Rodriguez v. Cascade Collections LLC

• Decision Date: 31 March 2021
• Docket Number: Case No. 2:20-cv-00120-JNP-DBP
• Citation: 532 F.Supp.3d 1099
• Parties: Francisco RODRIGUEZ, Plaintiff, v. CASCADE COLLECTIONS LLC, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Utah

532 F.Supp.3d 1099

Francisco RODRIGUEZ, Plaintiff,

v.CASCADE COLLECTIONS LLC, Defendant.

Case No. 2:20-cv-00120-JNP-DBP

United States District Court, D. Utah.

Signed March 31, 2021

Ryan L. McBride, David J. McGlothlin, Kazerouni Law Group, Phoenix, AZ, Theron D. Morrison, Morrison Law Group, Ogden, UT, for Plaintiff.

Chad C. Rasmussen, Alpina Legal, Provo, UT, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS, DENYING MOTION TO STRIKE, GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART CASCADE'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, DENYING RODRIGUEZ'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, AND GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION

Jill N. Parrish, United States District Court Judge

Before the court are: (1) defendant Cascade Collections, LLC's motion to dismiss; (2) Cascade's motion to strike; (3) Cascade's motion for summary judgment, (4) plaintiff Francisco Rodriguez's motion for summary judgment; and (5) Rodriguez's motion for class certification. The court DENIES Cascade's motion to dismiss, DENIES Cascade's motion to strike, GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART Cascade's motion for summary judgment, DENIES Rodriguez's motion for summary judgment, and GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART Rodriguez's motion for class certification.

BACKGROUND

Rodriguez took out a loan to purchase a truck. He fell behind on his payments, and his account was referred to Cascade for collections. Cascade mailed a letter to Rodriguez in an attempt to collect the debt. At the top of the letter, Cascade listed the account number for the auto loan. Just below the account number, appeared the following: "Amount Due: $19,138.39." The body of the letter stated in part:

If you dispute the validity of this debt or any part of it, you must notify us either by writing to Cascade Collections LLC, P.O. Box 970547, Orem, UT 84097, or by calling toll-free 855-978-7184 or locally (801) 900-3328 within thirty (30) days of the date of this letter; otherwise we will consider this debt to be valid and proceed accordingly. If you notify this office in writing within thirty (30) days from receiving this notice that you dispute the validity of the debt or any portion thereof, this office will obtain verification of the debt or obtain a copy of a judgment and will mail you a copy of such judgment or verification. If you request this office in writing within thirty (30) days after receiving this notice, this office will provide you with the name and address of the original creditor, if different from the current creditor.

Please pay the Amount Due. We would like to collect the Amount Due in an efficient and convenient way. If you are able to pay the Amount Due in full at once please do so. On the other hand, if you are unable to pay the amount in full at once, we are able to set up a payment plan so that the Amount Due is paid gradually over time. Please note that the Amount Due is the balance as of the date listed above and may or may not include interest, accruing interest, costs, or other fees. Please contact this office to determine how the Amount Due is calculated and to determine the balance.

Rodriguez sued Cascade, alleging that the collection letter violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA). The complaint quoted the portion of the letter stating that if Rodriguez wished to dispute the validity of the debt, he had to notify Cascade by either mailing a letter to the address provided or calling one of the two telephone numbers listed in the letter. The complaint alleged that "Defendant's notice limits the methods for Plaintiff to contact Defendant to a letter through the mail or a phone call. 15 U.S.C. 1692g(a)(3) allows for Plaintiff to notify Defendant through other reasonable means such as facsimile or even in person." Rodriguez asserted that this portion of the letter violated § 1692e, § 1692f, and § 1692g of the FDCPA. Rodriguez also requested the certification of a class action lawsuit for individuals who received letters from Cascade that were substantially similar to the letter that he received.

Rodriguez filed his complaint on February 21, 2020. The court entered a scheduling order setting a May 29, 2020 deadline to file amended pleadings. The scheduling order also set a September 14, 2020 deadline to complete fact discovery. On July 16, 2020, Rodriguez filed a motion for summary judgment and a motion for class certification. In the motion for summary judgment, Rodriguez raised new theories of liability for statements made in the collection letter. First, Rodriguez pointed out one sentence in the letter stated that he had 30 days from the date of the letter to dispute the debt, while two other sentences stated that he had 30 days from the date he received the letter to dispute the debt. Rodriguez argued that this internal inconsistency violated the FDCPA. Second, Rodriguez argued that the following statement violated the FDCPA: "Please note that the Amount Due is the balance as of the date listed above and may or may not include interest, accruing interest, costs, or other fees." He asserted that this equivocating statement made it impossible for him to know the true amount of the debt.

