed for legal services rendered in connection with her divorce. He obtained an ex parte attachment in the amount of $10,000 against the defendant's interest in real estate as security for a judgment. At the same time, the plaintiff obtained an ex parte attachment against a property settlement to be paid to the defendant pursuant to a divorce decree. Stephen Young, the defendant's ex-husband, was named as the trustee defendant of that property settlement. The parties do not dispute, and, accordingly, we will assume for purposes of this case, that the attachment was timely (and otherwise properly) recorded.

The property settlement portion of the attachment was dissolved after hearing on August 2, 1994. The defendant's ex-husband then filed a motion for clarification and objection to the real estate attachment claiming that "[t]he court has upheld the attachment on my property (awarded 7/5/94 through divorce stipulation 91-M-1550) against [the defendant] even though she has no interest in said property." In response thereto, the trial court, in its order, reiterated that the trustee attachment was dissolved, and further ordered that "[t]o the extent that [the defendant] has any interest in the ... real estate, the real estate attachment remains in place. If [the defendant] has no interest in said real estate, the attachment is dissolved."

The plaintiff claims that the trial court effectively dissolved the real estate attachment, and thus deprived him of all security for his judgment, since the defendant, as anticipated, conveyed her interest in the real estate to her ex-husband in exchange for a sum of money. The plaintiff argues that the trial court had no authority to act upon the defendant's ex-husband's motion since the defendant's ex-husband was a non-party to the underlying action, and otherwise had no standing to object to the attachment. The defendant's ex-husband argues that the trial court properly treated his motion as a request to intervene. He appeared pro se and claimed he did not attend the original attachment hearing due to a scheduling error. Under the circumstances, we find that it was not unreasonable for the trial court to consider his motion.

Having made this determination, we now turn to the real matter of concern to the plaintiff; namely, that he has lost his security for any judgment he obtains against the defendant. Our analysis begins with the language of the trial court's order. Although presumably the trial court intended to preserve the attachment, that intent is not reflected in the language of the order. To the contrary, it indicates that if at the time the order was issued the defendant had no interest in the real estate, the attachment was dissolved. In other words, the order makes the preservation of...