Rodriguez v. Christus Spohn Health Sys. Corp.
| Decision Date | 13 June 2012 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. C–09–95. |
| Parties | Susanna Hinojosa RODRIGUEZ, Plaintiff, v. CHRISTUS SPOHN HEALTH SYSTEM CORPORATION, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Texas |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Gay Ellen Gilson, Attorney at Law, Corpus Christi, TX, Adriaan Tieleman Jansse, The Jansse Law Firm, San Antonio, TX, for Plaintiff.
David Reeves Iler, Jessica Paige Sykora, Warren Szutse Huang LLP, Fulbright & Jaworski, Houston, TX, for Defendant.
Pending before the Court are Defendants CHRISTUS Spohn Health System Corporation d/b/a CHRISTUS Spohn Hospital Corpus Christi–Memorial (also sued as CHRISTUS Spohn Health System Corporation) and CHRISTUS Health's (collectively “CHRISTUS”) Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Plaintiff's Due Process Claims Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Dkt. No. 109), Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Plaintiff's Equal Protection Claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Dkt. No. 175), and Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings Regarding Plaintiff's Claim under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code Section 81.010 (Dkt. No. 177), to which Plaintiff Susanna Hinojosa Rodriguez (“Rodriguez”) has responded (Dkt. Nos. 117 & 181; 182; and 183, respectively), and CHRISTUS has replied (Dkt. Nos. 123 & 184–A; 186–A; and 189–A, respectively).1 Rodriguez has also filed a Motion and Amended Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Liability on Plaintiff's Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code § 81.010 Claim (Dkt. Nos. 178 & 179), to which CHRISTUS has responded (Dkt. No. 185).
I. Factual and Procedural Background
On October 28, 2008, Rodriguez filed a healthcare liability suit in Texas state court against CHRISTUS, the Nueces County Hospital District (the “Hospital District”),2 and John Hill (“Hill”), a mental health technician employed by CHRISTUS. Rodriguez alleged that, on or about April 1, 2007, she “was voluntarily admitted as a patient to [CHRISTUS'] Behavioral Medicine Department for treatment of a serious mental health condition-bi-polar disorder and other mental health conditions.” (Pl. First Amended Pet., Dkt. No. 1, Ex. 9, ¶ 10.) Rodriguez claimed that during her hospitalization, Hill sexually assaulted her ( Id. ¶ 36.) Hill allegedly assaulted Rodriguez again that same day after lunch, this time “by approaching [her] from behind; grabbing and fondling her breasts and rubbing his crotch against her buttocks and lower back pressing his penis against her and stating ‘Do you want my black dick?’ ” ( Id. ¶ 37.) Rodriguez claimed that she reported the assault to nursing staff, but CHRISTUS' “fail[ure] to take any prompt and appropriate remedial action[ ] left [her] scared, intimidated, and fearing for her safety,” so she asked to be discharged. ( Id. ¶¶ 39–40.) Rodriguez further alleged that “[i]n the aftermath of the assaults, [her] condition significantly worsened and [she] was diagnosed with Post Traumatic Stress Disorder” which “culminated in [her] having suicidal thoughts and [she] has attempted suicide as a result.” (
CHRISTUS filed a plea to the jurisdiction in Texas state court seeking dismissal of Rodriguez' suit on the grounds of governmental immunity. CHRISTUS argued that because the Hospital District contracts out to CHRISTUS the responsibilities of indigent health care required by Texas law, CHRISTUS is a “hospital district management contractor,” which is defined by statute as “a nonprofit corporation, partnership, or sole proprietorship that manages or operates a hospital or provides services under contract with a hospital district that was created by general or special law.” Tex. Health & Safety Code § 285.071. Section 285.072 further provides that a “hospital district management contractor in its management or operation of a hospital under a contract with a hospital district is considered a governmental unit for purposes of Chapters 101, 102, and 108, Civil Practice and Remedies Code[.]” Tex. Health & Safety Code § 285.072. Thus, although it is a private corporation, CHRISTUS claimed that it was entitled to governmental immunity on Rodriguez' healthcare liability claims.
