Rodriguez v. City of Chicago
| Decision Date | 21 September 1998 |
| Docket Number | No. 97-3339,97-3339 |
| Citation | 156 F.3d 771 |
| Parties | 77 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1421, 74 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 45,507 Angelo RODRIGUEZ, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CITY OF CHICAGO, a municipal corporation, Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit |
David A. Shaneyfelt, Hoogendoorn, Talbot, Davids & Godfrey, Chicago, IL, Scott C. Idleman (argued), Marquette University, School of Law, Milwaukee, WI, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Susan S. Sher, Ruth F. Masters (argued), Office of the Corporation Counsel, Appeals Division, Chicago, IL, for Defendant-Appellee.
Before POSNER, Chief Judge, CUMMINGS and RIPPLE, Circuit Judges.
On September 20, 1995, Angelo Rodriguez, a patrol officer in the Chicago Police Department ("CPD"), filed a four-count complaint against the City of Chicago. In that complaint, Officer Rodriguez alleged that the City discriminated against him on the basis of his religion by refusing to exempt him from an assignment to stand guard outside an abortion clinic on November 19, 1994. The only claim at issue in this appeal is Officer Rodriguez's contention that the City's refusal to exempt him from the clinic duty violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17. 1 On August 11, 1997, upon the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court granted the City's motion for summary judgment and denied Officer Rodriguez's motion. This appeal followed. For the reasons set forth in the following opinion, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
Officer Rodriguez has served as a patrol officer in the CPD's 14th District since September 1980. Two abortion clinics are located in that district: (1) the Central Medico Pan American Clinic, located at 3412 West Fullerton Avenue ("the Fullerton Clinic") and (2) the American Women's Medical Center, located at 2744 North Western Avenue ("the Western Clinic"). Following a mass demonstration outside the Fullerton Clinic on October 23, 1993, the CPD began to assign one or more officers to stand guard outside the abortion clinics throughout the City. The CPD typically assigned officers to such "clinic duty" only on Saturday mornings. The officers assigned to clinic duty are instructed to establish a police presence outside the clinics by parking their squad cars in front of the clinics. The purpose of the clinic duty is to protect the clinics' property and employees and to keep the peace.
When the clinic duty first began, the CPD would assign officers on the "First Watch" 3 to arrive at each clinic at about 5:00 a.m., until the "Second Watch" officers arrived shortly after the 7:00 a.m. morning roll call. Those officers would then stay until about 9:00-9:30 a.m., and check for the appearance of demonstrators. If none came, the CPD would cancel the detail and instruct the beat officers to pass by the clinics frequently and note if any demonstrators appeared. If any arrived, supervisors would send a relief officer to the detail at approximately 9:30-10:00 a.m. and at two and one-half hour intervals thereafter, until the last demonstrators left, usually around noon.
The clinic duty was activated regularly on Saturdays following the October 1993 demonstration at the Fullerton Clinic, although it was curtailed somewhat during the winter months. In August 1994, clinic assignments were increased in response to violence outside an abortion clinic in Pensacola, Florida. However, since November 1994, clinic assignments have been less frequent because of a lack of demonstrators, and the CPD activates the Saturday morning clinic duty only on an "as needed" basis.
Officer Rodriguez was among the officers assigned to the October 23, 1993 mass demonstration at the Fullerton Clinic and assisted in making arrests outside the clinic. However, while making arrests that day, he became unsettled about his role outside the clinic. As a life-long Roman Catholic, Officer Rodriguez accepts the teachings of the Roman Catholic Church that an elective abortion is the wrongful taking of innocent human life and that individuals have a general moral obligation to avoid participating in, or facilitating, an elective abortion. Subsequently, he was assigned to clinic duty on three occasions in the months following the demonstration. During that time, he became more and more convinced that his presence at the clinic facilitated the ongoing activities of the abortion clinic and, consequently, conflicted with his religious beliefs.
