Rodriguez v. Lolotai
| Decision Date | 28 March 2022 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action 20-cv-02541-PAB-STV |
| Parties | MICHELE DOMINICA RODRIGUEZ, an individual, Plaintiff, v. POLICE OFFICER WAYLON LOLOTAI, in his official capacity, POLICE OFFICER HER, in his official capacity, JOHN DOE PARAMEDICS, JOHN DOE PARAMEDICS' EMPLOYER, and CITY OF BOULDER, COLORADO, a municipality Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Colorado |
MICHELE DOMINICA RODRIGUEZ, an individual, Plaintiff,
v.
POLICE OFFICER WAYLON LOLOTAI, in his official capacity, POLICE OFFICER HER, in his official capacity, JOHN DOE PARAMEDICS, JOHN DOE PARAMEDICS' EMPLOYER, and CITY OF BOULDER, COLORADO, a municipality Defendants.
Civil Action No. 20-cv-02541-PAB-STV
United States District Court, D. Colorado
March 28, 2022
ORDER
PHILIP A. BRIMMER, CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
This matter is before the Court on the Combined Motion for Summary Judgment on Behalf of Officers Lolotai, Her, and the City of Boulder [Docket No. 23]. Plaintiff responded, Docket No. 26, [1] to which defendants replied. Docket No. 29. The Court
has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
I. BACKGROUND[2]
Boulder parks are closed between 11:00 p.m. and 5:00 p.m., and remaining in a park between those hours is a violation of Boulder Municipal Code § 8-3-3(b). Docket No. 23 at 2, ¶ 2. Officers Waylon Lolotai (“Lolotai”) and Fue Her (“Her” and, collectively with Officer Lolotai, the “defendant officers” or the “officers”) were on routine foot patrol on August 25, 2018 along the Boulder Creek path at approximately 11:40 p.m. Id., ¶ 1. The officers heard a disturbance across Broadway in Sister Cities Plaza, which is a park covered by the 11:00 p.m. closure rule. Id., ¶¶ 3-4.[3] Upon arriving at the plaza, the officers encountered five individuals sitting and standing, along with several open containers, including one behind and within easy reach of plaintiff. Id. at 2-3, ¶¶ 3-6.[4]
Possession of an open container of alcohol is a violation of Boulder Municipal Code § 5-7-2. Id. at 3, ¶ 11.
The officers asked the individuals to be seated. Id., ¶ 8. Plaintiff objected and asked the officers if they had a warrant. Id., ¶ 9.[5] Officer Lolotai responded that there were open containers of alcohol around plaintiff and the others, id., ¶¶ 10, 12, and, after plaintiff denied this, Officer Lolotai illuminated the area with his flashlight, which showed an open container immediately behind plaintiff. Id., ¶ 13.
Officer Lolotai asked plaintiff to sit down 11 times and explained that he asked everyone to sit down for his safety. Id., ¶¶ 14, 16. Plaintiff sat down briefly, and Officer Lolotai asked plaintiff for her identification and informed her that she was being detained. Id. at 4, ¶¶ 17, 19. After providing her date of birth, plaintiff stood. Id., ¶ 20. Officer Lolotai again asked plaintiff to sit down and told her that if she did not sit, he was going to place her in handcuffs. Id., ¶ 21. Plaintiff sat down and reached into a bag that was on the bench next to her. Id., ¶ 22. Officer Lolotai asked plaintiff to stop digging in her bag. Id., ¶ 23. Plaintiff stood up and asked where her phone was. Id., ¶ 24. After Officer Her told plaintiff to “[s]top reaching for stuff, ” she tossed her phone
into her bag and reached into her bag again. Id., ¶¶ 25-26.[6] The officers put plaintiff in handcuffs, while plaintiff resisted the officers. Id., ¶¶ 27-28.[7] Plaintiff continued to resist as the officers “bent Plaintiff over at the waist and placed her face on a bag” on the ground. Id. at 5, ¶¶ 29-30.[8] Plaintiff was bent over for 62 seconds before the officers backed away and allowed her to move about while repeatedly asking her to sit down. Id., ¶¶ 31-32.[9]
When the officers searched plaintiff, they found that she had a knife in her pocket, in violation of Boulder Municipal Code § 5-8-9, and that there was a hatchet under a bag near where plaintiff was sitting. Id., ¶¶ 33-34. The officers told plaintiff that she was going to be placed in a police car. Id., ¶ 35. Plaintiff resisted the officers, and they used minimal force to obtain compliance. Id., ¶ 36-37. Non-party officers decided to transport plaintiff via ambulance to Boulder Community Hospital. Id. at 6, ¶ 40. Over an officer's objections, paramedics, who are not employed by the City of Boulder (the “City”), administered Haldol to plaintiff so that she could be transported safely. Id., ¶¶ 41-42; Docket No. 25, (Ex. E) (Ekwo) AXONBody2Video2018-08-252345, at 5:55:22-41. Neither of the defendant officers participated in the decision to use Haldol, and neither was present when the drug was administered. Id., ¶ 43. Plaintiff did not file a notice of claim with the City. Id., ¶ 46.
