Rodriguez v. Jones
| Decision Date | 09 June 2009 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 03-CV-74919-DT. |
| Citation | 625 F.Supp.2d 552 |
| Parties | Frank C. RODRIGUEZ, Petitioner, v. Kurt JONES, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan |
Frank Rodriguez, Carson City, MI, pro se.
Brad H. Beaver, Michigan Department of Attorney General, Lansing, MI, for Respondent.
Petitioner Frank C. Rodriguez has filed a pro se application for the writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Respondent Kurt Jones urges the Court through counsel to deny the habeas petition on grounds that the state court did not unreasonably apply Supreme Court precedent to Petitioner's claims and that some of the claims are procedurally defaulted. Having reviewed the pleadings and record, the Court agrees that Petitioner's claims do not warrant granting the writ of habeas corpus. Accordingly, the habeas petition will be denied.
Petitioner was tried jointly in Oakland County Circuit Court with co-defendant Tico Porter. On November 4, 1997, the jury found Petitioner guilty of conspiracy to deliver 650 or more grams of cocaine, MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.157a; MICH. COMP. LAWS § 333.7401(2)(a)(i), possession with intent to deliver 50 to 224 grams of cocaine, MICH. COMP. LAWS § 333.7401(2)(a)(iii), and two counts of delivery of less than 50 grams of cocaine, MICH. COMP. LAWS § 333.7401(2)(a)(iv).1 The facts leading to these convictions have been summarized by the Michigan Court of Appeals as follows:
Defendants' convictions arise from their alleged involvement in sales of cocaine in Waterford Township and Pontiac from approximately September 1990 to March 1994. In 1988, the Waterford Police Department received information that Rodriguez was selling cocaine in area bars. In 1989 and 1990, the police conducted surveillance of Rodriguez' activities. On September 28, 1990, the police arrested Rodriguez for driving while his operator's license was suspended and, in a search incident to the arrest, found cocaine; Rodriguez was charged with possession with intent to deliver less than fifty grams of cocaine. In December 1992, Rodriguez pleaded guilty to that charge and was sentenced to lifetime probation.
In the interim, in April 1992, the Waterford Police, in conjunction with the Oakland County Sheriff's Department and the Narcotics Enforcement Team, began a larger investigation into defendants' drug dealing on the basis of information that the size and scope of their organization had grown. The police resumed surveillance, during which they observed Porter present with Rodriguez while Rodriguez was dealing cocaine. In July 1993, a grand jury convened and, in March 1994, returned an indictment charging defendants. Also named in the indictment was a coconspirator, Paul Potter, who pleaded guilty to a lesser charge in exchange for his testimony against defendants.
The indictment alleged that both defendants, Potter, "and others both known and unknown to the Grand Jury" participated in a conspiracy beginning about September 1990 and continuing until March 1994, in which Rodriguez purchased cocaine in quantities ranging from one ounce to one kilogram and that Porter and Potter aided Rodriguez in the transporting, storing, weighing, and packaging of the cocaine that was sold in smaller amounts in Oakland County during this period. The indictment also charged defendants and Potter each with possession with intent to deliver more than 650 grams of a mixture containing cocaine in November 1991 and charged Rodriguez with two counts of delivering less than fifty grams of a mixture containing cocaine that involved transactions on August 13, 1991, and September 10, 1991, and one count of possession with intent to deliver less than fifty grams of a mixture containing cocaine that involved a transaction on December 17, 1991. Following a preliminary examination, defendants were bound over on all charges.
After defendants were bound over for trial, the second count charging Porter with possession with intent to deliver more than 650 grams of a mixture containing cocaine was amended to possession with intent to deliver 50 or more but less than 225 grams of a mixture containing cocaine. The second count of the indictment charging Rodriguez with possession with intent to deliver more than 650 grams of a mixture containing cocaine was amended to possession with intent to deliver 50 or more but less than 225 grams of a mixture containing cocaine. Following a jury trial, defendants were convicted as set forth above.
People v. Rodriguez, 251 Mich.App. 10, 13-16, 650 N.W.2d 96, 101-02 (2002). The trial court sentenced Petitioner to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for the conspiracy conviction, ten to thirty years in prison for the possession conviction, and two to thirty years in prison for each of the delivery convictions.
