Rodriguez v. Fort Worth Transp. Auth., 02–14–00340–CV
| Citation | 546 S.W.3d 180 |
| Decision Date | 23 June 2016 |
| Docket Number | NO. 02–14–00340–CV,02–14–00340–CV |
| Parties | Michelle RODRIGUEZ, Appellant v. FORT WORTH TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY; McDonald Transit, Inc.; McDonald Transit Associates, Inc.; and LeShawn Vaughn, Appellees and Fort Worth Transportation Authority a/k/a The T; McDonald Transit, Inc.; McDonald Transit Associates, Inc.; and LeShawn Vaughn, Appellants v. Michelle Rodriguez and New Hampshire Insurance Co., Appellees |
| Court | Court of Appeals of Texas |
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT/APPELLEE MICHELLE RODRIGUEZ: J. MARK SUDDERTH, NOTEBOOM-THE LAW FIRM, HURST, TEXAS.
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES/APPELLANTS FORT WORTH TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY A/K/A THE T; MCDONALD TRANSIT, INC.; MCDONALD TRANSIT ASSOCIATES, INC.; AND LESHAWN VAUGHN: TIMOTHY G. CHOVANEC, LAW OFFICE OF TIMOTHY G. CHOVANEC, P.C., FORT WORTH, TEXAS, MARK G. CREIGHTON, LAW OFFICE OF MARK G. CREIGHTON, FORT WORTH, TEXAS.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE NEW HAMPSHIRE INSURANCE CO., JOHN V. FUNDIS, DOWNS STANFORD, P.C., DALLAS, TEXAS.
PANEL: DAUPHINOT, WALKER, and MEIER, JJ.
The trial court granted partial summary judgment and the petition for interpleader filed by Appellees and Cross–Appellants Fort Worth Transportation Authority, also known as The T (FWTA), McDonald Transit, Inc. (MTI), McDonald Transit Associates, Inc. (MTA), and LeShawn Vaughn (the transit defendants) in the suit brought by Appellee Michelle Rodriguez, denied Rodriguez's motion for partial summary judgment, and denied all parties' requests for attorney's fees. Both sides appealed.
In her appeal, Rodriguez argues that the trial court erred by granting partial judgment for the transit defendants, by dismissing her claims against Vaughn, and by denying her motion for partial summary judgment. In their appeal, the transit defendants complain of the trial court's denial of their requested attorney's fees.
Because we hold (1) that the trial court erred by granting the transit defendants' motion for partial summary judgment, dismissing Rodriguez's claims, and denying Rodriguez's motion for summary judgment in part and (2) that the trial court abused its discretion by granting the interpleader based on the transit defendants' arguments about the statutory cap on their liability, we reverse the trial court's judgment in part. We affirm the trial court's judgment as to its denial of attorney's fees to the transit defendants.
This appeal is from two consolidated lawsuits arising out of the death of Rodriguez's mother, Judith Peterson. Peterson was struck and killed by a bus driven by Vaughn. Vaughn is an employee of MTI. MTI and MTA are both independent contractors of FWTA. Cross–Appellee New Hampshire Insurance Company (Insurance) paid worker's compensation death benefits to Rodriguez.
Rodriguez filed a wrongful death suit against the transit defendants in the 153rd District Court of Tarrant County. In a separate suit against only FWTA and Vaughn, Insurance brought claims in subrogation for negligent entrustment and respondeat superior.2 Insurance filed its suit in the 67th District Court of Tarrant County.
In Insurance's suit, MTI filed a petition in intervention and interpleader. MTI stated that it had been sued by Rodriguez and that it would not deny its liability or "[p]laintiff's injuries and damages as alleged in the lawsuits." But MTI further alleged that under section 101.023(b) of the Texas Tort Claims Act (TTCA),3 the liability of FWTA, MTI, and their employees was capped at $100,000 for all claims arising out of Peterson's death and that Rodriguez and Insurance had competing claims against that $100,000. MTI asserted that it was tendering the limit of $100,000 into the registry of the court under rule of civil procedure 43.4 It asked that it "and all current and future parties which are entitled to the protections of the [TTCA], be dismissed from this cause, With Prejudice" and that it recover its attorney's fees and costs.
