Rodriguez v. Molina
| Decision Date | 24 June 2022 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 4:22-cv-00183-SMR-HCA |
| Citation | 608 F.Supp.3d 791 |
| Parties | Eny Adamy Mejia RODRIGUEZ, Petitioner, v. Dennys Antonio Reyes MOLINA, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Iowa |
Cara S. Donels, Thomas Merrill Patton, Fredrikson & Byron, P.A., Des Moines, IA, for Respondent.
ORDER ENTERING PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
Petitioner Eny Adamy Mejia Rodriguez filed a Petition pursuant to the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (the "Convention") and the International Child Abduction Remedies Act ("ICARA"). [ECF No. 1]. In the Complaint, Petitioner alleges Respondent unlawfully took their child from Honduras to the United States.1 Id. The Court construed Petitioner's request as a Temporary Restraining Order ("TRO") under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(b). Id. The requested order would, among other things, prohibit Respondent Dennys Antonio Reyes Molina from removing the child from the jurisdiction. Id. The Court granted the order. [ECF No. 9].
After granting the order, the Court set an expedited hearing to determine whether to convert the TRO into a preliminary injunction. [ECF No. 9]. At the hearing, Petitioner and Respondent – both represented by counsel – stipulated to extending the order until a final determination could occur. [ECF No. 12]. In so doing, parties agreed that the circumstances supporting the issuance of the TRO remained. Id. Finally, parties agreed that the preliminary injunction hearing would not be consolidated with a merits trial under Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(a)(2). Id. Given the parties’ agreement, as well as the Court's review of the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65, the preliminary injunction is GRANTED.
The United States of America is a signatory to the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction ("the Convention"). The Convention's goals are twofold: 1) "to secure the prompt return of children wrongfully removed to or retained in any Contracting State" and 2) "to ensure that rights of custody and of access under the law of one Contracting state are effectively respected in the other Contracting States." Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, art. 1(a),(b), Oct. 24, 1980, T.I.A.S. No. 11670, 1343 U.N.T.S. 89 ("The Convention."). The Senate considered and unanimously ratified the Convention in October 1986. S. Treaty Doc. No. 99-11. Shortly afterwards, the International Child Abduction Remedies Act ("ICARA") was enacted to carry out the treaty domestically. See 22 U.S.C. § 9001 – 9010.
Although the Convention and ICARA created a detailed framework to address potential child abductions, a petitioner seeking a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction must still comply with the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65. See Morgan v. Morgan , 289 F. Supp. 2d 1067, 1069 (N.D. Iowa 2003) ; Babcock v. Babcock , 3:20-cv-00066-RWP, 2020 WL 6293445, at *2 (S.D. Iowa Aug. 24, 2020) ; McIntyre v. Smith , Case No. 21-cv-2182 (WMW/LIB), 2021 WL 5167280, at *1 (D. Minn. Oct. 7, 2021). For district courts sitting within the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, they must consider the following four factors before granting a preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order: "(1) the threat of irreparable harm to the movant; (2) the state of the balance between this harm and the injury that granting the injunction will inflict on other [ ] litigant[s]; (3) the probability that movant will succeed on the merits; and (4) the public interest." Dataphase Sys., Inc. v. C L Sys., Inc. , 640 F.2d 109, 113 (8th Cir. 1981). "No single factor in itself is dispositive; in each case all of the factors must be considered to determine whether on balance they weigh towards granting the injunction." Baker Elec. Coop., Inc. v. Chaske , 28 F.3d 1466, 1472 (8th Cir. 1994) (quoting Calvin Klein Cosmetics Corp. v. Lenox Labs., Inc. , 815 F.2d 500, 503 (8th Cir. 1987) ); see also D.M. by Bao Xiong v. Minn. State High Sch. League , 917 F.3d 994, 999 (8th Cir. 2019) (citation omitted).
Each of these four factors weighs in favor of converting the temporary restraining order into a preliminary injunction. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS the preliminary injunction.
The first factor requires a moving party to show they will suffer an irreparable harm if the preliminary injunction is not granted. Gen. Motors Corp. v. Harry Brown's, LLC , 563 F.3d 312, 318–19 (8th Cir. 2009) (citing Dataphase , 640 F.2d at 113 ). "A party must show that the harm is certain and great and of such imminence that there is a clear and present need for equitable relief." Iowa Utilities Bd. v. F.C.C. , 109 F.3d 418, 425 (8th Cir. 1996) (citing Packard Elevator v. I.C.C. , 782 F.2d 112, 115 (8th Cir. 1986) ). Likewise, there must be no alternative besides granting the preliminary injunction that would redress the harm. Watkins Inc. v. Lewis , 346 F.3d 841, 846–47 (8th Cir. 2003) (). An unreasonable delay in seeking injunctive relief often precludes a finding of irreparable harm in the case. See Adventist Health Sys./Sunbelt, Inc. v. United States Dep't of Health and Hum. Servs. , Case No. 3:20-cv-00101-SMR-SBJ, 2021 WL 973455, at *7 (S.D. Iowa Mar. 12, 2021) (citing Benisek v. Lamone , ––– U.S. ––––, 138 S. Ct. 1942, 1944, 201 L.Ed.2d 398 (2018) ).