On January 29, 1994, Officer Rodriguez informed his watch commander, Captain William Guswiler, of his religious opposition to serving on clinic duty. Officer Rodriguez told Captain Guswiler that he had no objection to going to the clinic in an emergency situation but that he did not want to be assigned to the regular clinic duty. Captain Guswiler told Officer Rodriguez that he would try not to assign him to such duty; however, he could not give Officer Rodriguez a formal exemption from such work. For four months thereafter, Officer Rodriguez was not assigned to clinic duty.
In April 1994, Officer Rodriguez went on medical leave due to an injury. When he returned in September 1994, he again sought to ensure that he would not be assigned to clinic duty. Rather than rely on his informal arrangement with Captain Guswiler, Officer Rodriguez sent a memorandum to 14th District Commander Jose Velez in which he requested to be exempted from future assignments at abortion clinics because of his On November 19, 1994, Captain Guswiler decided to assign police personnel to one of the clinics because demonstrators were present. At approximately 11:35 a.m., the officer on duty at the clinic requested a replacement in order to take a "personal." 4 Sergeant Ronald Grimes assigned Rodriguez to replace the officer on clinic duty. After receiving the assignment, Officer Rodriguez promptly requested a "personal" and returned to the 14th District station. At the station, he told Sergeant Grimes that he objected to such work and informed him of his informal arrangement with Captain Guswiler. Sergeant Grimes responded, however, that Officer Rodriguez could not refuse the assignment. Officer Rodriguez then agreed to fulfill the assignment under protest. He was on clinic duty for approximately one-half hour before the watch was canceled for the remainder of the day. Since that incident, Officer Rodriguez has endeavored to avoid clinic duty by utilizing various options available to him, such as taking vacation time and obtaining out-of-district assignments on those days (Saturdays) on which the clinic duty is most likely to be activated. According to the record before us, he has not been assigned to any further clinic duty since this incident.
religious beliefs. After receiving Officer Rodriguez's missive, Commander Velez discussed Officer Rodriguez's request with Captain Guswiler and they agreed that Officer Rodriguez was not free to refuse an assignment, but that, when possible, Guswiler would continue to avoid assigning Officer Rodriguez to clinic duty. Commander Velez, however, never responded to Officer Rodriguez directly; nor did he inform anyone else of the request, because, in his view, CPD policy clearly prohibits an officer from refusing an assignment.
On September 20, 1995, Officer Rodriguez initiated the present action against the City asserting four claims: (1) Count I alleged that the City discriminated against him on the basis of his religion by refusing his request to be exempted from clinic duty in violation of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act; (2) Count II alleged religious discrimination under the Municipal Code of the City of Chicago based on the same incident; (3) Count III alleged a violation of religious liberty under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA") for the same incident; and (4) Count IV sought an injunction prohibiting the CPD from assigning Officer Rodriguez to clinic duty. At various stages in the proceedings, the district court dismissed Officer Rodriguez's claims under the Municipal Code and RFRA, 5 leaving only his Title VII claim and his request for injunctive relief. The parties then filed cross-motions for summary judgment on the Title VII claim.
The district court granted the City's motion for summary judgment and denied Officer Rodriguez's. The court began its analysis of Officer Rodriguez's Title VII claim by noting that the City had conceded that Officer Rodriguez had established a prima facie case of religious discrimination. At that point, the burden shifted to the City to show that it had made a reasonable accommodation of Rodriguez's religious beliefs or that any accommodation would result in undue hardship. The district court held that various options were available to Officer Rodriguez under the existing collective bargaining agreement 6 ("CBA") by which he could avoid the conflict between his job assignments and religious beliefs and that, accordingly, the City has satisfied its duty to accommodate him. In particular, the court found that, under the CBA, Officer Rodriguez could have requested transfer to six alternative districts on the north side comparable to the 14th District that did not have facilities where abortions were performed. Due to his seniority, Rodriguez would have been able to make the change with no reduction in his level of pay or benefits. In addition, there existed several other options available to Officer Rodriguez by which he could have
avoided clinic duty such as applying for "special function assignments," changing his shift, changing his start time, using time due and using unpaid leave. In this regard, the court noted that Officer Rodriguez had been able to avoid clinic duty since November 1994 by taking advantage of those options.
We review de novo the district court's grant of...
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