Rodriguez v. Bexar Cnty. Hosp. Dist.

• Decision Date: 30 November 2015
• Docket Number: CIVIL NO. SA-14-CA-861-OG
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Texas
• Parties: DAVID RODRIGUEZ, No. 746546, Plaintiff, v. BEXAR COUNTY HOSPITAL DISTRICT d/b/a UNIVERSITY HEALTH SYSTEM, BEXAR COUNTY, TEXAS, JONATHAN GARCIA, Badge no. 1777, Deputy Bexar County Sheriff, KEISHA Last Name Unknown, University Hospital Nurse's Aide, JAMES Last Name Unknown, University Hospital Nurse's Aide, and CHERYL ANN SUMMERVILLE, University Hospital Nurse, Defendants.

DAVID RODRIGUEZ, No. 746546, Plaintiff, v. BEXAR COUNTY HOSPITAL DISTRICT d/b/a UNIVERSITY HEALTH SYSTEM,

BEXAR COUNTY, TEXAS, JONATHAN GARCIA, Badge no. 1777,

Deputy Bexar County Sheriff, KEISHA Last Name Unknown,

University Hospital Nurse's Aide, JAMES Last Name Unknown,

University Hospital Nurse's Aide, and CHERYL ANN SUMMERVILLE,

University Hospital Nurse, Defendants.

CIVIL NO. SA-14-CA-861-OG

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS SAN ANTONIO DIVISION

November 30, 2015

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

The matters before the Court are (1) defendant Garcia's motion to dismiss, filed June 18, 2015 (ECF no. 38), (2) defendant Summerville's motion to dismiss, filed June 3, 2015 (ECF no. 27), (3) defendant Bexar County's motion to dismiss, filed September 16, 2015 (ECF no. 81), (4) defendant University Health System's motion to dismiss or, alternatively, motion for summary judgment, filed September 18, 2015 (ECF no. 83), and (5) plaintiff's claims against the two incompletely identified nurse's aides listed in plaintiff's original complaint. On August 14, 2015, this Court advised the parties it would treat defendants Garcia's and Summerville's motions to dismiss as motions for summary judgment (ECF nos. 53 & 54).

For the reasons set forth below, (1) defendants Garcia's and Summerville's motions for summary judgment will be granted, (2) the remaining defendants' motions for summary judgment and motions to dismiss will be granted, and (3) all of plaintiff's claims against the two nurse's aides incompletely identified in plaintiff's original complaint and response to this Court's Show Cause Order will be dismissed as legally frivolous.

I. Background & Procedural History

Plaintiff filed a highly detailed original Section 1983 civil rights complaint in this Court on September 29, 2014 (ECF no. 1).¹ After the Court twice directed plaintiff to respond to a ShowCause Order (ECF nos. 4 & 14), plaintiff did so on April 2, 2015 (ECF no. 19). In an Order issued May 5, 2015 (ECF no. 23), this Court directed service on those defendants who could reasonably be identified. On June 3, 2015, defendant Summerville, previously identified by plaintiff only as "Cheryl Ann Last Name Unknown," filed a motion to dismiss in which she asserted, among other defenses, the doctrine of qualified immunity (ECF no. 27). Plaintiff filed a response to said defendant's motion on June 18, 2015 (ECF no. 36). Also on June 18, 2015, defendant Garcia filed a motion to dismiss in which he also raised the defense of qualified immunity, as well as other defenses (ECF no. 38). Plaintiff responded to this motion on July 14, 2015 (ECF no. 40). Inapair of Orders issued August 14, 2015 (ECF nos. 53 & 54), the Court (1) advised the parties that defendants' Garcia's and Summerville's motions to dismiss would be treated as motions for summary judgment, (2) explained summary judgment procedure and proof for the benefit of the prose plaintiff, and (3) directed the parties to file their summary judgment evidence supporting or opposing those defendants' motions by September 25, 2015.

The defendant identified by the pro se plaintiff as "Bexar County Adult Detention Center" (liberally construed by this Court as an attempt to bring suit against Bexar County, Texas²) filed a motion to dismiss (ECF no. 81). The defendant identified by plaintiff as "University Health System" (liberally construed by this Court as an attempt to bring suit against the Bexar County Hospital District d/b/a University Health System) filed a motion to dismiss and, alternatively, for summary judgment (ECF no. 83). Pursuant to the Prisoner Mailbox Rule, plaintiff filed his unsworn, unverified, responses to both those motions on October 13, 2015 (ECF nos. 104 & 105).³

The Court has reviewed the objections to various portions of the purported summary judgment evidence filed by the parties and advises the parties it will disregard any submissions which do not satisfy the standard for proper summary judgment evidence set forth in Rule 56, FED.R.CIV.P., as explained in the Magistrate Judge's Orders of August 14, 2015. For the reasons discussed at length below, in the course of reviewing defendants' motions for summary judgment, the Court will disregard any and all (1) quotations from unauthenticated trial transcripts and incidentreports, (2) factual assertions in unsworn pleadings,⁴ (3) factual assertions in purported affidavits not based upon the purported affiant's personal knowledge, and (4) other materials which have not been properly authenticated or otherwise presented to the Court in proper summary judgment form.⁵ TheCourt will review plaintiff's claims against defendants Garcia, Summerville, and the Bexar County Hospital District d/b/a University Health System under the Rule 56, FED.R.CIV.P., standard. The Court will review plaintiff's claims against defendant Bexar County within the context of Rule 12(b)(6), Fed.R.Civ.P. The Court will review plaintiff's claims against the two incompletely identified nurse's aides under the standard set forth in 28 U.S.C. Sections 1915(e) and 1915A(b).

