Rodriguez v. Comas

• Decision Date: 02 November 1988
• Docket Number: No. 87-1318,87-1318
• Citation: 888 F.2d 899
• Parties: Jose Denis RODRIGUEZ, et al., Plaintiffs, Appellees, v. Juan COMAS, Defendant, Appellant. . Heard
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit

Page 899

888 F.2d 899

Jose Denis RODRIGUEZ, et al., Plaintiffs, Appellees, v. Juan COMAS, Defendant, Appellant.

No. 87-1318.

United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit.

Heard Nov. 2, 1988.

Decided May 30, 1989.

As Amended on Denial of Rehearing

Oct. 11, 1989.

Opinion on Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied Nov. 7, 1989.

Anabelle Rodriguez, Asst. Sol. Gen., Dept. of Justice, Guaynabo, P.R., with whom Hon. Rafael Ortiz Carrion, Sol. Gen., and Norma Cotti Cruz, Deputy Sol. Gen., Ponce, P.R., were on brief, for defendant, appellant.

Harry Anduze Montano, Santurce, P.R., for plaintiffs, appellees.

Before COFFIN, Circuit Judge, WISDOM, ^* Senior Circuit Judge, and TORRUELLA, Circuit Judge.

WISDOM, Senior Circuit Judge:

This appeal requires the Court to consider again the question of qualified immunity and to determine a principled basis for the addition of plaintiffs as pendent parties.

Jose Dennis Rodriguez, an attorney for the Municipality of San Juan, and Irma Colon Rodriguez, his wife, sued Juan Comas Valle under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 and Puerto Rican law. They allege that Comas, a police officer for the Commonwealth, arrested Rodriguez in violation of his federal constitutional rights. The jury awarded Rodriguez $75,000 and his wife $25,000. Comas argues that he is protected from liability by qualified immunity and that Mrs. Rodriguez is a pendent party plaintiff improperly before the court. We affirm the judgments for both the Rodriguezes.

I

On May 2, 1984, Rodriguez was in the San Juan District Court representing his uncle, Jose Matos, who had been charged by his estranged common law wife, Maria Davila, with making threats against her, a misdemeanor under Puerto Rican law. Comas informed Rodriguez that he was investigating the charge and that Hestor Quinones, an assistant district attorney, wished to speak to him about threats he had made to Davila. Comas asked for his "generales": name, address, telephone number, and other information. Rodriguez replied that he could not speak to Quinones then because Matos's case had not been called. He refused to respond to questions about his "generales". Comas left to consult with Quinones. About an hour later, Comas again approached Rodriguez and told him that the district attorney wished to speak with him. Rodriguez said that he was willing to see Quinones after the trial of the Matos case and started to enter the anteroom to the courtroom. Comas then stepped in front of him and asked three times for his name, and "generales". Both men became excited, raised their voices, and spoke loudly so that their voices were audible in the room and in the hallway, where there were, of course, lawyers and their clients. Comas then summoned a marshal who escorted Rodriguez to Judge Arroyo. Rodriguez identified himself and explained that he could not accompany Comas for questioning because he expected his uncle's case to be called. Judge Arroyo instructed Comas to leave Rodriguez alone until after the Matos hearing was over.

Rodriguez's case was not called by the end of the day, at which time Comas confronted Rodriguez outside the courtroom and announced that he was under arrest. ¹ Comas charged Rodriguez with obstructing justice and also with having made threats against his uncle's wife. Comas took Rodriguez to the "cuartelillo" where there were manacled prisoners charged with criminal offenses. Rodriguez remained there for several hours before he was released.

Several weeks later, a magistrate found that there was no probable cause for Rodriguez's arrest for allegedly making threats, but that there was probable cause to arrest Rodriguez for obstructing justice. On August 8, 1984, after a jury trial, Rodriguez was acquitted.

Rodriguez brought this action on May 2, 1985. He said that the public arrest and publicity caused embarrassment, psychological trauma, physical pain, and such emotional distress that he was absent from work for 108 days. The trial judge dismissed his wife's federal claim but allowed her to remain as a pendent party plaintiff. Vol. I at 83-4. On February 13, 1987, the jury found for both plaintiffs, awarding Rodriguez $75,000 and his wife $25,000.

II

Comas moved for a directed verdict after Rodriguez presented his evidence. Comas argued that he was entitled to qualified immunity. Tr. vol. II, at 214. The district court denied the motion. Id. at 226. Comas renewed the motion at the close of the trial. The court denied it again. Vol. III at 362.

