Rodriguez v. General Acc. Ins. Co. of America, No. 73222
Court | United States State Supreme Court of Missouri |
Writing for the Court | ROBERTSON; BLACKMAR, C.J., RENDLEN, HIGGINS, COVINGTON and HOLSTEIN, JJ., and FLANIGAN; BILLINGS |
Citation | 808 S.W.2d 379 |
Docket Number | No. 73222 |
Decision Date | 03 May 1991 |
Parties | Gail and Matias RODRIGUEZ, Appellants, v. GENERAL ACCIDENT INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA, Respondent. |
Page 379
v.
GENERAL ACCIDENT INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA, Respondent.
En Banc.
Page 380
Carrie L. Kmoch, St. Louis, for appellants.
Eugene K. Buckley, John S. McCollough, St. Louis, for respondent.
ROBERTSON, Judge.
This case involves the underinsured motorist coverage of an automobile insurance contract. Appellants, Gail and Matias Rodriguez, appeal the entry of summary judgment in favor of the defendant, General Accident Insurance Company of America (General Accident), claiming that the underinsured motorist coverage of the insurance contract between the parties is ambiguous. Relying on that ambiguity, the Rodriguezes urge that this Court should apply an "objective reasonable expectation" standard to find that their underinsured motorist coverage is excess coverage and that they are entitled to the limits of that coverage irrespective of payments received from the tortfeasor. They also contend that they are entitled to stack the underinsured motorist coverage.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment. We granted transfer to consider this case together with Sisco v. American Family Mutual Insurance Co., 806 S.W.2d 409 (Mo. banc 1991). Mo. Const. art. V, sec. 10. We have jurisdiction. Following oral argument, we determined that the cases were significantly different and warranted separate consideration. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
I.
On September 11, 1987, appellant Gail Rodriguez received injuries when the vehicle she was driving collided with a vehicle operated by John Fruehwirth. Fruehwirth's insurance company paid Rodriguez $50,000, the limits of liability of Fruehwirth's insurance policy. Rodriguez sought the balance of her damages from her insurance carrier, General Accident, under the policy's "underinsured motorist coverage."
The face sheet of the policy in question shows various coverages for two automobiles including underinsured motorist coverage with a limit of $50,000 on each vehicle. The face sheet also reveals that General Accident did not charge an additional premium for the underinsured motorist coverage. The salient provisions of the
Page 381
Underinsured Motorist Coverage Endorsement are as follows:Underinsured Motorist Coverage
A. We will pay damages which an "insured" is legally entitled to recover from the owner or operator of an "underinsured motor vehicle" because of "bodily injury;"
1. Sustained by an "insured";
* * * * * *
C. "Underinsured motor vehicle" means a land motor vehicle or trailer of any type to which a bodily injury liability bond or policy applies at the time of the accident but its limit for bodily injury liability is less than the limit of liability for this coverage.
* * * * * *
A. The limit of liability shown in the schedule for this coverage is our maximum limit of liability for all damages resulting from any one accident. This is the most we will pay regardless of the number of:
1. "Insureds";
2. Claims made;
3. Vehicles or premiums shown in the Declarations; or
4. Vehicles involved in the accident
However, the limit of liability shall be reduced by all sums paid because of the "bodily injury" by or on behalf of persons or organizations who may be legally responsible. This includes all sums paid under part A of this policy.
(Emphasis added).
General Accident declined to pay citing the contractual language. The Rodriguezes brought this action seeking both to recover under the uninsured motorist coverage and to have their underinsured motorist coverage stacked, thereby claiming a total of $100,000 in underinsured motorist coverage. General Accident filed a motion for summary judgment. The trial court sustained the motion holding that Fruehwirth was not an "underinsured motorist" under the insurance contract. This appeal followed.
II.
Summary judgment is an extreme, drastic remedy and may be employed only where there are no genuine issues of fact and where the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Elliott v. Harris, 423 S.W.2d 831, 835 (Mo. banc 1968). On review, this Court examines the record in the light most favorable to the party against whom judgment was rendered. Gast v. Ebert, 739 S.W.2d 545, 546 (Mo. banc 1987). The Rodriguezes admit that Fruehwirth was covered by a policy of insurance with $50,000 limits and that they have recovered $50,000 from Fruehwirth's insurer. With this admission any factual dispute in this case evaporates. As there are no issues of fact unresolved, the propriety of the trial court's order sustaining General Accident's motion for summary judgment turns solely upon questions of law.
