Rodriguez v. Cnty. of Contra Costa
| Decision Date | 01 November 2013 |
| Docket Number | Case No: C 13-02516 SBA |
| Parties | DANIEL RODRIGUEZ, Plaintiff, v. COUNTY OF CONTRA COSTA, OAKLEY POLICE DEPARTMENT, CITY OF OAKLEY, PITTSBURG POLICE DEPARTMENT, CITY OF PITTSBURG, ROGER CANADY, individually and in his capacity as a police officer for the City of Oakley; and DOES 1-50, inclusive, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of California |
Plaintiff Daniel Rodiguez brings the instant excessive force action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Pittsburg Police Department and the City of Pittsburg (collectively "Defendants")1, among others. The Court has original jurisdiction over Plaintiff's § 1983 claims and supplemental jurisdiction over his related state law causes of action. 28 U.S.C. § 1331, 1367.
The parties are presently before the Court on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint. Dkt. 11. Having read and considered the papers filed in connection with this matter and being fully informed, the Court hereby GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART the motion to dismiss for the reasons set forth below. The Court, in itsdiscretion, finds this matter suitable for resolution without oral argument. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b); N.D. Cal. Civ. L.R. 7-1(b).
The following facts are taken from the Complaint, which, for purposes of this motion, are accepted as true. On November 25, 2012, Plaintiff was walking home from his job as a handyman at a local motel. Compl. ¶ 9, Dkt. 1. As Plaintiff approached his mother's house in Oakley, Oakley Police Officer Roger Canady drove up in his police cruiser and ordered Plaintiff to lie down on the ground. Id. ¶ 9. Unbeknownst to Plaintiff, Officer Canady was in pursuit of an armed robbery suspect who had robbed a liquor store located a short distance away. Id. ¶ 10.
Plaintiff asked why he was being ordered to lay down. Id. Officer Canady did not respond, and instead, took his police dog out of the car. Id. At this point, Plaintiff got on his knees and placed his hand behind his head. Id. ¶ 11. Officer Canady aimed his pistol at Plaintiff while yelling and screaming at him. Id. He then ordered his service dog to circle Plaintiff and then to attack him. Id. ¶¶ 11-12. Officers from the Pittsburg Police Department and the Contra Costa County Sheriff's Department arrived on scene and drew their weapons while shouting at Plaintiff to remain on the ground. Id. ¶ 13. The dog continued to attack and bite Plaintiff on his back, arms, legs and face. Id. At no time did any of the law enforcement officers attempt to stop the attack. Id.
An unidentified police officer eventually pulled the dog off of Plaintiff and placed him in handcuffs. Id. ¶ 15. The officers summoned the robbery victim, the liquor store owner, to the scene. Id. Upon his arrival, the store owner said, "You have the wrong guy." Id. Despite learning that they had detained the wrong person, the officers left Plaintiff in handcuffs on the ground. Id. In addition, none of the officers left to look for the actual suspect; instead, they stayed and taunted Plaintiff by calling him "insulting names." Id. A paramedic then arrived, and was advised that Plaintiff was a robbery suspect. Id. ¶ 16. Theparamedic laughed and commented, "He looks like a criminal." Id. Angry, Plaintiff told the paramedic to go "screw herself and refused treatment. Id.
Notably, several witnesses were present and complained to the officers that the dog was used to attack the Plaintiff, who was defenseless. Id. ¶ 17. The officers told the witnesses to "shut up" and to go back inside their houses. Id. ¶ 18. Plaintiff's family members took Plaintiff back to the motel where he worked and summoned an ambulance. Id. Plaintiff was taken to the Delta Memorial emergency room, where he was treated for his injuries. Id. ¶ 19. The examination revealed that Plaintiff had 56 puncture wounds on his back, neck, arms and biceps. Id. He was treated and released. Id.
