Rodriguez v. McGinnis

Decision Date23 December 1969
Docket NumberNo. 69-CV-348.,69-CV-348.
Citation307 F. Supp. 627
PartiesEugene RODRIGUEZ, and the United States of America ex rel. Eugene Rodriguez, Plaintiff-Petitioner, v. Paul D. McGINNIS, Commissioner of Correction; Russell G. Oswald, Chairman of the Board of Parole, J. Edwin LaVallee, Warden and Chairman of the Prison Board of Clinton State Prison; New York State Board of Parole; and the New York State Department of Correction, Defendants-Respondents.
CourtU.S. District Court — Northern District of New York

Richard A. Kohn, Albany, N. Y., for plaintiff.

Louis J. Lefkowitz, Atty. Gen., State of New York, for respondents; Jack W. Hoffman, Timothy F. O'Brien, Asst. Attys. Gen., of counsel.

MEMORANDUM—DECISION and ORDER

JAMES T. FOLEY, Chief Judge.

This typewritten pro se complaint under the Civil Rights statutes is combined with a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. It rarely occurs, but the plaintiff-petitioner forwarded to the Clerk the prescribed statutory fees for filing the complaint and petition. This form of application demonstrates again the ingenuity of state prisoners in following a pattern of a pleading that brought successful results. A similar combined application,—and I had direct contact with the case,—was filed in this Court in Daniel, and U. S. ex rel. Daniel v. McGinnis et al., in 69-CV-118, and was lawyer-prepared by the firm of Rabinowitz, Boudin & Standard, Attorneys in New York City. This same firm recently obtained a preliminary injunction from District Judge Motley, of the Southern District of New York, in Sostre v. Rockefeller et al., 68 Civ. 4058, by decision dated September 4, 1969, for an inmate of Green Haven Prison, New York, involving a claim based upon 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, statutes upon which jurisdiction for this action is based. Judge Motley stated flatly the Court had jurisdiction. Applying the legal principles to be followed in preliminary injunction applications, she ruled that keeping the plaintiff Sostre in segregation for more than a year on account of disciplinary charges may be totally disproportionate to the offenses charged and thus violative of the Eighth Amendment. It was stated that the plaintiff had demonstrated clear probability of success upon a final determination of the merits. The injunction restrained the Warden from holding the plaintiff in punitive segregation and from depriving him of the rights and privileges of the general prison population until final determination was made. The trial has been held, briefing directed, and the matter is under consideration. In the meantime, I understand the preliminary injunction has been complied with and Sostre was released from segregation. Reference is made to this action and the preliminary ruling to indicate again that no matter the reluctance of the past, it is now settled beyond question that claims of this kind alleging federal constitutional deprivation by State prisoners, if not frivolous on their face, are within the jurisdiction of the federal courts under the Civil Rights Act and must be entertained and determined.

This fact should be recognized and accepted, because there is an increasing volume of judicial writing and comment to this effect. It is clear, as so well stated, that we have come a long way from some earlier attitudes toward rights of prisoners. (Jackson v. Godwin, 5 Cir., 400 F.2d 529.) Our own Circuit in Wright v. McMann, 2 Cir., 387 F.2d 519, at page 522, the noted case that involved a New York prisoner confined in segregation at Clinton Prison, remarked that the older cases retain little vitality; that there is no longer any question a state prisoner may bring an action under the Civil Rights Act, citing among other cases, Cooper v. Pate, 378 U.S. 546, 84 S.Ct. 1733, 12 L.Ed.2d 1030; and that the harshest blow to the old "hands-off" doctrine was struck by Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492. It is settled too that the due process and equal protection processes of the Fourteenth Amendment follow prisoners into prison. (Washington v. Lee (D.C.N.D.Ala.), 263 F.Supp. 327, 331; aff'd per curiam, 390 U.S. 333, 88 S.Ct. 994, 19 L.Ed.2d 1212). The Civil Rights statutes, when relied upon for federal jurisdiction, do not require the exhaustion of state judicial remedies. (Houghton v. Shafer, 392 U. S. 639, 88 S.Ct. 2119, 20 L.Ed.2d 1319; D'Amico v. California, 389 U.S. 416, 88 S.Ct. 526, 19 L.Ed.2d 647; McNeese v. Board of Education, 373 U.S. 668, 83 S. Ct. 1433, 10 L.Ed.2d 622; Monroe v. Pape, supra; Wright v. McMann, supra, 387 F.2d at p. 524).

