Rodriguez v. Riddell Sports, Inc.
Decision Date | 14 February 2001 |
Docket Number | No. 99-40680,DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS,PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES,99-40680 |
Citation | 242 F.3d 567 |
Parties | (5th Cir. 2001) RAQUEL O. RODRIGUEZ AND JOSE L. RODRIGUEZ,V. RIDDELL SPORTS, INC., ET AL., DEFENDANTS, RIDDELL SPORTS, INC.; RIDDELL, INC.; AND ALL AMERICAN SPORTS CORP., DOING BUSINESS AS RIDDELL/ALL AMERICAN, |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit |
[Copyrighted Material Omitted]
[Copyrighted Material Omitted]
[Copyrighted Material Omitted] Appeals from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas
Before Jolly, Jones, and Smith, Circuit Judges.
Defendants, Riddell Sports, Inc. ("RSI"), Riddell, Inc. ("RI"), and All American Sports Corporation, doing business as Riddell/All American. ("AA"), appeal a judgment holding them strictly liable for a design defect in a football helmet worn by plaintiff Jose Rodriguez when he allegedly suffered a blow causing brain injury, and finding them liable for the bystander emotional distress suffered by Jose's mother, Raquel Rodriguez. Concluding that the district court erred in charging the jury and that, as a matter of law, no bystander claim was viable, we reverse, remand in part, and render in part.
In 1995, Jose was a football player at Los Fresnos High School. At the first football scrimmage of the year, he played both offense and defense and took more than twenty hits to his helmet. After making his last tackle, which witnesses described as a seemingly normal one, he got up, went to the huddle, and walked or jogged off the field to the bench, where he first sat, then lay down in front of the bench and lost consciousness.
Jose's mother, Raquel, was present in the stands during the scrimmage but did not see Jose's last tackle, see him leave the field, or see him lie down. Sometime later, she was told that he was lying on the ground, so she went down to the field and saw him unconscious and foaming at the mouth. Jose was taken to a hospital and diagnosed as having suffered a subdural hematoma, causing permanent brain injury and a permanent vegetative state.
Jose and his mother sued for product liability and bystander injury against the manufacturer of Jose's helmet. They asserted that a design defect in the VSR-4 helmet manufactured by RI and reconditioned by AA significantly increased the chance of impact-induced brain injury such as that Jose had suffered.
Defendants are separate but related corporations. RI manufactures the VSR-4 helmet; AA is an athletic equipment reconditioner; RSI is a holding company and the parent of RI and AA. The VSR-4 helmet Jose wore was manufactured by RI and purchased by the school district before the 1994 football season and was reconditioned by AA in early 1995. The helmet's liner contained cells of an energy-absorbing foam ("old" Rubatex 3952 foam) that plaintiffs claim was fabricated by RI in September 1993.
Plaintiffs assert that the helmet was manufactured and purchased in 1994. They base this contention on the fact that the number "94010677" stamped in the shell of the helmet meant the year 1994 and that the number "993" stamped in the liner meant September 1993. Defendants challenge this claim, arguing that the helmet may have been manufactured as early as 1992.
In 1994, RI received samples of a new energy-absorbing foam. It did some initial tests on the foam from February to May 1994 but did not test the foam again until October 1995, when it concluded that the new foam had better energy-absorbing qualities and began to use it in its helmets.
Plaintiffs claim that if Jose's helmet had contained the new foam or thicker pieces of the old foam, the injury would not have occurred. Plaintiffs' biomechanical expert, Dr. Stalnaker, testified that the new foam would have reduced substantially the risk of a subdural hematoma. Therefore, Stalnaker characterized Jose's helmet as defective and unreasonably dangerous and, alternatively, opined that it could have been made safer simply by using less "comfort" foam and thicker pieces of the old energy-absorbing foam.
In response, RI's helmet designer stated that the helmet Stalnaker designed for demonstration at trial, with thicker energy-absorbing foam, was not practical. Stalnaker's design required removing most of the soft "comfort" foam and replacing it with hard energy-absorbing foam. RI's designer claimed players would not wear such a helmet, because it would be too uncomfortable. As to the claim that the new energy-absorbing foam should have been used in Jose's helmet, RI argued that it could not be used until testing was complete in October 1995--two months after Jose's injury.
