Rodriguez v. New Orleans Public Service, Inc.
| Citation | 400 So.2d 884 |
| Decision Date | 22 June 1981 |
| Docket Number | No. 80-C-2881,80-C-2881 |
| Parties | Severino RODRIGUEZ, et al. v. NEW ORLEANS PUBLIC SERVICE, INC. |
| Court | Supreme Court of Louisiana |
Floyd F. Greene, New Orleans, for defendant-applicant.
Ronald F. Plaisance, New Orleans, for plaintiff-respondent.
Rodolfo Rodriguez was injured during an altercation which occurred aboard a streetcar operated by New Orleans Public Service, Inc. (NOPSI). Rodolfo's father, individually and in behalf of his son, sued NOPSI for damages in the First City Court for the Parish of Orleans. That court rendered judgment for plaintiff in the amount of $1300.75 and the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment. This Court granted a writ of certiorari to consider the duty of the defendant to protect passengers from the intentional torts of other passengers. 396 So.2d 910.
The facts of this case have been accurately summed up by the court of appeal as follows:
Rodolfo Rodriguez, a 14-year-old white male, boarded a St. Charles Avenue streetcar at its intersection with Calhoun Street. He was accompanied by his young friend, Michael Hammer. Already on the streetcar were two young black females and at least two adults, referred to in the testimony as "tourists". Rodriguez and Hammer testified that shortly after they boarded the streetcar the two females commenced to make derogatory and insulting remarks toward them. They got up and moved a few seats away. The insulting epithets continued for approximately 20 blocks. At one point, Rodriguez and Hammer stated that the insults were so loud that the "tourists" turned and looked to their direction. Throughout this period of time the motorman on the streetcar, John Yancy, gave no indication that he was aware of the incidents taking place behind him.
As the streetcar reached the intersection of Carrollton and Oak Streets the two females arose to exit. As they passed young Rodriguez a large handbag of one of the females "slapped me across the face." Young Rodriguez reacted instantly by throwing up his arms and rising. In doing so, he knocked one of the females over and against one of the seats across the aisle. Immediately thereafter one of the females attacked Rodriguez with a seam ripper, inflicting superficial wounds on his lower left forearm, upper left arm, upper right arm and right chest. Yancy stopped the streetcar immediately and separated the youths. The females immediately left the scene. Rodriguez and Hammer got off the street car and went across the street to a local drug store to obtain first aid assistance.
After having received first aid assistance young Rodriguez and Hammer boarded another streetcar, and as they approached the end of the line they saw Yancy. Yancy then made inquiry concerning the extent of Rodriguez' injuries and called for a supervisor to investigate the matter.
Yancy's testimony is to the effect that he was totally unaware of any disturbance on his streetcar until the scuffling ensued. He did not hear the verbal abuse directed to the youths by the two females. He stated that he did not call his supervisor at Carrollton and Oak because he thought that a supervisor would be waiting at the Carrollton and Claiborne intersection. While he did admit to observing blood on Rodriguez' clothing and some blood on the seat of the streetcar, he still determined to wait until he reached the Carrollton and Claiborne intersection before reporting the incident.
There is testimony establishing that defendant's company rules require the operators of its vehicles to immediately report any incident involving personal injury. In this respect, Yancy should have called for supervisory assistance at the Carrollton and Oak intersection. It is also company policy that its operators should do everything reasonably within their power to avoid altercations that might result in injury to its fare-paying customers.
Plaintiff's contention is that the failure of the defendant's motorman to do anything between the time the female passengers began insulting Rodolfo and his companion and the time of the attack constituted a breach of defendant's duty of care. Given the factual posture of the case, we disagree.