Specifically, in this instance, although the Assistant Attorney General tries to convert the complaint into solely a habeas corpus petition that alone, of course, would entail the usual requirement for exhaustion of state remedies, to my mind the habeas corpus petition in the combination here is merely a proper adjunct to insure full relief if the plaintiff prevails in the dominant civil rights claim. (See Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684, 66 S.Ct. 773, 90 L.Ed. 939; Jones v. Peyton (E.D.Va.), 294 F. Supp. 173; United States ex rel. Stuart v. Yeager (D.C.New Jersey), 293 F. Supp. 1079; 28 U.S.C. § 1651). Cases directly in point that sustain in my judgment jurisdiction under the particular, narrow claim and issues raised thereby by this plaintiff-petitioner are: United States ex rel. Campbell v. Pate, 7 Cir., 401 F.2d 55, 57; Landman v. Peyton, 4 Cir., 370 F.2d 135; Sewell v. Pegelow, 4 Cir., 291 F.2d 196).

These federal authorities are set forth not as comprehensive review of all the law on the subject. Such federal writings are referred to merely to give several examples that there is full recognition by the federal courts that the primary authority and responsibility for prison administration and discipline remains, and should remain, with the State administrative personnel, and that the federal courts are never inclined to reach out to intrude unless,—and this is an important "unless" that New York should recognize,—there is sufficient showing procedures and regulations exist that impair the constitutional rights of prisoners. (Jordan v. Fitzharris (N. D.California), 257 F.Supp. 674, 680; Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107, 86 S. Ct. 760, 15 L.Ed.2d 620; United States ex rel. Schuster v. Herold, 2 Cir., 410 F. 2d 1071; cert. den. 396 U.S. 847, 90 S. Ct. 81, 24 L.Ed.2d 96.) This position is no more than a simple, common-sense one that is in accord with the American desire for fairness within its prison systems and such philosophy has been heralded in this day from a variety of sources. The new Chief Justice of the United States, Justice Burger, in an address to the American Bar Association, called for a comprehensive and profound examination into our penal system from beginning to end, and among the details he thought should be examined are the standards and programs for release. (American Bar Association News, Vol. 14, p. 5). Chief Judge Lumbard in his concurring opinion in Wright, supra, 387 F.2d at page 527, referred to—and I think recommended in effect to New York—consideration of the hearing procedures and safeguards set forth in the Task Force Report on Corrections, issued in May 1967 by the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice. (See also State Prisons and the Free Community, Judge Jiudice, New York State Bar Journal, December 1969, p. 672.)

The President of the United States a short time ago called for consideration of a ten-year program with enormous appropriations to undertake search for improvements in the federal penal system that may become models for state corrections and prison administrators. Undeniably, change is in the air and the handwriting on the wall is big and black for all to see. States are making important changes in regard to promulgation of effective, fair procedures where withholding, forfeiture and restoration of good time is involved. (Burns v. Swenson (D.C.W.D.Missouri), 288 F.Supp. 4.) To its credit, it was developed at the hearing in this action that effective March 1, 1969, the New York State Department of Correction issued "Revised Procedures Covering Disciplinary Matters". Plaintiff's Ex. 8.) Such enlightened approach is heartwarming to this District Court where increasing numbers of civil rights claims of the kind here are being filed by State prisoners.

I am a firm believer that the blemishes and mistakes in the procedures of the past are best corrected from within by adoption of fair and enlightened regulations and instructions bound to withstand attack in any court, and ultimately lead to the reduction of such alleged grievances. The Governor, the Correction Commissioner and the legal advisors for the Commissioner of Correction and the Wardens are the ones to lead the way. The best legal advice is that which anticipates difficulty and counsels the corrective measures that will reduce the challenge. A good example is the statement in Wright, 387 F.2d at p. 528 by Judge Lumbard: "The Attorney General has advised us that whatever may be the truth as to the condition of solitary confinement in a strip cell in 1965 and 1966, such conditions do not now exist." Of course, the Wardens, it seems, must have autonomy and wide authority for on-the-spot decisions but no one would contend that Wardens or their deputies should be permitted to become a law unto themselves. I am aware there is at times a guarded, almost hostile, attitude toward federal court intrusion into certain aspects of State Prison affairs. That state of mind is unfortunate and the best way, I think, to dispel it is to advise the lay correction officers, whom I have found to be men of integrity and dedication, that new thinking in the law is prevalent and must be followed.

In this action, there is again set forth as an affirmative Second Defense: "The complaint fails to state a claim sufficient to establish the jurisdiction of this Court over the subject-matter." As I have tried to indicate, in...

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