Plaintiff brings the following five claims for relief: (1) Fourth Amendment unconstitutional seizure against the defendant officers; (2) Fourth Amendment excessive force against the defendant officers, the paramedics, and their employer; (3) First Amendment retaliation and suppression of speech and association against the defendant officers; (4) negligent hiring, failure to supervise, and failure to train against the City; (5) and unconstitutional policy, practices, and customs against the City. Docket No. 1 at 14-22, ¶¶ 41-89.
II. LEGAL STANDARDS
A. Summary Judgment
Summary judgment is warranted under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 when the “movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-50 (1986). A disputed fact is “material” if, under the relevant substantive law, it is essential to proper disposition of the claim. Wright v. Abbott Labs., Inc., 259 F.3d 1226, 1231-32 (10th Cir. 2001). Only disputes over material facts can create a genuine issue for trial and preclude summary judgment. Faustin v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 423 F.3d 1192, 1198 (10th Cir. 2005). An issue is “genuine” if the evidence is such that it might lead a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Allen v. Muskogee, 119 F.3d 837, 839 (10th Cir. 1997).
Where “the moving party does not bear the ultimate burden of persuasion at trial, it may satisfy its burden at the summary judgment stage by identifying a lack of evidence for the nonmovant on an essential element of the nonmovant's claim.” Bausman v. Interstate Brands Corp., 252 F.3d 1111, 1115 (10th Cir. 2001) (quotation omitted). “Once the moving party meets this burden, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to demonstrate a genuine issue for trial on a material matter.” Concrete Works of Colo., Inc. v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 36 F.3d 1513, 1518 (10th Cir. 1994). The nonmoving party may not rest solely on the allegations in the pleadings, but instead must designate “specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.”
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986) (quotations omitted). “To avoid summary judgment, the nonmovant must establish, at a minimum, an inference of the presence of each element essential to the case.” Bausman, 252 F.3d at 1115. When reviewing a motion for summary judgment, a court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Id.
B. Qualified Immunity
“Qualified immunity balances two important interests - the need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009). A court should resolve questions of qualified immunity at the earliest possible stage of litigation. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 646 n.6 (1987). However, a plaintiff facing a qualified immunity challenge still does not have a heightened pleading standard. Currier v. Doran, 242 F.3d 905, 916-17 (10th Cir. 2001).
Under the doctrine of qualified immunity, “government officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). Thus, to survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) “where a qualified immunity defense is implicated, the plaintiff ‘must allege facts sufficient to show (assuming they are true) that the defendants plausibly violated their constitutional rights.'” Hale v. Duvall, 268 F.Supp.3d 1161, 1164 (D. Colo. 2017) (quoting Robbins v. Oklahoma ex rel. Dep't of Human Servs.,
519 F.3d 1242, 1249 (10th Cir. 2008)). When a defendant raises the defense of qualified immunity, a “plaintiff carries a two-part burden to show: (1) that the defendant's actions violated a federal constitutional or statutory right, and, if so, (2) that the right was clearly established at the time of the defendant's unlawful conduct.” T.D. v. Patton, 868 F.3d 1209, 1220 (10th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Courts are “permitted to exercise their sound discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first in light of the circumstances in the particular case.” Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236. The practical effect of Pearson's directive on the qualified-immunity analysis is that for a plaintiff to prevail, both prongs must be adequately established; however, for a defendant to prevail, inadequacy with respect to either prong will suffice. See Shroff v. Spellman, 604 F.3d 1179, 1188 (10th Cir. 2010).
III. ANALYSIS
A. Claims against Officers Lolotai and Her
1. Claim One - Unconstitutional Seizure
The Court first considers plaintiff's “unconstitutional seizure” claim against the defendant officers. Plaintiff claims that she was subject to a Fourth Amendment seizure the moment Officer Lolotai told her that she was being detained. Docket No. 1 at 14, ¶ 44. Plaintiff further alleges that the officers lied about a fight occurring in order to approach a group of “‘transients' under false pretenses” and that Officer Lolotai could not answer why he detained plaintiff but, if he actually had reasonable suspicion, he
had to “readily” explain the reason for the detention. Id. at...
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