Rodriguez v. Residence Inn By Marriott, LLC
| Docket Number | 3:23-cv-01504-JAH-BGS |
| Decision Date | 28 November 2023 |
| Parties | LISA RODRIGUEZ, an individual, Plaintiff, v. RESIDENCE INN BY MARRIOTT, LLC, a corporation; MAVIS AMBROSIO, an individual; and DOES 1100, inclusive, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of California |
(1) DISCHARGING ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE [ECF NO. 5]; AND
(2) DENYING MOTION TO REMAND TO STATE COURT [ECF NO 7]
Pending before the Court are the parties' responses to the Court's order to show cause (“OSC”) regarding subject matter jurisdiction and Plaintiff Lisa Rodriguez's (“Plaintiff”) motion to remand to state court (“Motion”). (“Remand Mot.”; ECF No. 7). After careful consideration of the entire record, the parties' arguments, the applicable law, and for the reasons set forth below, the Court DISCHARGES the OSC and DENIES Plaintiff's Motion.
On May 17, 2023, Plaintiff filed this case in the Superior Court of the State of California, County of San Diego, against her former employer, Defendant Residence Inn By Marriott, LLC (“the Marriott”), and her former Assistant General Manager, Defendant Mavis Ambrosio (“Ambrosio”) (collectively, “Defendants”) for violations of the California Labor Code, Business and Professions Code, and Industrial Welfare Commission Wage Orders. .
On August 16, 2023, Defendants removed the case to the United States District Court for the Southern District of California based on diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. (“Removal Notice”; ECF No. 1). Plaintiff and Ambrosio are citizens of California; the Marriott is a citizen of Maryland and Delaware. (Id. at 3-4; Pl.'s Compl. at 5-6). Although Ambrosio's citizenship would defeat diversity because he and Plaintiff are both citizens of California, the Marriott argues Ambrosio was fraudulently joined and should therefore be disregarded for purposes of determining diversity jurisdiction. (Removal Notice at 4-7).
On August 18, 2023, the Court issued an OSC for why the case should not be remanded for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and ordered briefing from the parties on the issues of subject matter jurisdiction and fraudulent joinder. (ECF No. 5). On September 15, 2023, the Marriott filed a response to the OSC. . On October 6, 2023, Plaintiff filed a response to the OSC and motion to remand to state court, to which the Marriott replied. (Remand Mot.; “Marriott Reply”; ECF No. 8). On October 25, 2023, the Court held a hearing and heard oral arguments from the parties. (ECF No. 9).
On or about August 19, 2017, Plaintiff began working for the Marriott at its Residence Inn San Diego Sorrento Mesa/Sorrento Valley hotel (“Marriott San Diego”) as a non-exempt Night Auditor at an hourly rate of $21.30. (Pl.'s Compl. at ¶¶ 2, 8, 13). Ambrosio was Marriott San Diego's Assistant General Manager. (Id. at ¶ 3). Plaintiff alleges that Defendants withheld her overtime compensation when she worked more than eight hours in a workday. (Id. at ¶¶ 9-10, 14, 49-58). When Plaintiff complained of her missing overtime wages, she was informed that she “maxed out” her overtime and was not owed any compensation. (Id. at ¶10). Plaintiff alleges that in retaliation for these complaints, the Marriott terminated her employment on or around September 30, 2022.
Plaintiff further alleges that Defendants failed to provide her with all legally mandated respite periods. (Id. at ¶¶ 16, 67-77). Prior to December 2021, Plaintiff alleges that she missed an average of at least five meal periods and rest breaks per week due to the voluminous nature of her work, understaffing, and pressure from management to complete her work within her scheduled hours. (Id. at ¶ 16). Plaintiff alleges that Defendants engaged in a system of willful violations of labor laws, acting intentionally and with deliberate indifference and conscious disregard to Plaintiff's rights by failing to provide her off-duty meal periods, duty-free rest breaks, failing to keep and provide accurate and timely records of wages earned and other legally mandated records, requiring her to work through meal periods and off the clock, failing to pay overtime wages, and failing to timely pay her final wages following the termination of her employment. (Id. at ¶¶ 17, 49-58, 6792). Plaintiff alleges that as a result of the retaliation and wrongful termination, she has suffered and continues to suffer severe emotional distress and anxiety. (Id. at ¶ 18).
