Rodriguez-Deynes v. Moreno-Alonso
| Decision Date | 22 March 2019 |
| Docket Number | CIV. NO. 16-2986 (PG) |
| Parties | VICTOR RODRIGUEZ-DEYNES, Plaintiff, v. EDWARD MORENO-ALONSO, ET AL., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico |
Plaintiff Victor Rodriguez-Deynes ("plaintiff") files suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and three local statutes. See Docket No. 3. Defendant Edward Moreno-Alonso ("defendant" or "Moreno-Alonso") moves to dismiss. See Docket No. 9. Plaintiff opposes. See Docket No. 21. For the reasons set forth below, the court GRANTS AND DENIES IN PART defendant's motion to dismiss.
Plaintiff took the position of Academic Director at the Escuela Libre de Música Ernesto Ramos Antonini ("the school") on September 3, 2008. See Docket No. 3 at 3. He alleges the school suffered from a litany of staffing, funding and infrastructure problems at that time. See id. In February of 2010, plaintiff purportedly became aware of the Department of Education's (or "the department") plan to move the school to a new location. See id. at 5. To address the school's problems, and to oppose relocation, plaintiff claims he made numerous expressions between 2009 and 2011. See id. at 5-8.1
Plaintiff posits that, in retaliation, defendant - the Secretary of Education from 2011 to 2012 - intentionally coordinated a scheme of false accusations and frivolous complaints filed in state court. See id. at 7. Plaintiff also maintains that, in or around May of 2010, several individuals actingin concert with defendant called and visited him in an effort to intimidate and "pressure" him. See id. at 8. Plaintiff further alleges that defendant and codefendant Jesus Rivera-Sanchez ("codefendant" or "Rivera-Sanchez") - the Secretary of Education from 2010 to 2011 - fabricated a disciplinary record against him. See id. Then, plaintiff avers, he was notified he had been summarily suspended - albeit with pay - on October 7, 2011. See id. at 7.2
On July 24, 2012, defendant was reinstated to his position, as "Academic Director of the School District of San Juan I." Id. at 10. However, he was transferred from the school to the Rafael Cordero Specialized School ("Rafael Cordero"), within the same district. Plaintiff worked at Rafael Cordero for four days, before leaving to seek medical attention. See id. at 11.
Plaintiff filed an initial complaint in state court on September 26, 2012. See Docket No. 21 at 28. On November 16, 2016, plaintiff sued defendant and co-defendant, in their individual capacities, in this court.3 See Docket No. 1. Almost two months later, plaintiff filed an amended complaint ("the complaint"). See Docket No. 3. Defendant moves to dismiss. See Docket No. 9.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) authorizes the dismissal of a complaint that fails to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. "To avoid dismissal, a complaint must provide 'a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.'" Garcia-Catalan v. United States, 734 F.3d 100, 102 (1st Cir. 2013) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). When ruling on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a district court must "ask whether the complaint states a claim to relief that is plausible on its face, accepting the plaintiff's factual allegations and drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor." Cooper v. Charter Communications Entertainments I, LLC, 760 F.3d 103, 106 (1st Cir. 2014) (citing Maloy v. Ballori-Lage, 744 F.3d 250, 252 (1st Cir. 2014)) (internal quotations marks omitted).
"To cross the plausibility threshold, the plaintiff must 'plead factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.'" Cooper, 760 F.3d at 106 (citing Maloy 744 F.3d at 252). See also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). That is, "[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, ... , on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact) ... ." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal citations omitted). "Non-conclusory factual allegations in the complaint must then be treated as true, even if seemingly incredible." Ocasio-Hernandez v. Fortuno-Burset, 640 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2011).
Plaintiff claims that defendant, acting under the color of state law, infringed upon his rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution of the United States, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Docket No. 3 at 12.
Section 1983 does not create substantive rights, but rather provides a cause of action through which a plaintiff can vindicate federal rights elsewhere conferred. See Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994). To state a claim under § 1983, plaintiff must allege that defendant acted under color of state law and deprived him of a protected federal right. See Rogan v. City of Boston, 267 F.3d 24, 27 (1st Cir. 2001).
