Rodriguez v. City Of Modesto
| Decision Date | 23 November 2010 |
| Docket Number | CASE NO. CV F 10-1370 LJO MJS |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California |
| Parties | MIGUEL RODRIGUEZ, et al., Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF MODESTO, et al, Defendants. |
ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' F.R.Civ.P. 12 MOTION TO DISMISS
Defendants City of Modesto ("City") and nine City peace officers1 seek to dismiss plaintiffs'2unlawful arrest and excessive force claims in the absence of sufficient legal grounds and factual allegations. Plaintiffs "concede that Defendants' arguments have merit" and seek to file an amended complaint to "correct the defects appearing on the face of the original complaint." This Court considered defendants' F.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss on the record and VACATES the December 6, 2010 hearing, pursuant to Local Rule 230(g). This Court DISMISSES plaintiffs' claims and GRANTS plaintiffs leave to amend to the extent delineated below.
On February 8, 2009 at around 1 a.m., plaintiffs gathered at Mr. Alizaga's Modesto home to celebrate his birthday. A police officer knocked at the door, and Mr. Alizaga's dog ran out when he opened the door. As Mr. Alizaga tried to retrieve the dog, Officers Spruiell and Ziya grabbed Mr. Alizaga, threw him to the ground and handcuffed him "for no apparent reason." Officers Spruiell and Ziya struck Mr. Alizaga with their batons. Mr. Alizaga was booked on charges of resisting arrest, a misdemeanor.
Mr. Rodriguez came out of the house, observed Mr. Alizaga's arrest, and wanted to find out the reason. Mr. Rodriguez stood peaceably on the home's front lawn and attempted to learn from police why Mr. Alizaga was arrested. Officers Ziya, Fontes and Murphy arrested Mr. Rodriguez without having observed him commit a criminal offense. During the arrest, Officer Fontes shot Mr. Rodriguez with his Taser, and Officer Ziya struck Mr. Rodriguez' arm with his baton. Officer Murphy gave the "bite command" to his K-9 which bit Mr. Rodriguez.
When Mr. Rodriguez was handcuffed and walked to a patrol car, unidentified officer Doe Defendant No. 1 put a shotgun to Mr. Rodriguez' back and banged his head against the roof of the patrol car. Doe Defendant No. 1 attempted to break Mr. Rodriguez' bad leg after Mr. Rodriguez had alerted the officer of a prior injury to the leg. Mr. Rodriguez screamed: Doe Defendant No. 1 responded: "Fuck your daughter, you piece of shit!"
The police threw Mr. Rodriguez "roughly" in the back of a patrol car to injure his bad leg. The police took Mr. Rodriguez to a hospital for medical clearance and then to jail. Mr. Rodriguez was released the following morning at about 1 a.m. with a citation for resisting arrest, a misdemeanor.
When the police arrested Mr. Alizaga and Mr. Rodriguez, Ms. Fernandez came outside and observed Mr. Alizaga and Mr. Rodriguez being beaten. As Ms. Fernandez stood on the home's porch and watched, Officer Buehler grabbed Ms. Fernandez, threw her to the ground, and handcuffed her for "no apparent reason." Unidentified officer Doe Defendant No. 2 struck Ms. Fernandez several times with his club when Ms. Fernandez lay face-down on the front lawn, handcuffed and screaming for help. Officer Souza4 held a police dog next to Ms. Fernandez' head for no reason. Police placed Ms. Fernandez in a patrol car's back seat and ignored her repeated requests for an explanation. Ms. Fernandez was transported to a hospital for medical clearance, was taken to jail, was charged with resisting arrest, and released with a citation for resisting arrest, a misdemeanor.
Lt. Cloward was the "ranking officer" on the scene and did nothing to restrain the unlawful behavior of officers under his command.
Plaintiffs claim to have suffered multiple contusions and abrasions and emotional distress. Ms. Fernandez further claims cervical strain.
The complaint alleges 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("section 1983") claims for unreasonable seizure and failure to adequately train, supervise and discipline officers (collectively the "section 1983 claims"). The complaint further alleges tort claims of assault and battery and false arrest/false imprisonment. These claims will be discussed in greater detail below. The complaint seeks to recover compensatory and punitive damages and attorney fees.
On February 10, 2009, a misdemeanor criminal complaint was filed to charge each plaintiff with a count of violation of California Penal Code section 148(a) (). Plaintiffs entered nolo contendere pleas to charges against them.
Defendants raise several F.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) challenges to the complaint's section 1983 and tort claims.
A F.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss is a challenge to the sufficiency of the pleadings set forth in the complaint. Scheurer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683 (1974); Gilligan v. Jamco Development Corp., 108 F.3d 246, 249 (9th Cir. 1997). A F.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) dismissal is proper where there is either a "lack of a cognizable legal theory" or "the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory." Balisteri v. Pacifica Police Dept., 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990); Graehling v. Village of Lombard, Ill., 58 F.3d 295, 297 (7th Cir. 1995).
In resolving a F.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) motion, a court must: (1) construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff; (2) accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true; and (3) determine whether plaintiff can prove any set of facts to support a claim that would merit relief. Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337-338 (9th Cir. 1996). Nonetheless, a court is not required "to accept as true allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences." In re Gilead Sciences Securities Litig., 536 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). A court "need not assume the truth of legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations," U.S. ex rel. Chunie v. Ringrose, 788 F.2d 638, 643, n. 2 (9th Cir.1986), and must not "assume that the [plaintiff] can prove facts that it has not alleged or that the defendants have violated... laws in ways that have not been alleged." Associated General Contractors of California, Inc. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526, 103 S.Ct. 897 (1983). A court need not permit an attempt to amend if "it is clear that the complaint could not be saved by an amendment." Livid Holdings Ltd. v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc., 416 F.3d 940, 946 (9th Cir. 2005).
"While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the 'grounds' of his 'entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1964-65 (2007) (internal citations omitted). Moreover, a court "will dismiss any claim that, even when construed in the light most favorable to plaintiff, fails to plead sufficiently all required elements of a cause of action." Student Loan Marketing Ass'n v. Hanes, 181 F.R.D. 629, 634 (S.D. Cal. 1998). In practice, a complaint "must contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material elements necessary to sustain recovery under some viable legal theory." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 562, 127 S.Ct. at 1969 (quoting Car Carriers, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 745 F.2d 1101, 1106 (7th Cir. 1984)).
In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, __ U.S. __, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009), the U.S. Supreme Court recently explained:
To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face."... A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.... The plausibility standard is not akin to a "probability requirement," but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. (Citations omitted.)
After discussing Iqbal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals summarized: "In sum, for a complaint to survive a motion to dismiss, the non-conclusory 'factual content, ' and reasonable inferences from that content, must be plausibly suggestive of a claim entitling the plaintiff to relief." Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 989 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Iqbal, __ U.S. __, 129 S.Ct. at 1949).
The U.S. Supreme Court applies a "two-prong approach" to address a motion to dismiss:
First, the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.... Second, only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss.... Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will... be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.... But where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged-but it has not "show[n]"-"that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 8(a)(2).
In keeping with these principles a court considering a motion to dismiss can choose to begin by identifying...
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