In Gross v. Teche Lines, 207 La. 354, 21 So.2d 378 (1945), this Court approved a doctrine which states that a carrier of passengers is not an insurer of safety but, rather, is required to exercise the highest degree of care and is liable for the slightest negligence. This Court further stated that when a passenger is injured in an accident and has failed to reach his destination in safety, the burden is on the carrier to prove itself free from fault, i. e., that it acted with the highest degree of care or that the accident did not occur. See also Galland v. New Orleans Public Service, Inc., 377 So.2d 84 (La.1979); Wise v. Prescott, 244 La. 157, 151 So.2d 356 (1963). The reason for the first rule is the notion that one who is in the business of providing transportation for a fee should be a more professional transporter than the "reasonably prudent" driver with respect to hazards associated with the transportation of passengers. In keeping with the reason for the rule, the courts of this state have consistently applied it in cases involving vehicular collisions involving public passenger carriers 1 or other injuries related to the operation of carriers' vehicles. 2
More recently, the duty of highest care has been applied, with differing interpretations, to injuries arising from batteries inflicted upon passengers by trespassers or other passengers. 3 It is obvious however that injury resulting from a battery is totally unconnected with the hazards generally associated with transportation. Because of the lack of any connexity between transportation by public carriers and batteries upon passengers other than the location of the injuries, an application of the "highest care" standard to attacks committed on public carriers' vehicles would go beyond the reason for the rule and treat public carriers specially for all purposes rather than for those risks associated with the conducting of its business. Such a result cannot be sanctioned and is expressly disapproved.
Merely because the defendant will not be held to the highest degree of care to prevent intentional batteries upon its passengers does not mean that the law will absolve it from liability any time a passenger is attacked. Since defendant is essentially operating a business that permits the public to enter its premises, it should be held to the same duty as a reasonable business establishment with respect to hazards not associated with the peculiar nature of carriage of passengers.
Owners of businesses who permit the public to enter their establishments have a duty to exercise reasonable care to protect those who do enter. Ferrington v. McDaniel, 336 So.2d 796 (La.1976); Kavlich v. Kramer, 315 So.2d 282 (La.1975); Rigney v. Howard Bros. Discount Stores, Inc., 387 So.2d 38 (La.App. 3rd Cir. 1980); Martel v. South Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 368 So.2d 1192 (La.App. 3rd Cir. 1979). This duty extends to keeping the premises safe from unreasonable risks of harm or warning persons of known dangers. Williams v. Winn Dixie of La., Inc., 393 So.2d 680 (La.1981). When the independent, intentional tortious or criminal acts of a third person constitute the unreasonable risk, this duty does not require the proprietor to risk physical injury or civil or criminal liability by physical intervention. Rather, the duty can be discharged by the summoning of those entrusted by law with the power of immediately maintaining the peace, the police, at the time the proprietor knows or should reasonably know of the third person's intention and apparent ability to execute the intended acts. See Guidry v. Toups, 351 So.2d 1280 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1977), writ den. 353 So.2d 1036 (La.1978); Borne v. Bourg, 327 So.2d 607 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1976); Anderson v. Clements, 284 So.2d 341 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1973); Rodney v. Mansur, 219 So.2d 305 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1969). 4 In addition, the proprietor would have to, as far as is practicable under the circumstances, warn others of the danger prior to the arrival of the police so that they might take actions to avoid the danger. Anderson v. Clements, supra; see also Williams v. Winn Dixie of La., su...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Lopez v. Southern Cal. Rapid Transit Dist.
...... Southern California Rapid Transit District (RTD), a public corporation, has a duty to protect passengers aboard its ... (See, e.g., McPherson v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc. (5th Cir.1967) 383 F.2d 527, 531 [applying Georgia law]; ...2016; but cf. Rodriguez v. New Orleans Public Serv., Inc. (La.1981) 400 So.2d 884, ...,200 square miles with approximately 2,000 buses in service during peak hours, RTD contends that, "To impose [upon it] ......
-
Schwamb v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.
....... Francis G. Weller and James Hahn, New Orleans, for defendant-appellant Delta Air Lines, Inc. . Paul G. .... Duty of Common Carriers . A public carrier of passengers is not the insurer of its passengers' safety. It ... . Page 462 . Rodriguez v. NOPSI, 400 So.2d 884, 887 (La.1981). . Nor is a common ......
-
Broussard v. State
...not, however, insure the safety of every individual who may happen to ride its elevator. Cf. Rodriguez v. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc., 400 So. 2d 884, 886 (La. 1981). If the elevator's defective condition is open and obvious to all who encountered it, thenPage 18the defect may not be unrea......
-
In re
...not, however, insure the safety of every individual who may happen to ride its elevator. Cf. Rodriguez v. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc., 400 So.2d 884, 886 (La.1981). If the elevator's defective condition is open and obvious to all who encountered it, then the defect may not be unreasonably ......