On June 4, 2013, Plaintiff filed the instant action against: the County of Contra Costa; the Oakley Police Department; the City of Oakley; the Pittsburg Police Department; the City of Pittsburg; and Officer Canady. He alleges six claims for relief, styled as follows: (1) violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on the First, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments; (2) assault and battery; (3) intentional infliction of emotional distress ("IIED"); (4) violation of California Civil Code § 51.7; (5) violation of California Civil Code § 52.1; and (6) negligence. Plaintiff seeks compensatory, statutory and punitive damages.
Defendants Officer Canady, City of Oakley, County of Contra Costa and Oakley Police Department filed their Answer on August 13, 2013. Dkt. 12.
Defendants City of Pittsburg and the Pittsburg Police Department have now filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Plaintiff opposes the motion. The matter is fully briefed and is ripe for adjudication.2
"Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is proper when the complaint either (1) lacks a cognizable legal theory or (2) fails to allege sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory." Somers v. Apple, Inc., -- F.3d --, 2013 WL 5712731, at *3 (9th Cir. Sept. 3, 2013). "To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). In assessing the sufficiency of the pleadings, "courts must consider the complaint in its entirety, as well as other sources courts ordinarily examine when ruling on Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss, in particular, documents incorporated into the complaint by reference, and matters of which a court may take judicial notice." Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007). The court is to "accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true and construe the pleadings in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Outdoor Media Group, Inc. v. City of Beaumont, 506 F.3d 895, 899-900 (9th Cir. 2007) . Where a complaint or claim is dismissed, leave to amend generally is granted, unless further amendment would be futile. Chaset v. Fleer/Skybox Int'l, 300 F.3d 1083, 1087-88 (9th Cir. 2002).
Defendants contend that the Complaint fails to allege a viable theory of liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated; and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by "a person" acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). Section 1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights, but a jurisdictional vehicle for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred. See Thornton v. City of St. Helens, 425 F.3d 1158, 1164 (9th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted).
There is no respondeat superior liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Serv. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 692 (1978). Instead, to establish municipal liability under Monell, the plaintiff must "identify a municipal 'policy' or 'custom' that caused the plaintiff's injury." Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997) (citing cases). Specifically, a plaintiff must show that (1) he was deprived of a constitutional right; (2) the defendant had a policy, custom or practice; (3) the policy, custom or practice amounted to a deliberate indifference to his constitutional rights; and (4) the policy, custom or practice was the moving force behind the constitutional violation. Dougherty v. City of Covina, 654 F.3d 892, 900 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Mabe v. San Bernadino County, Dept. of Public Social Servs., 237 F.3d 1101, 1110-11 (9th Cir. 2001)).
Defendants argue that, as to the City of Pittsburg, Plaintiff is predicating liability solely on a theory of respondeat superior, as opposed to Monell. The basis of this contention is unclear, given that the Complaint expressly alleges that the City of Pittsburg, among others, "maintained, enforced, tolerated, permitted, acquiesced in, and applied policies, practices, or customs" that amounted to deliberate indifference to Plaintiff's constitutional rights. Compl. ¶ 7 (emphasis added). In addition, the pleadings specify the nature of those alleged policies, practices and customs. Id. ¶ 7a-f. The Court finds that Plaintiff has adequately alleged a § 1983 claim under Monell against the City of Pittsburg.
Defendant next contend that the Pittsburg Police Department is not a proper party-defendant to a § 1983 claim. The Court agrees. Although municipalities, such as cities and counties, are amenable to suit under Monell, sub-departments or bureaus of municipalities, such as the police departments, are not generally considered "persons" within the meaning of § 1983. Hervey v. Estes, 65 F.3d 784, 791 (9th Cir. 1995).
Plaintiff's reliance on Shaw v. State of California Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 788 F.2d 600 (9th Cir. 1986) is misplaced. Shaw held that for purposes of California law, a police department is a "public entity" under California Government Code § 811.2, and as such, "[a] Police Department may be sued in Federal court." Id. at 605. Inthis case, the issue is not whether the Pittsburg Police Department may be sued in federal court. Rather, the question is whether the Pittsburg Police Department it is a proper party for purposes of a § 1983 claim, which Shaw did not address. Therefore, Pittsburg Police Department is dismissed as a party-defendant from Plainti...
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