Rodriguez v. Rahs Grocery Co.
| Decision Date | 21 September 2021 |
| Docket Number | 20-cv-150-JAH |
| Parties | MICHAEL RODRIGUEZ, Plaintiff, v. RALPHS GROCERY COMPANY, an Ohio Corporation; and DOES 1-10, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of California |
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Pending before the Court are Plaintiff Michael Rodriguez's (“Plaintiff” or “Rodriguez”) and Defendant Ralphs Grocery Company's (“Defendant” or “Store”) Cross Motions for Summary Judgment, filed pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P 56. See Doc. Nos. 20, 21. The motions have been fully briefed. See Doc. Nos. 24-27. For the reasons explained, the Court GRANTS Defendant's motion and DENIES Plaintiff's motion.
Plaintiff Michael Rodriguez shops at his neighborhood grocery store the Food 4 Less located at 312 Euclid Avenue, San Diego California, which is located less than a half mile from his home. The Store has numerous cart corrals located throughout the parking lot where customers are to deposit their shopping carts after use. Occasionally customers dispose of their shopping carts outside of the designated corrals, which are eventually picked-up and retrieved by Store employees.
To ensure carts are disposed of into the proper corrals, the Store employs cart associates. The primary duty of the cart associate is to visually inspect the Store's parking lot and retrieve all shopping carts from outside the Store and bring them back to the cart storage area in front of the store.
Plaintiff cannot walk independently because he has cerebral palsy, so he uses a wheelchair for mobility. On two occasions in November 2019 and on two occasions in December 2019 Plaintiff visited the Store to buy groceries. Along Euclid Avenue, Rodriguez can take one of two paths of travel to the store: 1) a path located along the south side of Wells Fargo that leads into the Store parking lot; 2) a path located further south on Euclid Avenue, after crossing Naranja Street, which provides a switchback ramp leading to a marked path of travel toward the Store. During the alleged visits Rodriguez used either of the aforementioned paths to get to and from the Store. During each of these visits, Rodriguez encountered shopping carts blocking the path of travel, making it difficult for him to pass through in his wheelchair. On each of the November 2019 visits, Rodriguez complained to the Store manager at least twice, who assured Plaintiff the issues would be taken care of.
Since those visits, Rodriguez has continued to visit the Store, including several times between August and November 2020, wherein he repeatedly encountered shopping carts blocking the paths of travel, specifically on the switchback ramp and on or near the walkway in front of the Store. On several occasions, shopping carts that were collected and stacked together were left on the path of travel, usually off to one side but still crowding the way. Rodriguez complained about the obstructions several more times and asked the Store manager to change policies so that the paths are kept clear of shopping carts.
On several occasions, Rodriguez has had to either move shopping carts out of his way to pass, or otherwise ride his wheelchair in the vehicular way to access the store when unable to get around carts another way. The latter caused Rodriguez discomfort as he feared he would be hit by a car. During one of his November 2019 visits, cars honked at Rodriguez, and a security guard even shouted at him when he used the vehicular way to access the Store.
Plaintiff filed a complaint on January 22, 2020, asserting claims for (1) disability discrimination in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et. seq.; (2) disability discrimination for failure to reasonably accommodate, 42 U.S.C. § 12182; and (3) disability discrimination for failure to reasonably accommodate in violation of the Unruh Civil rights Act (“Unruh”), Cal. Civ. Code § 51-53. Plaintiff names Ralphs Grocery Company and Does 1-10 as defendants. Plaintiff alleges that he is a paraplegic who cannot walk and who uses a wheelchair for mobility. Complaint ¶ 1 (Doc. No. 1). He alleges that on two occasions in November 2019 and two occasions in December 2019, Defendant failed to provide accessible paths of travel leading from the parking lot to the store entrance within the ADA standards as related to wheelchair users like Plaintiff. Id. ¶¶ 8, 10.
Defendant filed an answer on February 10, 2020 and the parties jointly filed a discovery plan on June 2, 2020. On June 8, 2020 the Honorable William V. Gallo, United States Magistrate Judge, issued a Scheduling Order. On February 26, 2021 Defendant Store and Plaintiff filed separate motions for summary judgment. The parties filed respective oppositions on March 26, 2021, and both filed respective replies on April 9, 2021.
Summary judgment is properly granted when “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and ... the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). Entry of summary judgment is appropriate “against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of establishing an absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. Where the party moving for summary judgment does not bear the burden of proof at trial, as here, it may show that no genuine issue of material fact exists by demonstrating that “there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's case.” Id. at 325. The moving party is not required to produce evidence showing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, nor is it required to offer evidence negating the non-moving party's claim. Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 885 (1990); United Steelworkers v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 865 F.2d 1539, 1542 (9th Cir. 1989). “Rather, the motion may, and should, be granted so long as whatever is before the District Court demonstrates that the standard for the entry of judgment, as set forth in Rule 56(c), is satisfied.” Lujan, 497 U.S. at 885 (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323).
Once the moving party meets the requirements of Rule 56, the burden shifts to the party resisting the motion, who “must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256 (1986). Without specific facts to support the conclusion, a bald assertion of the “ultimate fact” is insufficient. See Schneider v. TRW, Inc., 938 F.2d 986, 990-91 (9th Cir. 1991). A material fact is one that is relevant to an element of a claim or defense and the existence of which might affect the outcome of the suit. The materiality of a fact is thus determined by the substantive law governing the claim or defense. Disputes over irrelevant or unnecessary facts will not preclude a grant of summary judgment. T.W. Electrical Service, Inc. v. Pacific Electrical Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248).
When making this determination, the court must view all inferences drawn from the underlying facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587. “Credibility determinations, the weighing of evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge, [when] ... ruling on a motion for summary judgment.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255.
Cross-motions for summary judgment do not necessarily permit the judge to render judgment in favor of one side of the other. Starsky v. Williams, 512 F.2d 109, 112 (9th Cir. 1975). The court must consider each motion separately “on its own merits” to determine whether any genuine issue of material fact exists. Fair Hous. Council of Riverside Cnty, Inc. v. Riverside Two, 249 F.3d 1132, 1136 (9th Cir. 2001); Starsky, 512 F.2d at 112. When evaluating cross-motions for summary judgment, the court must analyze whether the record demonstrates the existence of genuine issues of material fact, both in cases where both parties assert that no material factual issues exist, as well as where the parties dispute the facts. See Fair Hous. Council of Riverside Cnty, 249 F.3d at 1136 (citing Chevron USA, Inc. v. Cayetano, 224 F.3d 1030, 1037 n.5 (9th Cir. 2000)).
Defendant argues that 1) Plaintiff's Inaccessible Path of Travel claim fails for lack of fair notice; 2) Plaintiff's ADA and Unruh Act claims lack merit; 3) Plaintiff's claims for injunctive relief are moot; and 4) if the Court does not dismiss Plaintiff's Unruh Act claim with prejudice, then it should decline supplemental jurisdiction over the claim.
FRCP Rule 8 states that a civil complaint “must contain…a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). The Supreme Court has interpreted the “short and plain statement” requirement to mean that the complaint must provide “the defendant [with] fair notice of what…the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)).
To succeed on his Title III, ADA claim, “a plaintiff must show that: (1) he is disabled within the meaning of the ADA (2) the defendant is a private entity that owns, leases, or operates a place of public accommodation; and (3) ...
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