Insurance nonsuited all of its claims. On motions filed by the transit defendants, Rodriguez's case was transferred to the 67th District Court, and the two suits were consolidated.5
The transit defendants filed a combined amended interpleader petition and request for declaratory relief, which, unlike MTI's original interpleader petition, included all of the transit defendants. They gave the same legal basis for the interpleader as MTI had in its previous interpleader petition—a liability cap of $100,000 shared among all four defendants. This amended interpleader petition asserted that Rodriguez's claims were defensible, but they would not defend against them if the court accepted their interpleader to resolve all of Rodriguez's claims.
Both sides filed motions for partial summary judgment. In the transit defendants' motion, they reiterated their arguments that a single limit of $100,000 applied to Rodriguez's wrongful death claim, and they asserted that Vaughn was entitled to be dismissed under the TTCA as an employee of a governmental unit.
Rodriguez filed an amended petition for a declaratory judgment that FWTA, MTI, and MTA each had a liability limit of $100,000 and that Vaughn's liability was not limited. In her response to the transit defendants' summary judgment motion, Rodriguez acknowledged that the liability limits of the TTCA applied, but she disagreed that the TTCA capped the total from all defendants at a combined total of $100,000. She argued that the interpleader was improper and must be denied.
In Rodriguez's motion for partial summary judgment, she asserted that there was no evidence that MTI had unconditionally tendered funds into the registry of the court, that it was exposed to double liability, or that it was an innocent, disinterested stakeholder. She asserted the same grounds, among others, framed as traditional summary judgment grounds. And she asked for a declaratory judgment that the liability limits in the TTCA applied separately to FWTA, MTA, and MTI, and that Vaughn's liability was not limited by the TTCA.
The trial court denied Rodriguez's motion for partial summary judgment and granted that of the transit defendants. In its order granting partial summary judgment for the transit defendants, the trial court granted the requested interpleader and dismissed all claims against the transit defendants. It found that the claims against Vaughn should be dismissed based on section 101.106(b) of the TTCA6 and that Rodriguez's total amount of recovery against all of the defendants cumulatively was no more than $100,000 under the TTCA.
After a hearing, the trial court denied the transit defendants' request for attorney's fees. It then rendered a final judgment that further ordered that Rodriguez recover $100,000 after the exhaustion of all appeals and dismissing Rodriguez's claims with prejudice.
In Rodriguez's first issue, she asserts that the trial court erred by granting the transit defendants' motion for partial summary judgment. Under this issue, she argues that the tort-liability limits applicable to multiple defendants apply separately to each defendant and that Vaughn is not an employee of a governmental unit under the TTCA.
We review a summary judgment de novo.7 We take as true all evidence favorable to the nonmovant, and we indulge every reasonable inference and resolve any doubts in the nonmovant's favor.8 The summary judgment will be affirmed only if the record establishes that the movant has conclusively proved all essential elements of the movant's cause of action or defense as a matter of law.9
When both parties move for summary judgment and the trial court grants one motion and denies the other, the reviewing court should review both parties' summary judgment evidence and determine all questions presented.10 The reviewing court should render the judgment that the trial court should have rendered.11
The TTCA contains the following provisions relevant to this appeal:
By their plain language, the $100,000 liability limit applies only to suits against local governments, and the provision for employees' dismissal from suits applies only to employees of a governmental unit and not to employees of the governmental unit's independent contractor.
Chapter 452 of the transportation code regulates regional transportation authorities. The chapter uses the term "regional transportation authority" to describe authorities created either under that chapter (as provided for under subchapter R15 ) or under the chapter's predecessor in the revised civil statutes.16 Section 452.052 makes a regional transportation authority a governmental unit under the TTCA.17
Section 452.056 authorizes a regional transportation authority to contract for the operation of all or a part of its transportation system.18 Subsection (d) of that section provides that a private operator that has contracted with a transportation authority "is not a public entity for purposes of any law of this state except that an independent contractor of the authority" that performs...
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