Defendant moves to dismiss plaintiff's claims. See Docket No. 9. He argues plaintiff suffered no such breach of his federal rights because all purported actions fell within constitutional bounds. See id. at 3-11. To boot, defendant posits that at least some of plaintiff's claims are time-barred. See id. at 11-13.
Working for the government does not strip a person of all First Amendment protection. See Foley v. Town of Randolph, 598 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2010). See also Decotiis v. Whittemore, 635 F.3d 22, 29 (1st Cir. 2011). At the same time, "a citizen who accepts public employment must accept certain limitations on [their] freedom." Borough of Duryea, Pa. v. Guarnieri, 564 U.S. 379, 386 (2011) (citations omitted).4 Ergo, the "protection that public employees enjoy against speech-based reprisals is qualified." McGunigle v. City of Quincy, 835 F.3d 192, 202 (1st Cir. 2016) (citing Mercado-Berrios v. Cancel-Alegria, 611 F.3d 18, 26 (1st Cir. 2010); Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418 (2006)).
Plaintiff alleges that defendants "retaliat[ed] against [him] for his exercise of his rights under the First Amendment." Docket No. 3 at 12. Defendant moves to dismiss. See Docket No. 9 at 3-7. He argues the First Amendment affords plaintiff - a public employee - no shelter here. See id. Defendant avers, concerning the eight instances of speech presently in question, that plaintiff does not plausibly plead he engaged in protected speech. See id.5
Thus, the court must settle whether plaintiff plausibly pleads that he spoke as a citizen on a matter of public concern, rather than as a public employee. See Decotiis, 635 F.3d at 35. If plaintiff spoke as a public employee, no constitutional protections attach. See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421 (). But, if plaintiff spoke as a citizen on a matter of public concern, the First Amendment may shield him.6 See Lane v. Franks, 573 U.S. 228, 237 (2014).
To determine whether plaintiff took off his "employee hat" and put on his "citizen hat," the court must establish his official duties and assess whether the speech in question was made pursuant to those duties. Decotiis, 635 F.3d at 31. See also O'Connell v. Marrero-Recio, 724 F.3d 117, 123 (1st Cir. 2013). The inquiry calls for a "practical rather than formal" approach. Decotiis, 635 F.3d at 31 (). After defining the public employee's official duties, contextual clues help the court zero in on the nature of the expression under consideration. See id. at 32; Mercado-Berrios, 611 F.3d at 27 n.9 (quoting Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421-23).7
Today, the court will consider simply if "the complaint alleges facts that plausibly set forth citizen speech." See Decotiis, 635 F.3d at 35 ).8 Nunc incipimus:
1. Expressions at the Parent's Assembly
Plaintiff alleges that "as part [sic] plaintiff's endeavor he naturally made certain relevant expressions in official activities such as the assembly of parents." Docket No. 3 at 5. See also id. at 7 (). That allegation does not set forth facts that plausibly posit plaintiff engaged in citizen speech when he spoke at the Parent's Assembly. On the contrary: the complaint characterizes the assembly as an "official activit[y]." That characterization, while not dispositive, weighs against plaintiff. See Decotiis, 635 F.3d at 33 (citing Foley, 598 F.3d at 7) ("speech made to an audience to which an employee only has access through [their] job is generally less akin to citizen speech"); Foley 598 F.3d at 6-8 (discussing "official speech"); n.7, supra. In the absence of any other pleaded facts, the court must dismiss plaintiff's First Amendment claim as pertaining to the expressions he made at the Parent's Assembly. No inferences can be made in favor of plaintiff - there are no pleaded facts from which to infer that he engaged in citizen speech. See Cooper, 760 F.3d at 106 (citing Maloy, 744 F.3d at 252).9 Thus, the court GRANTS defendant's motion as to plaintiff's claims regarding his expressions at the Parent's Assembly. They are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
2. Open Letter and Expressions to NotiCel
Plaintiff alleges he "wrote an open letter addressed to the school community stating the magnitude of these problems and indicating the need of [sic] additional resources." Docket No. 3 at 5. See also id. at 7 (). Thus, the court must consider another...
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