Rodrigues v. Gerhards
| Decision Date | 29 April 2020 |
| Docket Number | A164928,A164926 (Control) |
| Citation | 303 Or.App. 770,466 P.3d 1016 |
| Parties | In the MATTER OF the MARRIAGE OF Desiree Florina RODRIGUES, Petitioner-Appellant, and Nathan Andrew GERHARDS, Respondent-Respondent. Desiree Florina Rodrigues, Petitioner-Appellant, and Nathan Andrew Gerhards, Respondent-Respondent. |
| Court | Oregon Court of Appeals |
R. Grant Cook and Lafky & Lafky filed the brief for appellant.
No appearance for respondent.
Before Aoyagi, Presiding Judge, and Egan, Chief Judge, and Mooney, Judge.
Wife appeals from the judgment of contempt and the related supplemental judgment in these consolidated cases, challenging the trial court's calculation of husband's spousal support obligation and its conclusion that husband was not in contempt with respect to that obligation. Wife first argues that the trial court erred in 2017 when it interpreted its 2014 supplemental judgment as not reinstating the support amounts awarded in 2011. She argues that that incorrect interpretation amounted to an unauthorized modification of spousal support that led to an incorrect calculation of husband's support arrearage and life insurance obligation. We conclude that the 2014 supplemental judgment unambiguously awarded transitional support to wife upon the same terms set forth in the April 25, 2011, general judgment of dissolution. We, therefore, reverse the 2017 supplemental judgment and reverse and remand the contempt judgment.
The amount of husband's spousal support obligation is key to determining his compliance with that obligation in the context of this remedial contempt proceeding. The standard of proof in a contempt proceeding is by clear and convincing evidence. ORS 33.055(11). A contempt proceeding is legal in nature and our review is for any evidence to support the trial court's findings. Niman and Niman , 206 Or. App. 259, 278, 136 P.3d 105 (2006) ; Polygon Northwest v. NSP Development, Inc. , 194 Or. App. 661, 670, 96 P.3d 837 (2004). Resolution of this appeal turns on the trial court's interpretation of its March 25, 2014, supplemental judgment, which we review for legal error. Tucker and Tucker , 293 Or. App. 398, 402, 428 P.3d 945 (2018) (citing Neal and Neal , 181 Or. App. 361, 365, 45 P.3d 1011 (2002) ).
Wife initiated this contempt proceeding on November 4, 2015, when she filed her motion and order to show cause seeking, among other things, (1) compensation for her losses in the amount of the total spousal support obligation ($78,000) minus any payments made and (2) reconsideration of the "amount and duration" of the spousal support award in light of our opinion issued on the first appeal filed in this case, Rodrigues and Gerhards , 258 Or. App. 199, 309 P.3d 160 (2013).1 In that opinion, we reversed the trial court's award of transitional spousal support and remanded with direction to consider an award of maintenance support to wife.2 Id. at 201, 309 P.3d 160. On remand, the trial court concluded that "[w]ife shall not receive an award of maintenance spousal support and the General Judgment and Money Award of April 25, 2011, attached hereto as Exhibit 2 is reaffirmed." It is the trial court's interpretation in 2017 of that supplemental judgment that is at the core of this appeal.
These consolidated cases are not particularly novel insofar as they reflect continued financial discord between former spouses. But, there have been somewhat complex procedural turns over the 10-year history of the dissolution case that we describe to provide context and as it is relevant to the question before us. The parties were divorced by entry of a general judgment of dissolution of marriage on April 25, 2011 (the 2011 judgment). Husband was ordered to pay wife transitional spousal support for five years in decreasing monthly payment amounts ($1,500 per month for 36 months and then $1,000 per month for 24 months), totaling $78,000. Wife appealed that judgment and challenged the award of transitional spousal support, arguing that the court erred in not awarding her indefinite maintenance support.
In December 2011, while wife's first appeal was pending, husband filed a motion to modify his spousal support obligation because he had lost his job. In December 2012, the trial court held a hearing on that motion and, in May 2013, entered a supplemental judgement significantly reducing husband's overall support obligation (the 2013 supplemental judgment). Wife's untimely notice of appeal as to the 2013 supplemental judgment was dismissed.