The petition and supporting record demonstrate that Petitioner will suffer irreparable harm in the absence of a preliminary injunction. Specifically, the Complaint asserts Respondent brought the child from Honduras to the United States without requesting or receiving Petitioner's permission to do so. [ECF No. 1 at 3]. This action deprived her of the ability to care for the child, who allegedly resided with her full-time in Honduras. Id. Petitioner made several attempts to secure the return of the child, both by herself and through the Honduran and the United States governments. [ECF Nos. 5 (Sealed); 8 (Sealed)]. These requests were not fulfilled.
Petitioner lacks the ability to see the child after Respondent and the child arrived in the United States. At the beginning of the dispute, she alleges that she was limited to sending messages to the child through Facebook Messenger for a two-hour period each day, as well as only brief phone or video calls. [ECF No. 1 at 3]. Later in the dispute, but before filing the Complaint, Petitioner asserts Respondent and Respondent's significant other blocked her on Facebook, which prevented any communication with the child. [ECF No. 1-8 at 2–3]. More recently, she has had minimal phone calls and no in-person visits with the child. [ECF No. 1 at 3].
The denial of a parent's lawful right to connect with and visit a child constitutes irreparable harm under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(b)(1)(A), particularly in an ICARA case. Morgan , 289 F. Supp. 2d at 1070. The record demonstrates Petitioner has almost completely been denied access to the child, which means she will suffer irreparable injury in the absence of an injunction maintaining this Court's jurisdiction over the Respondent and child pending expeditious resolution of this matter. Accordingly, this element has been met.
"A court should flexibly weigh the case's particular circumstances to determine whether the balance of equities so favors the movant that justice requires the court to intervene ... until the merits are determined." United Indus. Corp. v. Clorox Co. , 140 F.3d 1175, 1179 (8th Cir. 1998) (quoting Calvin Klein , 815 F.2d at 503.). "In balancing the equities, we weigh ‘the threat of irreparable harm’ shown by the movant against ‘the injury that granting the injunction will inflict on other parties.’ " MPAY Inc. v. Erie Custom Comput. Applications, Inc. , 970 F.3d 1010, 1020 (8th Cir. 2020) (quoting Dataphase Sys. , 640 F.2d at 113 ). This balancing test requires a court to distinguish between "weak or illusory injur[ies]" and "very real threats" of injuries. Sak v. City of Aurelia, Iowa , 832 F. Supp. 2d 1026, 1046 (N.D. Iowa 2011).
As discussed, Petitioner has produced evidence suggesting she suffered and will continue to suffer irreparable injury without a preliminary injunction. Conversely, the injunction constitutes a minimal intrusion on Respondent because it would not mandate he move the child from her current location, it would not require the return of the child to Honduras, and it is not a final determination on the merits. The injunction maintains the status quo until an expeditious final determination, required under the Convention, is issued. Accordingly, this element also supports granting the preliminary injunction.
"Success on the merits has been referred to as the most important of the four factors." Roudachevski v. All-Am. Care Ctrs., Inc. , 648 F.3d 701, 706 (8th Cir. 2011). The factor requires a court to consider whether a party has "a substantial likelihood of success on the merits." Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds , 530 F.3d 724, 731 (8th Cir. 2008) (quoting Richenberg v. Perry , 73 F.3d 172, 172–73 (8th Cir. 1995) ). "[T]he moving party need not demonstrate a mathematical probability of success, such as greater than 50 percent." Yankton Sioux Tribe v. Kempthorne , 442 F. Supp. 2d 774, 782 (D. S.D. 2006) (quoting Heartland Acad. Cmty. Church v. Waddle , 335 F.3d 684 (8th Cir. 2003) ). The moving party "must simply show a ‘fair chance of prevailing.’ " Jet Midwest Int'l Co., Ltd. v. Jet Midwest Grp. , LLC, 953 F.3d 1041, 1045 (8th Cir. 2020) (quoting Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. , 530 F.3d at 732 ). More importantly, a court need not decide whether the party "will ultimately win." PCTV Gold, Inc. v....
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