On July 31, 2020, Cascade filed a motion to dismiss Rodriguez's claims for lack of standing or, in the alternative, for summary judgment. On the same day, Cascade also filed a motion to strike the two new claims raised in Rodriguez's motion for summary judgment.

ANALYSIS

I. CASCADE'S MOTION TO DISMISS

Cascade moves to dismiss this action under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, arguing that this court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over Rodriguez's claims. Cascade argues that the court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction because Rodriguez does not possess Article III standing to sue. It contends that Rodriguez alleges only a "bare procedural violation" of the FDCPA. Without further alleged harm, Cascade argues, such a violation does not constitute an injury-in-fact necessary to confer standing on Rodriguez. Rodriguez responds that Cascade's alleged behavior constitutes more than a "bare procedural violation" of the FDCPA because the provisions of the FDCPA that Cascade allegedly violated are intended to protect debtors’ substantive rights. Rodriguez further responds that even if the provisions in question only establish procedural requirements, Cascade's violations created the "appreciable risk of harm" necessary for Article III standing where a defendant violates a procedural, rather than substantive, statutory right.

" Article III of the Constitution permits federal courts to decide only ‘Cases or ‘Controversies.’ " Baker v. USD 229 Blue Valley , 979 F.3d 866, 871 (10th Cir. 2020) (citing U.S. Const. art. III, § 2). "To establish a case or controversy, a plaintiff must possess standing to sue." Kan. Nat. Res. Coal. v. U.S. Dep't of Interior , 971 F.3d 1222, 1231 (10th Cir. 2020) (citing Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins , ––– U.S. ––––, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547, 194 L.Ed.2d 635 (2016) ). To have Article III standing to sue, a plaintiff must have "(1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision." Id. (quoting Spokeo , 136 S. Ct. at 1547 ). The plaintiff "bears the burden of establishing these elements." Spokeo , 136 S. Ct. at 1547. At the motion-to-dismiss stage, courts look to the well-pleaded allegations of the complaint to determine whether a plaintiff has met this burden. Id.

Cascade does not dispute that Rodriguez has satisfied the second and third elements above; rather, it argues that he has not suffered an "injury in fact." Specifically, Cascade contends that Rodriguez has not alleged a concrete injury because he did not allege any harm beyond a mere procedural violation of the FDCPA. "To establish an injury in fact, a plaintiff must show that he or she suffered ‘an invasion of a legally protected interest’ that is ‘concrete and particularized’ and ‘actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.’ " Kan. Nat. Res. , 971 F.3d at 1231 (quoting Spokeo , 136 S. Ct. at 1548 ). "For an injury to be ‘particularized,’ it ‘must affect the plaintiff in a personal and individual way.’ " Spokeo , 136 S. Ct. at 1548 (citation omitted). To be "concrete," an injury "must be ‘de facto ’; that is, it must actually exist." Id. at 1549. But concrete is not synonymous with "tangible"; "intangible injuries can [ ] be concrete." Id.

The parties agree that the Supreme Court's decision in Spokeo is instructive in this case. In that case, the plaintiff, Robins, alleged that Spokeo, an alleged consumer reporting agency, violated the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) by publishing false information about him on its website. Id. at 1546. Robins did not allege any injury beyond the violation of the FCRA; i.e., he did not allege that the false information caused him reputational harm or prevented him from employment opportunities. Because of this, the district court dismissed the case, reasoning that he had not alleged an injury in fact. Id. at 1546. The Ninth Circuit reversed, reasoning that Robins had pled that "Spokeo violated his statutory rights" and that his "personal interests in the handling of his credit information [were] individualized." Id.

The Supreme Court vacated and remanded, explaining that the Ninth Circuit only analyzed the "particularized" prong of the injury-in-fact test, not the "concreteness" prong. Id. at 1550. As explained above, intangible injuries may qualify as "concrete." In determining whether an intangible harm constitutes a concrete injury, the Supreme Court instructed:

[B]oth history and the judgment of Congress play important roles. Because the doctrine of standing derives from the case-or-controversy requirement, and because that requirement in turn is grounded in historical practice, it is instructive to consider whether an alleged intangible harm has a close relationship to a harm that has

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