In response to CHRISTUS' assertion that it is a governmental unit, Rodriguez filed her First Amended Petition on April 2, 2009, adding causes of action under Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code § 81.010 and under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of her right to substantive due process and equal protection. Based on Rodriguez' pleading of § 1983 claims, on April 30, 2009, the Hospital District, with CHRISTUS' consent, timely removed the case to this Court, where it was originally assigned to then-Chief Judge Hayden Head. Rodriguez subsequently filed Plaintiff's Original Complaint (Dkt. No. 11) in this Court, reasserting all of the claims she had previously alleged in state court.
On October 15, 2009, CHRISTUS filed three motions to dismiss all of Rodriguez' claims against it: (1) Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) or, Alternatively, Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 (Dkt. No. 19); (2) Defendant CHRISTUS Health's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) (Dkt. No. 20); and (3) Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings Regarding Plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Claims (Dkt. No. 21). 3 After Judge Head recused, the case was reassigned to Judge Janice Graham Jack. (Dkt. No. 44.) With one exception, Judge Jack denied CHRISTUS' 12(b)(1) motions, ruling that CHRISTUS did not have immunity from suit for purposes of Rodriguez's state-law claims and also that CHRISTUS was acting under color of state law for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Dkt. No. 54.)
After Judge Jack recused and this action was reassigned to the undersigned judge, CHRISTUS filed a motion for reconsideration of Judge Jack's ruling on Rodriguez' state-law claims (Dkt. No. 58), which this Court denied (Dkt. No. 80). CHRISTUS subsequently filed an interlocutory appeal of Judge Jack's rulings on Rodriguez' state-law claims. (Dkt. No. 84.) The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit vacated Judge Jack's ruling and found that CHRISTUS, as a hospital district management contractor, did qualify for limited governmental immunity under the Texas Tort Claims Act, thus dismissing all of Rodriguez's state-law claims against CHRISTUS “except to the extent that [any Chapter 81 claim] falls under § 81.010.” Rodriguez v. CHRISTUS Spohn Health Sys. Corp., 628 F.3d 731, 734 (5th Cir.2010).
Rodriguez' only remaining causes of action against CHRISTUS following remand were those under Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code § 81.010 and her due process and equal protection claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which Rodriguez subsequently realleged when she filed her First Amended Complaint on August 5, 2011 (Dkt. No. 141). CHRISTUS now moves for summary judgment on Rodriguez' constitutional claims under § 1983 and moves for judgment on the pleadings on Rodriguez' state-law claim under § 81.010.
II. CHRISTUS' Motions for Partial Summary JudgmentA. Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment is proper “if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see also Christopher Village, LP v. Retsinas, 190 F.3d 310, 314 (5th Cir.1999). “For any matter on which the nonmovant would bear the burden of proof at trial ..., the movant may merely point to the absence of evidence and thereby shift to the non-movant the burden of demonstrating by competent summary judgment proof that there is an issue of material fact warranting trial.” Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Avenell, 66 F.3d 715, 718–19 (5th Cir.1995); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323–25, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). To prevent summary judgment, the non-movant must “respond by setting forth specific facts” that indicate a genuine issue of material fact. Rushing v. Kansas City S. Ry. Co., 185 F.3d 496, 505 (5th Cir.1999).
When considering a motion for summary judgment, the Court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-movant. See Samuel v. Holmes, 138 F.3d 173, 176 (5th Cir.1998); Texas v. Thompson, 70 F.3d 390, 392 (5th Cir.1995). “The court may not undertake to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses, weigh the evidence, or resolve factual disputes; so long as the evidence in the record is such that a reasonable jury drawing all inferences in favor of the nonmoving party could arrive at a verdict in that party's favor, the court must deny the motion.” Int'l Shortstop, Inc. v. Rally's, Inc., 939 F.2d 1257, 1263 (5th Cir.1991). However, the non-movant cannot avoid summary judgment by presenting only “conclusory allegations” or “unsubstantiated assertions,” such as the bare allegations of a complaint, but must present sufficient evidence, such as sworn testimony in a deposition or affidavit, to create a genuine issue of material fact as to the claim asserted. Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir.1994) (en banc). “Even if the standards of Rule 56 are met, a court has discretion to deny a motion for summary judgment if it believes that ‘the better course would be to proceed to a full trial.’ ” Freeman v. U.S., 2005 WL 3132185, *2 (S.D.Tex. Nov. 22, 2005) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)).
B. Evidentiary Objections
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