Rodriguez v. Bush

Decision Date02 May 2005
Docket NumberNo. Civ.A. 04-4952.,Civ.A. 04-4952.
Citation367 F.Supp.2d 765
PartiesWilliam RODRIGUEZ, Plaintiff, v. George Herbert Walker BUSH, et al. Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania

Philip J. Berg, Law Offices of Philip J. Berg, Lafayette Hill, PA, for Plaintiff.

Viveca D. Parker, US Attorney's Office, Philadelphia, PA, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM

ROBRENO, District Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff, William Rodriguez, is a former maintenance worker at the World Trade Center (WTC) in New York, New York. Plaintiff was present in North Tower of the WTC on the morning of September 11, 2001 and is reported to have heroically assisted in rescuing persons from the North Tower after American Airlines Flight 11 crashed into it at 8:46 a.m.1

Plaintiff has filed suit against fifty-six named government officials/entities, including the President of the United States and other high government officials (the "Government Defendants"), and one hundred John Doe defendants. Based on the September 11 attacks and the defendants' alleged participation therein, plaintiff alleges violations of numerous statutes in his thirteen-count, two-hundred-and-eleven-page complaint. Among them are violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1961-68 (RICO), the Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA), 18 U.S.C. §§ 2331-39, and various other criminal statutes for which, unlike RICO and the ATA, there exists no private right of action. According to the complaint:

The essence of Plaintiff's complaint is that a classic RICO "Enterprise," having gained control of key offices and instrumentalities of the United States government ... and the Armed Forces, are guilty of (among other crimes that are "predicate acts" under RICO) kidnapping [sic], arson, and murder including but not limited to, the carrying out of the 9-11 terror attacks that resulted in the death of nearly 3,000 persons.

Compl. ¶ 88. Plaintiff contends that, because of the September 11 attacks, he lost his job at the World Trade Center and suffered personal injuries. Compl. ¶¶ 3, 35.

The Government Defendants, who are the only defendants to have been served with process, have responded with a motion to dismiss or transfer. They contend the case should be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction or transferred to the Southern District of New York (SDNY) in accordance with the provisions of the Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act of 2001 (ATSSSA).2

The parties submitted briefs on the issue of subject matter jurisdiction and the propriety of venue in this district, and the court heard oral argument on these issues. After consideration of the arguments raised in the briefs and fleshed out at oral argument, and upon review of the relevant legal authority, the court will transfer the case to the Southern District of New York.

II. DISCUSSION
A. Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction

ATSSSA vests original and exclusive jurisdiction in the courts of the SDNY to hear claims of the type asserted by plaintiff. ATSSSA § 408(b). Congress enacted ATSSSA on September 22, 2001, in response to the September 11 terrorist attacks. One of the primary purposes of ATSSSA is "to provide compensation to any individual (or relatives of a deceased individual) who was physically injured or killed as a result of the terrorist-related aircraft crashes of September 11, 2001." ATSSSA § 408. To effectuate this purpose, Congress expressly created an exclusive cause of action over which the courts of the SDNY would have exclusive jurisdiction:

There shall exist a Federal cause of action for damages arising out of the hijacking and subsequent crashes of American Airlines flights 11 and 77, and United Airlines flights 93 and 175, on September 11, 2001.... [T]his cause of action shall be the exclusive remedy for damages arising out of the hijacking and subsequent crashes of such flights.

. . . . .

Jurisdiction. The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over all actions brought for any claim (including any claim for loss of property, personal injury, or death) resulting from or relating to the terrorist-related aircraft crashes of September 11, 2001.

ATSSSA § 408(b).

The parties dispute whether ATSSSA applies to plaintiff's claims. Resolution of this dispute centers on whether plaintiff's claims "result from or relate to" the September 11 attacks. "The preeminent canon of statutory interpretation requires [courts] to presume that [the] legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there." BedRoc Ltd., LLC v. United States, 541 U.S. 176, 183, 124 S.Ct. 1587, 158 L.Ed.2d 338 (2004) (citation and quotation marks omitted). If the text of the statute is unambiguous, a court's inquiry begins and ends with that text. Id.; Ki Se Lee v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 218, 222 (3d Cir.2004). A court discerns "[t]he plainness or ambiguity of statutory language ... by reference to the language itself, the specific context in which that language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole." Gordon v. Wawa, Inc., 388 F.3d 78, 81 (3d Cir.2004) (citation omitted).

