Rodriguez v. Raymours Furniture Co.

• Decision Date: 15 June 2016
• Citation: 225 N.J. 343,138 A.3d 528,32 A.D. Cases 1598
• Parties: Sergio RODRIGUEZ, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. RAYMOURS FURNITURE COMPANY, INC., a corporation, t/a Raymour & Flanigan, Defendant–Respondent.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

225 N.J. 343

138 A.3d 528

32 A.D. Cases 1598

Sergio RODRIGUEZ, Plaintiff–Appellant

v.RAYMOURS FURNITURE COMPANY, INC., a corporation, t/a Raymour & Flanigan, Defendant–Respondent.

Supreme Court of New Jersey.

Argued Dec. 1, 2015.

Decided June 15, 2016.

Alan L. Krumholz, Jersey City, argued the cause for appellant (Krumholz Dillon, attorneys).

Patricia A. Smith argued the cause for respondent (Ballard Spahr, attorneys; Ms. Smith, Edward T. Groh, and Amy L. Bashore, Cherry Hill, on the briefs).

Bennet D. Zurofsky, Newark, argued the cause for amicus curiae National Employment Lawyers Association–New Jersey (Mr. Zurofsky, Schall & Barasch, and Sarah Fern Meil, Milford, attorneys; Mr. Zurofsky, Ms. Meil, and Richard M. Schall, Moorestown, on the brief).

John E. Keefe, Jr., Red Bank, argued the cause for amicus curiae New Jersey State Bar Association (Miles S. Winder III, President, attorney; Paris P. Eliades, Sparta, of counsel; Mr. Keefe, Mr. Eliades, Stephen T. Sullivan, Jr., Red Bank, Liana M. Nobile, and Javier J. Diaz, on the brief).

Nancy Erika Smith, Montclair, argued the cause for amicus curiae New Jersey Association for Justice (Smith Mullin, attorneys; Ms. Smith and Neil Mullin, of counsel; Ms. Smith, Mr. Mullin, and Virginia A. Pallotto, on the brief).

Ronald K. Chen, Trenton, argued the cause for amicus curiae American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey (Rutgers Constitutional Rights Clinic Center for Law & Justice, attorneys; Mr. Chen, Edward L. Barocas, Jeanne M. LoCicero, and Alexander R. Shalom, of counsel and on the brief).

Martin W. Aron argued the cause for amicus curiae Academy of New Jersey Management Attorneys (Jackson Lewis, attorneys; Mr. Aron and Maggie L. Gousman, Morristown, of counsel and on the brief).

Justice LaVECCHIA

delivered the opinion of the Court.

In this appeal we address whether the Law Against Discrimination (LAD), N.J.S.A. 10:5–1

to –49—a law established to fulfill a public-interest purpose—can be contravened by private agreement.

Here an employment application contained a provision requiring the applicant, if hired, to agree to bring any employment-related cause of action against the employer within six months of the challenged employment action and waive any statute of limitations to the contrary. After being hired and employed for a period of time, plaintiff filed a complaint in Superior Court against his former employer, claiming among other things an LAD violation premised on disability discrimination. The trial court dismissed the action, enforcing the six-month limitations period for filing that employment-related claim, and the Appellate Division affirmed.

We reverse. The challenged provision cannot be viewed as a private contractual agreement by which private parties contract to limit private claims by shortening the generally applicable statute of limitations for such actions. The cause of action that plaintiff brings is factually premised on his employment relationship, but it is not a simple private claim. Plaintiff alleges an LAD violation—a law designed for equal parts public and private purposes.

The LAD plays a uniquely important role in fulfilling the public imperative of eradicating discrimination. One searches in vain to find another New Jersey enactment having an equivalently powerful legislative statement of purpose, along with operative provisions that arm individuals and entities with formidable tools to combat discrimination not only through their use but also by the threat of their use. There is a huge incentive for employers to thoroughly investigate and respond effectively to internal complaints in order to limit or avoid liability for workplace discrimination. Responsible employers are partners in the public interest work of eradicating discrimination, but such responsible behavior takes time. A shortened time frame for instituting legal action or losing that ability hampers enforcement of the public interest.

Presently, a dual-enforcement scheme allows litigants to bring direct suit or utilize the resources of the Division on Civil Rights (DCR). Although the LAD has private and administrative remedies, election of either statutorily created course of action furthers the public and private purpose of the LAD—preventing and eliminating discrimination. See Fuchilla v. Layman, 109 N.J. 319, 334, 537 A. 2d 652

(stating that LAD seeks “nothing less than the eradication of the cancer of discrimination” (quotation marks and citations omitted), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 826, 109 S.Ct. 75, 102 L.Ed. 2d 51 (1988) ). Restricting the ability of citizens to bring LAD claims is antithetical to that societal aspiration and defeats the public policy goal.