In an appeal of right, Petitioner alleged that (1) his rights under the Double Jeopardy Clause were violated, (2) the trial court's jury instructions were fatally defective, (3) he was denied his right to a unanimous verdict, (4) he was deprived of his right to present a defense by the trial court's ruling and the prosecutor's misconduct, (5) the admission of his nontestifying co-defendant's out-of-court statement violated his rights under the Confrontation Clause, and trial counsel was ineffective for not objecting, and (6) the prosecutor's other misconduct required reversal. The Michigan Court of Appeals was unpersuaded by these arguments and affirmed Petitioner's convictions in a published opinion on April 26, 2002. See id.
Petitioner raised the same six claims and six new claims in the Michigan Supreme Court. The new claims alleged that (7)2 the trial court deprived Petitioner of his right to due process by admitting "other acts" evidence, (8) the trial court violated Petitioner's right not to be placed twice in jeopardy by failing to instruct the jury on similar acts evidence, (9) defense counsel's failure to request a limiting instruction on similar acts evidence violated Petitioner's right to effective assistance of counsel, (10) the trial court abused its discretion when denying Petitioner's motions for a separate trial, (11) the state courts failed to uphold the "same transaction" test, and (12) the trial court failed to instruct the jury that it must unanimously agree on the specific acts that equaled 650 grams. The Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal on April 1, 2003, because it was not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed. See People v. Rodriguez, 468 Mich. 880, 659 N.W.2d 241 (2003) (table).
Petitioner filed his habeas corpus petition on December 8, 2003. The petition incorporated by reference the twelve issues that Petitioner presented to the Michigan Supreme Court. Respondent moved to dismiss the habeas petition on the ground that Petitioner had not exhausted state remedies for all his claims. On January 4, 2005, the Court stayed Petitioner's exhausted claims and dismissed his unexhausted claims so that Petitioner could pursue additional remedies in state court. The Court closed this case for statistical purposes.
Petitioner then returned to state court where he filed a motion for relief from judgment. The trial court denied his motion, and the Michigan Court of Appeals denied leave to appeal for failure to show entitlement to relief under Michigan Court Rule 6.508(D). See People v. Rodriguez, No. 265073 (Mich.Ct.App. Apr. 11, 2006).
In an application for leave to appeal in the Michigan Supreme Court, Petitioner argued that (13)3 amendments to state law rendered his sentence cruel or unusual punishment under the Michigan Constitution, (14) the police and prosecutor engaged in sentencing entrapment, (15) his pre-sentence information report contained incorrect information, (16) he was entitled to consideration for parole due to his cooperation with law enforcement officers, (17) he was improperly sentenced as a habitual offender, (18) he was denied effective assistance of trial and appellate counsel, and (19) the trial court erred in its order denying Petitioner's motion for relief from judgment and in failing to rule on certain issues. The Michigan Supreme Court, in lieu of granting leave to appeal, remanded the case to the trial court to determine whether changes had been made in Petitioner's presentence investigation report, as ordered by the trial court at Petitioner's sentencing hearing, and, if not, for amendment of the report. The supreme court denied leave to appeal in all other respects because Petitioner failed to establish entitlement to relief under Michigan Court Rule 6.508(D). See People v. Rodriguez, 477 Mich. 902, 722 N.W.2d 853 (2006).
On November 29, 2006, Petitioner moved to reinstate his federal habeas petition, and on April 6, 2007, the Court re-opened this case. The parties then filed supplemental briefs.
The Court construes the habeas petition to assert the nineteen claims that Petitioner raised in state court. Respondent contends that some of these claims are procedurally defaulted. While that may be true, the Court will excuse the alleged procedural defaults in the interests of efficiency. Petitioner's claims lack merit, and the Court has found it more efficient to adjudicate the claims on their merits than to analyze whether they are barred from review by the doctrine of procedural default.
Petitioner is entitled to the writ of habeas corpus only if the state court's adjudication of his claims on the merits—
(1) resulted in a decision...
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