A.
The Rodriguezes argue that their insurance contract with General Accident is ambiguous and that they are entitled to a resolution of the ambiguity consistent with their objective reasonable expectations, citing Estrin Construction Co., Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 612 S.W.2d 413 (Mo.App.1981). Their argument leads them to conclude that application of the objective reasonable expectations doctrine renders the underinsured motorist coverage as excess coverage and that they are entitled to their policy limit, $50,000, in coverage beyond that which Fruehwirth's insurer previously paid.
In Robin v. Blue Cross Hospital Service, Inc., 637 S.W.2d 695, 697 (Mo. banc 1982), this Court described the objective reasonable expectations doctrine as a ...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Allied Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Stuart, Case No. 4:16–CV–806 (CEJ)
...or, in order to enforce a particular construction which it might feel is more appropriate." Rodriguez v. Gen. Acc. Ins. Co. of Am. , 808 S.W.2d 379, 382 (Mo. 1991) (en banc).The UIM Coverage endorsement in the policy involved in this case provides as follows:I. UNDERINSURED MOTORISTS COVERA......
-
Perkinson v. Courson, NO. 4–17–0364
...in the meaning of the words used in the contract.’ " Id. at 337 (quoting Rodriguez v. General Accident Insurance Co. of America , 808 S.W.2d 379, 382 (Mo. 1991) ).¶ 81 Here, plaintiff acknowledged signing the Release at issue upon her arrival at Cross Country. In fact, she signed three such......
-
Travis v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., Case No. 4:21-CV-00558-SPM
...are determined by the contract entered between the insured and the insurer.’ ") (quoting Rodriguez v. General Accident Ins. Co. of Am. , 808 S.W.2d 379, 383 (Mo. banc 1991) ).For all of the above reasons, the Court finds that the Illinois choice of law provision should be honored, and the C......
-
Dusharm v. Nationwide Ins. Co., No. 2:97-CV-371.
...proceeds." See, e.g., Alguila v. Safety Ins. Co., 416 Mass. 494, 624 N.E.2d 79, 80 (1993); Rodriguez v. General Accident Ins. Co., 808 S.W.2d 379, 382-83 (Mo.1991) (en banc). The fact that "limits of liability" refers to policies "applicable to the accident," not policies applicable to the ......
-
Allied Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Stuart, Case No. 4:16–CV–806 (CEJ)
...or, in order to enforce a particular construction which it might feel is more appropriate." Rodriguez v. Gen. Acc. Ins. Co. of Am. , 808 S.W.2d 379, 382 (Mo. 1991) (en banc).The UIM Coverage endorsement in the policy involved in this case provides as follows:I. UNDERINSURED MOTORISTS COVERA......
-
Perkinson v. Courson, NO. 4–17–0364
...in the meaning of the words used in the contract.’ " Id. at 337 (quoting Rodriguez v. General Accident Insurance Co. of America , 808 S.W.2d 379, 382 (Mo. 1991) ).¶ 81 Here, plaintiff acknowledged signing the Release at issue upon her arrival at Cross Country. In fact, she signed three such......
-
Travis v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., Case No. 4:21-CV-00558-SPM
...are determined by the contract entered between the insured and the insurer.’ ") (quoting Rodriguez v. General Accident Ins. Co. of Am. , 808 S.W.2d 379, 383 (Mo. banc 1991) ).For all of the above reasons, the Court finds that the Illinois choice of law provision should be honored, and the C......
-
Dusharm v. Nationwide Ins. Co., No. 2:97-CV-371.
...proceeds." See, e.g., Alguila v. Safety Ins. Co., 416 Mass. 494, 624 N.E.2d 79, 80 (1993); Rodriguez v. General Accident Ins. Co., 808 S.W.2d 379, 382-83 (Mo.1991) (en banc). The fact that "limits of liability" refers to policies "applicable to the accident," not policies applicable to the ......