II. Section 1983 Generally

Title 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 does not create any substantive rights, but instead was designed to provide a remedy for violations of federal statutory and constitutional rights. Sepulvado v. Jindal, 729 F.3d 413, 420 n.17 (5th Cir. 2013), cert. denied,134 S. Ct. 1789 (2014); Southwestern Bell Telephone, LP v. City of Houston, 529 F.3d 257, 260 (5th Cir. 2008); Hernandez ex rel. Hernandez v. Texas Department of Protective and Regulatory Services, 380 F.3d 872, 879-80 (5th Cir. 2004); Flores v. City of Palacios, 381 F.3d 391, 404 (5th Cir. 2004); LaFleur v. Texas Department of Health, 126 F.3d 758, 759 (5th Cir. 1997); Jackson v. City of Atlanta, Tex., 73 F.3d 60, 63 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 818 (1996).

There are two essential elements to a Section 1983 action: (1) the conduct in question must be committed by a person acting under color of state law; and (2) the conduct must deprive the plaintiff of a right secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States. Whitley v. Hanna, 726 F.3d 631, 638 (5th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1935 (2014); Romano v. Greenstein, 721F.3d 373, 377 (5th Cir. 2013); Wyatt v. Fletcher, 718 F.3d 496, 517 (5th Cir. 2013); Doe ex rel. Magee v. Covington County School District, 675 F.3d 849, 854 (5th Cir. 2012); D.A. ex rel. Latasha A. v. Houston Independent School District, 629 F.3d 450, 456 (5th Cir. 2010); Doe v. Dallas I.S.D., 153 F.3d 211, 215 (5th Cir. 1998); Randolph v. Cervantes, 130 F.3d 727, 730 (5th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 822 (1998); Leffall v. Dallas I.S.D., 28 F.3d 521, 525 (5th Cir. 1994); Resident Council of Allen Parkway Village v. U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 980 F.2d 1043, 1050 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 820 (1993); Martin v. Thomas, 973 F.2d 449, 452-53 (5th Cir. 1992); Augustine v. Doe, 740 F.2d 322, 324-25 (5th Cir. 1984). See also Walker v. City of Bogalusa, 168 F.3d 237, 240 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding a constitutional claim of discrimination requires proof of purposeful discrimination; disparate impact is insufficient; and the absence of discriminatory purpose precludes a constitutional violation).

In order to state a cause of action under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege facts establishing that an otherwise private defendant acted "under color" of state law. Rundus v. City of Dallas, Texas, 634 F.3d 309, 312 (5th Cir.) (to show there is state action by an otherwise private entity, the plaintiff must show either (1) the private entity's action represents an official-City policy or custom or (2) the defendant's action in enacting and enforcing the restriction is "fairly attributable" to the City), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 107 (2011); Castro Romero v. Becken, 256 F.3d 349, 354 (5th Cir. 2001) (holding no §1983 liability could exist with regard to private defendants absent allegations the non-governmental defendants acted in concert with a governmental entity to deprive the plaintiff of his rights); Brummett v. Camble, 946 F.2d 1178, 1184 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 965 (1992); Auster Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Stream, 764 F.2d 381, 386-88 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 848 (1988). Stated somewhat differently, a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C.§ 1983 must contain two elements: (1) that plaintiff has been deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States; and (2) that the defendant acted under color of state law. Kovacicv. Villarreal, 628 F.3d 209, 213 (5th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 2995 (2011); Bustos v. Martini Club Inc., 599 F.3d 458, 464 (5th Cir. 2010) (a person acts under color of state law if he misuses "power" possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law); Randolph v. Cervantes, 130 F.3d at 730; Doe v. Rains County Independent School District, 66 F.3d 1402, 1406 (5th Cir. 1995); Leffall v. Dallas I.S.D., 28 F.3d at 525; Resident Council of Allen Parkway Village v. U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 980 F.2d at 1050; Martin v. Thomas, 973 F.2d at 552-53; Fyfe v. Curlee, 902 F.2d 401, 403 (5th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 940 (1990); Wong v. Stripling, 881 F.2d 200, 202 (5th Cir. 1989).

Whether an officer is acting under color of state law does not depend on his on- or off-duty status at the time of the alleged violation. Rather, the court must consider: (1) whether the officer "misuse[d] or abuse[d] his official power," and (2) if "there is a nexus between the victim, the improper conduct, and [the officer's] performance of official duties." If an officer pursues personal objectives without using his official power as a means to achieve his private aim, he has not acted under color of state law.

Bustos v. Martini Club Inc., 599 F.3d at 464-65 (footnotes omitted).

Thus, not all actions of a state official...