On August 14, 2013, our appellate judgment was entered reversing and remanding the award of transitional spousal support and otherwise affirming the 2011 judgment of dissolution. Rodrigues , 258 Or. App. at 201, 309 P.3d 160. Concluding that the record did not support the award of transitional support, we held that the trial court erred in failing to consider an award to wife of maintenance spousal support, and we reversed and remanded to consider an award of maintenance support under ORS 107.105(1)(d)(C). Id. at 200, 309 P.3d 160. In August 2013, wife filed a motion to set aside the 2013 supplemental judgment that had reduced husband's support obligations, arguing that our opinion published two days earlier had effectively voided it. That motion was denied with leave to later refile.3
In February 2014, the trial court issued a letter opinion that memorialized its review of the record on remand, made findings, and concluded that maintenance support was not appropriate. In the letter opinion, the court "reaffirmed" the 2011 award of transitional support as "sufficient to enable wife to receive training or education" to manage her disabilities with the ultimate goal of "reintegration in the workplace." In March 2014, a supplemental judgment (the 2014 supplemental judgment) was entered that attached (1) a copy of the February 2014 letter opinion as Exhibit 1, expressly incorporating its findings of fact and (2) the April 2011 general judgment as Exhibit 2 expressly reaffirming that judgment. It did not reference the 2013 supplemental judgment. We express no opinion whether the trial court misconstrued the scope of our remand when it reinstated the transitional support award that we had concluded the record could not support.
Wife filed this contempt proceeding in November 2015, seeking enforcement of husband's spousal support obligation under the terms of the 2011 judgment of dissolution. She also requested reconsideration of the amount and duration of husband's support obligation in light of our 2013 opinion and her disabilities. A hearing was held, and the trial court recalculated husband's support obligations based on the 2013 supplemental judgment. A general judgment of contempt was entered against husband on April 18, 2017, ordering him to obtain life insurance in the amount of $25,000 to cover his support obligation to wife. On that same day, the court entered a supplemental judgment in the dissolution case clarifying that it had not been the court's intent in March 2014 to revert to the support terms of the 2011 judgment. Instead, the court calculated support according to the 2013 supplemental judgment, reducing the total amount of support and related insurance obligations. Those are the judgments on appeal.
Wife argues that the trial court abused its discretion when, in the 2017 supplemental judgment, it retroactively modified the 2014 judgment. As an initial matter, we reject wife's argument that the court abused its discretion when it sought to "correct" a three-year-old judgment under ORCP 71 C, because the record does not reflect that the court proceeded under ORCP 71 C when it entered its 2017 supplemental judgment. The language of the 2017 supplemental judgment makes clear that the court was interpreting, rather than correcting, the previous judgments to determine husband's support obligations as it considered those in the contempt proceeding. Neither party moved to correct the judgment, and the court did not make the findings required by ORCP 71 C4 to do so on its own motion.
Whether the trial court properly calculated husband's support obligation and whether it correctly held him in contempt for failing to have life insurance adequate to cover his obligation depends upon what terms the 2014 supplemental judgment established for support on remand from this court. To determine husband's support obligation, we thus look to the 2014 supplemental judgment itself. Because the parties did not stipulate to it, our goal is to give effect to the trial court's intent. Bennett v. Bennett , 208 Or. 524, 528, 302 P.2d 1019 (1956). If the judgment is unambiguous, subject to only one reasonable interpretation, we simply look to the text of the judgment to determine its meaning. Tough and Tough , 259 Or. App. 265, 270, 313 P.3d 326 (2013). Text is unambiguous "if its meaning is clear enough that it precludes doubt by a reasonable person." Blomquist and Blomquist , 126 Or. App. 319, 322, 868 P.2d 1356 (1994). If a judgment is unambiguous, it is enforced by its clear terms. Anderson and Anderson , 65 Or. App. 16, 19, 670 P.2d 170 (1983).
With those interpretive principles in mind, we turn to the 2014 supplemental judgment to determine whether its text is unambiguous:
The exhibits referred to in the judgment were, in fact, attached to the judgment, as permitted by ORS 18.038(3). It is clear from the language of the supplemental judgment that the attachments are intended to be part of the judgment. In fact, without the attachments, the single page judgment quoted above says nothing of substance. By adopting the factual...
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