The text of ATSSSA vests the SDNY with original and exclusive jurisdiction over all actions "resulting from or relating to" the September 11 attacks. The apparent breadth of this jurisdictional grant has raised questions.3 Some courts have declined to construe "resulting from or relating to" broadly to encompass, for example, a construction worker's claim for personal injury that occurred while he cleaning up debris from the WTC site, see Graybill v. City of New York, 247 F.Supp.2d 345 (S.D.N.Y.2002), or a dispute between two reinsurance companies over claims resulting from the September 11 attacks, see Can. Life Assurance Co. v. Converium Ruckversicherung (Deutschland) AG, 335 F.3d 52 (2d Cir.2003). These cases reveal that courts are unlikely to ascribe a mere "but for" meaning to the phrase "resulting from or relating to" the September 11 attacks.

This court need not, however, delineate the precise contours of the phrase "resulting from or relating to" because, in this case, plaintiff's cause of action plainly results from and relates to the September 11 attacks. Plaintiff contends that he "lost his employment of 19 years and his means of earning a living as a direct result of the attacks on the WTC on 9-11." Compl. ¶ 3. He further alleges that he "suffered personal injuries ... as [a] proximate result [] of the 9-11 attacks on the WTC." Compl. ¶ 35. Plaintiff was present and working at the WTC when the planes crashed into it and apparently engaged in heroic efforts to assist firefighters in finding and escorting occupants out of the building. Thus, plaintiff's loss of job and personal injuries, in this case, are a direct and immediate result of the September 11 attacks.4 Because plaintiff is a direct and immediate victim of the September 11 attacks, his cause of action results from and relates to the September 11 attacks. See Graybill, 247 F.Supp.2d at 348-49 (explaining that ATSSSA's "Title IV[, Victim Compensation,] addresses the most immediate victims of the terrorist attacks: those who died on board the hijacked jetliners, those who died or were injured when the jetliners hit the World Trade Center towers and the Pentagon, and those who died or were injured when the World Trade Center towers collapsed").

At oral argument, plaintiff conceded that his claims indeed "result from or are related to" the September 11 attacks, within the meaning of ATSSSA's exclusive-jurisdiction provision, Section 408(b)(3). He argued, however, that notwithstanding Section 408(b)(3), this court may assert jurisdiction because plaintiff's claim falls within Section 408(c), entitled "Exclusion." This argument must fail based on a reading of Section 408 as a whole.

Section 408(a)(1) provides,

Liability limited to insurance coverage. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, liability for all claims ... arising from the terrorist-related aircraft crashes of September 11, 2001, against an air carrier, aircraft manufacturer, airport sponsor, or person with a property interest in the World Trade Center, on September 11, 2001, ... shall not be in an amount greater than the limits of liability insurance coverage maintained by that [defendant.]

ATSSSA § 408(a)(1). Further, Section 408(c) provides,

Nothing in this section shall in any way limit any liability of any person who is a knowing participant in any conspiracy to hijack any aircraft or commit any terrorist act.

Id. § 408(c).

A reading of Section 408 as a whole shows that Section 408(c) is not an "exclusion" from 408(b)'s exclusive-jurisdiction provision. Rather, Section 408(c) serves to eliminate Section 408(a)(1)'s limitation of liability if the defendant is "a knowing participant in any conspiracy to hijack any aircraft or commit any terrorist act." Therefore, even if plaintiff could demonstrate the Government Defendant's complicity in the September 11 terrorist attacks, that putative complicity would eliminate any limit on the Government Defendant's prospective liability. However, complicity vel non is not a factor relevant to whether the SDNY has exclusive jurisdiction to resolve disputes that result from or are related to the September 11 attacks. ATSSSA § 408(b)(3).

Plaintiff also points to the decision of the District Court of the District of Columbia in Burnett v. Al Baraka Investment and Development Corp., 274 F.Supp.2d 86 (D.D.C.2003). The plaintiffs in Burnett, like plaintiff in the present case, were victims of the September 11 attacks who, based on those attacks, alleged violations of the Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA), 18 U.S.C. §§ 2331-39 (among other allegations). Id. at 91. The defendants moved to dismiss, arguing, inter alia, that Section 408(b)(3) of ATSSSA vests the SDNY with "exclusive jurisdiction over claims arising from the September 11 atta...

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