Plaintiffs argued, however, that RI could have begun using the new foam much earlier, because RI had received its first samples of it in February 1994. RI disagreed, introducing evidence that it had sent the sample foam back to the supplier for the supplier to address some concerns RI had with it. RI also presented testimony that the producer of the new foam was not sure initially that it could supply the new foam consistently.
Nonetheless, plaintiffs alleged that the reason the new foam was not tested again until October 1995 was that RI wanted to use up its stock of old, inferior foam. The only evidence plaintiffs introduced to support these allegations was that RI canceled an order of the old foam in 1993. This occurred, however, before RI had even received samples of the new foam.
Plaintiffs also argued that even if Jose's helmet was manufactured before RI received any new foam, the new foam could have been inserted by AA when it had Jose's helmet from December 1994 to May 1995 for reconditioning. Defendants denied that the new foam was available for use at that time and argued further that AA, as a mere service provider, had no obligation to upgrade Jose's helmet.
In addition to the products liability claim, plaintiffs assert a bystander claim on the theory that Raquel Rodriguez witnessed the manifestation of Jose's injury and, under Texas law, is entitled to recover for emotional distress. Defendants dispute the existence of any such bystander claim, because Raquel Rodriguez did not perceive both the accident and the manifestation of injury.
After plaintiffs rested, defendants moved for judgment as a matter of law ("j.m.l.") for insufficiency of the evidence on the design defect claim and as to the bystander claim. After both sides closed, the court deemed all motions timely reurged.
Defendants also objected to the jury charge, arguing that the questions--which referred to the defendants as one entity--could allow the jury to find for plaintiffs without their having proved their case against each defendant. The court denied the objection.
After the verdict, defendants reurged their motion for j.m.l. on the bystander claim. The court denied all pending motions and awarded Jose $9.9 million and Raquel $1.55 million.
Defendants contend the court erred as a matter of law in its jury charge by treating all the defendants as one entity and submitting questions on products liability as to parent RSI. It is undisputed that defendants objected to the charge before the case was submitted, in accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 51. We review errors of law de novo but reverse a charging error only where "the charge as a whole leaves us with substantial and ineradicable doubt whether the jury has been properly guided in its deliberations." Stine v. Marathon Oil Co., 976 F.2d 254, 259 (5th Cir. 1992) (citation omitted).
Question One of the charge asked: "Was there a design defect in the VSR-4 football helmet at the time it left the possession of Defendants that was a producing cause of the injury in question? (Emphasis added.) Question Four, the other question referring to the defendants, asked: "Did the Defendants' actions rise to a level of willful or callous and reckless indifference to the safety or rights of others?" (Emphasis added).1
The evidence showed that AA is a separate corporation from RI. Although both AA and RI are owned by RSI, a holding company, plaintiffs did not argue that defendants were alter egos, that they were agents of each other, or that the corporate veil should be pierced. Absent proof of one of these conditions, the corporate form must be respected. See Lucas v. Tex. Indus., Inc., 696 S.W.2d 372, 374 (Tex. 1985).
Defendants argue that treating them as one entity was an error of law, because they are separate, and that the harm of this aggregation is that it allowed the jury to apply the strict liability standard--which applies only to manufacturers--to service provider AA and to RSI and allowed the jury to consider the helmet to be in the possession of the manufacturer--thus triggering a duty to upgrade--when it was merely at the shop of a service provider.
Plaintiffs respond that defendants cannot object to the combining of the defendants in the charge, because defendants invited the error by referring to themselves collectively. See United States v. Baytank Inc., 934 F.2d 599, 606 (5th Cir. 1991).2 Defendants disagree, saying that plaintiffs take defendants' comments out of context and that defense counsel said "defendant" only when referring to a particular defendant, usually RI.
A thorough review of the record shows that defendants did not object as often as they could have when plaintiffs referred to them as one entity and that defense counsel, from time to time, may have been a bit sloppy in his references to defendants.3 Nonetheless, the evidence is plain that the three defendants were distinct corporations.
Further, it is plaintiffs' duty to prove each element of their prima facie case. Thus if combining two corporations into one is necessary to apply a strict liability standard, then plaintiffs must prove that the corporations should be combined, and sloppiness on the part of defendants does not excuse plaintiffs from this burden.
Plaintiffs argue, alternatively, that it was...
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