Based on these allegations, Plaintiff asserts four causes of action against the Marriott for wrongful termination, retaliation, and unlawful business practices. (Id. at ¶¶ 22-48, 9397). Plaintiff asserts six causes of action against the Marriott and Ambrosio for failure to pay overtime, minimum wage, and wages due upon termination; provide meal periods and rest breaks; and issue accurate and itemized wage statements (“wage and hour claims” or “wage and hour violations”). (Id. at ¶¶ 49-92).
The federal court is one of limited jurisdiction. See Gould v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. New York, 790 F.2d 769, 774 (9th Cir. 1986). As such, it cannot reach the merits of any dispute until it confirms its own subject matter jurisdiction. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environ., 523 U.S. 83, 93-94 (1998). Removal jurisdiction is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1441, et seq. A state court action can be removed if it could have originally been brought in federal court. Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). Thus, a party invoking the federal removal statutes must establish jurisdiction by demonstrating the existence of: (1) a statutory basis; (2) a federal question; or (3) diversity of the parties. See Mir v. Fosburg, 646 F.2d 342, 345 (9th Cir. 1980). District courts must construe the removal statutes strictly against removal and resolve any uncertainty as to removability in favor of remanding the case to state court. Boggs v. Lewis, 863 F.2d 662, 663 (9th Cir. 1988). The burden is on the removing party to demonstrate federal subject matter jurisdiction over the case. See Emrich v. Touche Ross & Co., 846 F.2d 1190, 1195 (9th Cir. 1988).
Here, Defendants removed the action based upon diversity jurisdiction. To establish diversity jurisdiction, Defendants must show: (1) complete diversity among opposing parties; and (2) an amount in controversy exceeding $75,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). Defendants have the burden of establishing that removal is proper and must support its jurisdictional allegations with competent proof. Duncan v. Stuetzle, 76 F.3d 1480, 1485 (9th Cir. 1996); Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992) (per curiam); Nishimoto v. Federman-Bachrach & Assocs., 903 F.2d 709, 712 n.3 (9th Cir. 1990).
The parties do not dispute that there is complete diversity between Plaintiff and the Marriott, as they are citizens of different states and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. However, there is not complete diversity if Ambrosio is considered, as he and Plaintiff are both citizens of California. Defendant argues Ambrosio was fraudulently joined and should not be considered for purposes of determining diversity jurisdiction.
I. Fraudulent Joinder
“There are two ways to establish fraudulent joinder: ‘(1) actual fraud in the pleading of jurisdictional facts, or (2) inability of the plaintiff to establish a cause of action against the non-diverse party in state court.'” Grancare, LLC v. Thrower by & through Mills, 889 F.3d 543, 548 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting Hunter v. Philip Morris USA, 582 F.3d 1039, 1044 (9th Cir. 2009)). As is relevant here, fraudulent joinder may be established the second way if the Marriott shows by clear and convincing evidence that Ambrosio “cannot be liable on any theory.” See Id. (quoting Ritchey v Upjohn Drug Co., 139 F.3d 1313, 1318 (9th Cir. 1998)); see also Hamilton Materials, Inc. v. Dow Chem. Corp., 494 F.3d 1203, 1206 (9th Cir. 2007) (“Fraudulent joinder must be proven by clear and convincing evidence.”). Accordingly, this Court must conduct a two-step inquiry in which it determines (1) whether there is any possibility that the state court would find that the complaint states a claim against Ambrosio, and (2) whether Plaintiff could potentially state a claim against Ambrosio in an amended complaint. Grancare, 889 F.3d at 548-50 (citing Hunter, 582 F.3d at 1046). If the answer to either of these questions is yes, then this Court must find that the joinder was proper and remand the case to state court. Id.
All of Plaintiff's claims against Ambrosio are reliant upon California Labor Code § 558.1, which provides:
Cal. Lab. Code § 558.1(a)-(b). Thus, for Plaintiff to state a claim against Ambrosio, he must be an owner, director, officer, or managing agent of the Marriott. The parties agree that Ambrosio is not an owner, director, or officer, but dispute whether he is a managing agent.
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