We hold that a private agreement that frustrates the LAD's public-purpose imperative by shortening the two-year limitations period for private LAD claims cannot be enforced.

I.

In August 2007, plaintiff Sergio Rodriguez, recently laid off from his previous job, sought to apply for the position of Helper with defendant, Raymours Furniture Company, Inc., t/a Raymour & Flanigan. He went to defendant's Customer Service Center in Monmouth Junction and obtained a job application, which was written in English. Plaintiff, a native of Argentina who was not proficient in the English language, brought the application home. A friend assisted plaintiff in filling out the application, translating sections in which plaintiff had to provide information.

The bottom of the second (and last) page of the application contained a section titled, “Applicant's Statement—READ CAREFULLY BEFORE SIGNING—IF YOU ARE HIRED, THE FOLLOWING BECOMES PART OF YOUR OFFICIAL EMPLOYMENT RECORD AND PERSONNEL FILE.” That section contained the following paragraphs:

I understand this employment application is not a promise of an offer of employment. I further understand that should I receive and accept an offer of employment, my employment does not constitute any form of contract, implied or expressed, and such employment will be terminable at will either by myself or Raymour & Flanigan upon notice of one party to the other. My continued employment would be dependent on satisfactory performance and continued need for my services as determined by Raymour & Flanigan.

I authorize investigation of all statements contained in this application. I understand that misrepresentation or omission of facts called for are grounds for a refusal to offer employment or a cause of dismissal if hired.

I AGREE THAT ANY CLAIM OR LAWSUIT RELATING TO MY SERVICE WITH RAYMOUR & FLANIGAN MUST BE FILED NO MORE THAN SIX (6) MONTHS AFTER THE DATE OF THE EMPLOYMENT ACTION THAT IS THE SUBJECT OF THE CLAIM OR LAWSUIT. I WAIVE ANY STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS TO THE CONTRARY.

I WAIVE TRIAL BY JURY IN ANY LITIGATION ARISING OUT OF, OR RELATING TO, MY EMPLOYMENT WITH RAYMOUR & FLANIGAN, INCLUDING CLAIMS OF WRONGFUL OR RETALIATORY DISCIPLINE OR DISCHARGE; CLAIMS OF AGE, SEXUAL, SEXUAL ORIENTATION, RELIGIOUS, PREGNANCY OR RACIAL DISCRIMINATION, CLAIMS UNDER TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT, TITLE IX, AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT, AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT, EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT, FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT, AND ALL OTHER APPLICABLE NON–DISCRIMINATION, EMPLOYMENT OR WAGE AND HOUR STATUTES.

Plaintiff returned the signed application to the Customer Service Center the next day. When asked by the manager on duty if he had any questions about the application, plaintiff responded in the negative. Plaintiff later certified in this action that he “ha[d] no understanding of the term Statute of Limitations,” that he “d[id] not know what the word ‘waive’ mean[t],” and that he “did not understand that [his] rights would be limited in case the company treated [him] illegally or unfairly.”

In mid-September 2007, plaintiff was hired by defendant as a Helper. There is no dispute that his position with the company was at-will. He worked at the Monmouth Junction location, until November 2008, when he transferred to a Customer Service Center in Randolph.

At some point after transferring to the Randolph location, plaintiff was promoted to Driver.¹ For his new position, plaintiff was required to fill out an additional employment application. That second application did not contain the same provision—limiting the applicant's time for filing any potential employment-related claims—that the first application did.

Early in April 2010, plaintiff injured his knee

in a work-related accident during a furniture delivery. Plaintiff ceased working shortly after his injury. Defendant reported the accident to its third-party workers' compensation benefits administrator.

The injury was determined to be compensable and payments were made for plaintiff's medical treatments.

During the summer of 2010, plaintiff underwent surgery and physical therapy for his knee injury

. He was cleared to return to light-duty work effective September 14, 2010, for a period of two weeks. On October 1, 2010, two days after resuming full-duty work, plaintiff was terminated. His supervisor informed him that business was slow. Defendant maintains that it laid plaintiff off as part of a company-wide reduction in force (RIF). Plaintiff disputes that a RIF was the reason for his termination when others with less seniority or distinguishing features were retained for service. Plaintiff filed a Claim Petition with the Division of Workers' Compensation on June 9, 2011.

Thereafter, on July 5, 2011, nearly seven months after being terminated, plaintiff filed a complaint against defendant in Superior Court, which action gives rise to this appeal. His complaint alleges illegal employment discrimination based on an actual or perceived disability, in violation of the LAD, and retaliation for obtaining workers' compensation benefits, in violation of the Workers' Compensation Act.

Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that plaintiff had agreed, pursuant to the waiver provision in defendant's employment application, to limit to six months the...