Rodonich v. House Wreckers Union Local 95, 82 Civ. 5583 (JMC).

• Decision Date: 20 September 1985
• Docket Number: No. 82 Civ. 5583 (JMC).,82 Civ. 5583 (JMC).
• Citation: 624 F. Supp. 678
• Parties: Joseph RODONICH, Alex Chotowicky, Wasyl Lawro, and Harry Diduck, Plaintiffs, v. HOUSE WRECKERS UNION LOCAL 95 OF LABORERS' INTERNATIONAL UNION OF NORTH AMERICA, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

624 F. Supp. 678

Joseph RODONICH, Alex Chotowicky, Wasyl Lawro, and Harry Diduck, Plaintiffs, v. HOUSE WRECKERS UNION LOCAL 95 OF LABORERS' INTERNATIONAL UNION OF NORTH AMERICA, et al., Defendants.

No. 82 Civ. 5583 (JMC).

United States District Court, S.D. New York.

September 20, 1985.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Hall & Sloan, New York City (Burton Hall, Wendy Sloan, of counsel) for plaintiffs.

Sipser, Weinstock, Harper & Dorn, New York City (Richard Dorn, of counsel) for defendant Local 95 and the individual defendants.

Connerton, Bernstein & Katz, Washington, D.C. (Orrin Baird, Theodore T. Green, of counsel) for defendant Laborers' Intern. Union of North America.

Schulman & Altman, New York City (James Altman, of counsel) for defendant Laborers' Intern. Union of North America.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

CANNELLA, District Judge:

Defendants' motions for summary judgment and to dismiss for failure to state a claim are granted in part and denied in part. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6); 56(b).

Plaintiffs' cross motion for partial summary judgment is denied. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a).

Plaintiffs' motion to supplement and amend the complaint is granted. Fed.R. Civ.P. 15(a), (d).

FACTS

Plaintiffs commenced this action against the Laborers' International Union of North America "LIUNA", Local 95 of LIUNA, and individual defendants alleging violations of the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act "LMRDA", 29 U.S.C. §§ 411(a)(1), (2), (5), 529, 530, the Labor Management Relations Act "LMRA", 29 U.S.C. § 185(a), the Racketeer Influence and Corrupt Organizations Act "RICO", 18 U.S.C. § 1962, and common law breach of contract. The complaint in essence alleges, among other things, that defendants engaged in a scheme to repress dissent within the union and unlawfully disciplined plaintiffs. Defendants move for summary judgment, claiming that plaintiffs' actions under the LMRA and LMRDA are barred by the statute of limitations. Defendants also move to dismiss plaintiffs' LMRA, RICO and common law breach of contract claims for failure to state a cause of action and LIUNA moves alternatively for summary judgment. LIUNA moves for summary judgment with respect to the claims under the LMRDA and moves to dismiss the claims under sections 101(a)(5) and 609 of the LMRDA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 411(a)(5), 529, as failing to state a cause of action. Plaintiffs cross move for partial summary judgment on the LMRA and state law contract claims. Plaintiffs also move to supplement and amend the complaint.

DISCUSSION

I. Statute of Limitations

Defendants, relying on Del Costello v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 103 S.Ct. 2281, 76 L.Ed.2d 476 (1983), contend that plaintiffs' claims under Title I of the LMRDA, 29 U.S.C. § 411 et seq. "Title I", and Section 301 of the LMRA, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) "Section 301", are barred by the six-month statute of limitations of Section 10(b) "Section 10(b)" of the National Labor Relations Act "NLRA", 29 U.S.C. § 160(b). Plaintiffs claim that state law statutes of limitations should apply. All parties agree that, if the state statutes apply, plaintiffs' claims are timely.

The Court, therefore, must determine whether the case is controlled by Del Costello, which applied Section 10(b)'s statute of limitations, governing unfair labor practices, to Section 301/fair representation "hybrid" suits. 462 U.S. at 169, 103 S.Ct. at 2293. In Del Costello, the Court declined to borrow state law statutes because only imprecise state law analogies to these hybrid suits exist. The Court first noted that section 10(b) provides an appropriate limitations period because Section 301/fair representation claims often involve conduct that amounts to an unfair labor practice. Id. at 170, 103 S.Ct. at 2293. More important to the Court's analysis was its determination that the six-month statute strikes a proper balance "between the national interests in stable bargaining relationships and finality of private settlements, and an employee's interest in setting aside what he views as an unjust settlement under the collective bargaining system." Id. at 171, 103 S.Ct. at 2294, (quoting United Parcel Serv. v. Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56, 70, 101 S.Ct. 1559, 1567, 67 L.Ed.2d 732 (1981) (Stewart, J., concurring)).