Qualified immunity protects governmental employees from liability, from discovery, and from trial. ² We should extend qualified immunity to Comas if we conclude that "a reasonable officer could have believed [arresting Rodriguez] to be lawful, in light of clearly established law and the information the [arresting] officer[ ] possessed". ³ We first examine the law, to determine whether the right allegedly violated was "clearly established"; if so, the defendant should reasonably have known of the right. Second, we examine the defendant's conduct, to establish whether objectively it was reasonable for him to believe that his actions did not violate a "clearly established" right.

The landscape in which this standard rests has changed recently. The standard in its original form arguably required only that plaintiffs state a "clearly established" right in their allegations. This formulation dissuaded courts from examining the evidence plaintiffs could adduce to support their allegations. The Supreme Court equated appellate review of motions to dismiss with review of motions for summary judgment, ⁴ and this Court restricted interlocutory appellate review of denials of summary judgment to examination of plaintiffs' allegations. ⁵

In 1987, the Supreme Court announced that the right to qualified immunity must be clearly established, not as a general matter but "in a more particularized, and hence more relevant, sense: the contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right". ⁶ Accordingly, this Court has since reviewed the entire record developed on summary judgment. ⁷ This procedure allows courts to determine the official's knowledge more accurately than had been possible when review was restricted to the allegations in the complaint.

We turn now to the substance of Comas's appeal. Rodriguez's right to refuse to answer Comas's questions is clearly established. As the target of Comas's investigation, Rodriguez could of course refuse to answer potentially incriminating questions. Comas's investigation had not developed enough to bring Rodriguez's Fifth Amendment rights into play, however. Comas knew that under Puerto Rican laws he could not arrest Rodriguez for the misdemeanor of threatening his client's estranged wife. Threats constitute a misdemeanor ⁸ for which an arrest before investigation is allowed only if the act takes place in the officer's presence. ⁹ He did, however, have reasonable suspicion to question Rodriguez. Comas tried to ratchet Rodriguez's failure to cooperate with this investigation into justification for an arrest. The Supreme Court, however, has consistently held that a person's refusal to comply with a police officer's justified Terry stop does not, by itself, warrant arrest. ¹⁰ More than a year before Comas arrested Rodriguez, Justice White stated, as clearly established law:

The person approached [by a police officer], however, need not answer any question put to him; indeed, he may decline to listen to the questions at all and may go on his way. He may not be detained even momentarily without reasonable, objective grounds for doing so; and his refusal to listen or answer does not, without more, furnish those grounds. ¹¹

This passage announces no change in law. It reaffirms the principle declared in Brown v. Texas: a person cannot be arrested for failing to cooperate with an investigation when law enforcement officials do not have "reasonable, objective" justification for an arrest. ¹²

We now consider whether a reasonable official would have believed that arresting Rodriguez for obstructing an investigation violated Rodriguez's right to refuse to answer questions. In deciding this question, we examine the record as a whole and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of Rodriguez, the nonmoving party. Under Puerto Rican law, Comas could only summon Rodriguez for questioning. Rodriguez's refusal to provide his name could impede Comas's investigation, then, only if it prevented Comas from summoning Rodriguez. No reasonable officer could conclude that it did. Rodriguez offered to appear for questioning after he finished his business in court. Rodriguez's name and address were available in the file on the case that Comas investigated. The complainant knew Rodriguez and could easily have provided the information Comas sought. Rodriguez identified himself to two judges in Comas's presence. Comas should have availed himself of these easily accessible sources for Rodriguez's name. ¹³

Indeed, it appears that Comas's questioning and arrest of Rodriguez in the presence of other lawyers were humiliating forms of harassment. Comas had attended a hearing in April 1984 at which Rodriguez had identified himself. Vol. II at 171-72. At that hearing, Rodriguez testified, "I identified myself for the record and Agent Comas is next to me". Vol. II at 171-72. A fellow officer of Comas said in his deposition that Comas knew Rodriguez's name before May 2, although he changed his testimony when he appeared as a witness for Comas. Vol. III. When Rodriguez arrived at the courthouse on May 2, he found Comas talking with his client. He told Comas that he wished to speak with his client. Vol. I at 99. Rodriguez's aunt pointed Rodriguez out to Comas. III at 289. An hour later, Comas informed Rodriguez that a district attorney wished to talk with him; he knew who Rodriguez was. Rodriguez testified that Comas addressed him by...