The Court cautioned however that its holding:

should not be taken as a departure from prior practice in borrowing limitations periods for federal causes of action, in labor law or elsewhere. We do not mean to suggest that federal courts should eschew use of state limitations periods anytime state law fails to provide a perfect analogy. See e.g., Mitchell, 451 U.S., at 61, n. 3 1563 n. 3. On the contrary, as the courts have often discovered, there is not always an obvious state-law choice for application to a given federal cause of action; yet resort to state law remains the norm for borrowing of limitations periods. Nevertheless, when a rule from elsewhere in federal law clearly provides a closer analogy than available state statutes, and when the federal policies at stake and the practicalities of litigation make that rule significantly more appropriate vehicle for interstitial lawmaking, we have not hesitated to turn away from state law.

Del Costello, 462 U.S. at 171-72, 103 S.Ct. at 2294.

In the instant case, this Court must consider Del Costello's cautionary language carefully. Turning first to plaintiffs' LMRDA claims, it appears that there is no precise state law analogy. Plaintiff urges that Title I of the LMRDA, which delineates the rights of union members with respect to the union, closely resembles a federal civil rights statute and was intended as a bill of rights for union members. See United Steelworkers v. Sadlowski, 457 U.S. 102, 109-12, 102 S.Ct. 2339, 2344-46, 72 L.Ed.2d 707 (1982). Accordingly, plaintiffs argue that the state statute of limitations applicable in federal civil rights actions should control the current litigation.

Although the Court agrees that Title I bears a resemblance to civil rights statutes, this purported analogue must be analyzed in accordance with the framework established in Del Costello. First, Title I violations, like Section 301/fair representation claims, have an unfair labor practice nexus. See Local Union 1397 v. United Steelworkers, 748 F.2d 180, 183 (3d Cir.1984); McConnell v. Chauffeurs, Teamsters and Helpers Local 445, 606 F.Supp. 460, 463 (S.D.N.Y.1985).

As Del Costello instructs, the relevant interests must also be balanced. See id. 462 U.S. at 171, 103 S.Ct. at 2293. Monarch Long Beach Corp. v. Soft Drink Workers, 762 F.2d 228, 231 (2d Cir.1985). It is important that a limitations period provide an aggrieved union member with a satisfactory opportunity to vindicate his LMRDA rights. In Del Costello the Court rejected a 90-day state law statute as too short a time for an employee to act on his Section 301 rights. See 462 U.S. at 166, 103 S.Ct. at 2291. Nonetheless, the Court chose the six-month period because of the countervailing interest in promoting "stable bargaining relationships." Id. at 171, 103 S.Ct. at 2294. LMRDA claims, however, do not implicate the collective bargaining process in the same way as Section 301/fair representation claims. Indeed, Section 301/fair representation suits represent a direct challenge to the grievance/arbitration mechanism in the collective bargaining agreement. Id. at 165, 103 S.Ct. at 2291.

In Auto Workers v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 86 S.Ct. 1107, 16 L.Ed.2d 192 (1966), by contrast, the Court recognized that a direct action under the collective bargaining agreement brought by a union against the employer does not involve "those consensual processes that federal labor law is chiefly designed to promote — the formation of the collective agreement and the private settlement of disputes under it." Id. at 702, 86 S.Ct. at 1111, quoted in Del Costello, 462 U.S. at 163, 103 S.Ct. at 2290. Accordingly, the Court applied the six-year state statute of limitations governing contracts. Similarly, in the present case, the internal union nature of LMRDA complaints impact only tangentially on the collective bargaining concerns expressed in Del Costello. Cf. Monarch Long Beach Corp., 762 F.2d at 231. Although the rapid resolution of labor disputes serves an important national policy, its urgency is not so great when the result of applying the six-month statute might be to thwart the Congressional purpose in enacting the LMRDA, which was to provide union members with a "bill of rights." United Steelworkers, 457 U.S. at 109, 102 S.Ct. at 2344. Del Costello's six-month statute is not to serve as a talisman.¹Del Costello, 462 U.S. at 171, 103 S.Ct. at 2294; see, e.g., Monarch Long Beach Corp. v. Soft Drink Workers, 762 F.2d 228 (2d Cir.1985); O'Hare v. General Marine Transport Corp., 740 F.2d 160 (2d Cir.1984), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 105 S.Ct. 1181, 84 L.Ed.2d 329 (1985). The Court finds that the state three-year statute of limitations applicable in federal civil rights actions² most appropriately strikes the balance established in Del Costello because that statute recognizes the need for a reasonable time period within which to vindicate rights similar to those created in Title I. See Bernard v. Delivery Drivers, 587 F.Supp. 524, 525 (D.Colo.1984); Berard v. General Motors Corp., 493 F.Supp. 1035, 1043 (D.Mass, 1980). Accordingly, plaintiffs' Title I claims are not time barred.³

The Court must now consider defendants' contention that the claims under Section 301 are barred by Del Costello's six-month statute of limitations. The Supreme Court has established that the union constitution is a contract under federal law. See United Association of Plumbers and Pipefitters, 452 U.S. at 621, 101 S.Ct. at 2550. Accordingly, the statute of limitations issue is controlled by Auto Workers v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 86 S.Ct. 1107, 16 L.Ed.2d 192 (1966), which held that in straightforward suits under Section 301 for...