Rodriguez v. S. Health Partners
| Decision Date | 03 June 2020 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 3:20-CV-0045-D |
| Parties | IRENE RODRIGUEZ, et al. Plaintiffs, v. SOUTHERN HEALTH PARTNERS, INC., et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Texas |
Plaintiff Irene Rodriguez ("Rodriguez") brings this lawsuit on behalf of herself and as parent and legal guardian of her prematurely-born twins, A.R. and B.R.,1 alleging that defendants Navarro County, Southern Health Partners, Inc. ("SHP"), Grady Shaw, M.D. ("Dr. Shaw"), and Linda Hullett, R.N. ("Hullett") failed to provide proper prenatal care to Rodriguez while she was incarcerated as a pretrial detainee at the Navarro County Jail (the "Jail"). Rodriguez brings federal-law claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and a state-law negligence claim. In two motions, Navarro County, and SHP, Dr. Shaw, and Hullett (collectively, the "SHP Defendants") move to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). For the reasons that follow, the court grants the motions to dismiss Rodriguez's claims under § 1983, declines to reach her state-law negligence claim, and grants Rodriguez leave toreplead.
Rodriguez sues defendants Navarro County, SHP (a private company that contracted with Navarro County to provide medical care at the Jail), and Dr. Shaw and Hullett (two SHP employees), alleging that while Rodriguez was a pretrial detainee at the Jail, SHP and its staff ignored her requests for prenatal care and the obvious signs that she was having problems with her pregnancy. In support of her claims, Rodriguez alleges the following facts.2
On December 22, 2017, when she was approximately 25 to 26 weeks pregnant with twins, Rodriguez was arrested and detained at the Jail. At the time of her arrest, Rodriguez informed Jail personnel that she was pregnant with twins. Rodriguez also informed Jail personnel that she had a previously-scheduled doctor appointment on December 28, 2017, but her request to keep this appointment was denied.
Six days after her arrest, on December 28, 2017, Rodriguez notified Jail personnel that she was beginning to show signs of premature labor,3 and she asked to be taken to a local hospital. Her request was denied. The following day, Rodriguez was seen at the Jail by Dr. Shaw. Dr. Shaw measured Rodriguez's stomach, but he did not otherwise examine her eventhough he allegedly knew that Rodriguez had reported signs of premature labor.
Over the next two weeks, Rodriguez continued to discharge fluid and became increasingly concerned about her pregnancy and the likelihood of premature labor. She repeatedly notified Jail staff in writing that she was concerned about her pregnancy and that she expected the babies to be born at any time, but neither the Jail nor its medical personnel took any action to address Rodriguez's concerns.
On January 5 or 6, 2018 Rodriguez reported to Hullett that she was having contractions. Hullett examined Rodriguez and confirmed that Rodriguez was, in fact, having contractions at regular intervals, approximately three minutes apart. Although contractions of this nature are a strong indicator of impending childbirth, Hullett did not permit Rodriguez to see a doctor or go to the hospital. She instead sent Rodriguez back to her jail cell.
On January 9, 2018, at approximately 3:00 a.m., Rodriguez notified the guards on duty that her contractions had become strong and that she needed urgent medical attention. Because no medical staff or Jail personnel with medical training were present at the Jail, the guards on duty called Hullett. Hullett determined that even though Rodriguez's contractions were timed at approximately one minute apart, Rodriguez did not need to be transported to a hospital immediately and could instead be kept under observation at the Jail.
Just after 5:00 a.m., Rodriguez began to give birth to A.R., the first of her twins. Having determined that Rodriguez now required hospitalization, the Jail staff on duty called Emergency Medical Services ("EMS"). Before EMS arrived, however, A.R. was born and stopped breathing. A correctional officer attempted to find a nasal aspirator to clear themucus out of A.R.'s airway, but he was unable to find one. EMS eventually arrived and cleared A.R.'s airway, but this was after critical minutes had been lost. Because A.R. required emergency treatment, a second ambulance had to be dispatched to the Jail so that Rodriguez and A.R. could both be transported to the hospital. Rodriguez's second twin, B.R., was delivered in her jail cell at 5:50 a.m. Rodriguez and her newborn twins were then transported to Navarro Regional Hospital. Later that same day, Rodriguez and the twins were transported to Baylor Scott & White Medical Center in Dallas where it was noted in Rodriguez's medical records that her pregnancy was complicated by "late limited prenatal care." Am. Compl. ¶ 36. A.R. and B.R. were later diagnosed with cerebral palsy, renal failure, respiratory failure, and numerous other serious short-and long-term health issues. Rodriguez alleges that defendants' failure to provide proper prenatal care, including access to a hospital and/or physician when they knew it was very likely that Rodriguez was at a heightened risk of going into premature labor, caused the serious harms to A.R. and B.R.
Rodriguez later filed the instant lawsuit against Navarro County, SHP, Dr. Shaw, and Hullett. In her amended complaint she alleges claims under § 1983 for unlawful conditions of confinement against Navarro County and SHP and for deliberate indifference against Dr. Shaw and Hullett. Rodriguez also alleges a Texas-law claim for negligence against all defendants. Navarro County and the SHP Defendants move to dismiss the amended complaint under Rule 12(b)(6). Rodriguez opposes both motions.
Under Rule 12(b)(6), the court evaluates the pleadings by "accept[ing] 'all well-pleaded facts as true, viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.'" In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir. 2007) ). To survive a motion to dismiss, Rodriguez must allege enough facts "to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U. S. 544, 570 ( 2007). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant[s] [are] liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). "The plausibility standard is not akin to a 'probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id.; see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (). "[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not 'show[n]'—'that the pleader is entitled to relief.'" Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (quoting Rule 8(a)(2)). Furthermore, under Rule 8(a)(2), a pleading must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Although "the pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require 'detailed factual allegations,'" it demands more than "'labels and conclusions.'" Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). And "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U. S. at 555).
The court considers together Navarro County's and the SHP Defendants' motions to dismiss Rodriguez's § 1983-based municipal liability claims against Navarro County and SHP.4
A municipality is a "person" subject to suit under § 1983 under certain circumstances. See Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). Although a municipality cannot be held liable simply on a theory of respondeat superior, id. at 691, it can be held liable if a deprivation of a constitutional right is inflicted pursuant to an official policy or custom, Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 237 F.3d 567, 579 (5th Cir. 2001). Municipal liability requires proof of three elements: "(1) an official policy (or custom), of which (2) a policymaker can be charged with actual or constructive knowledge, and (3) a constitutional violation whose 'moving force' is that policy or custom." Valle v. City of Houston, 613 F.3d 536, 541-42 (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting Pineda v. City of Houston, 291 F.3d 325, 328 (5th Cir. 2002)).
The first element requires that Rodriguez adequately plead an official policy or custom. "[A] policy can be shown through evidence of an actual policy, regulation, ordecision that is officially adopted and promulgated by lawmakers or others with policymaking authority." Id. at 542 (citing Burge v. St. Tammany Parish, 336 F.3d 363, 369 (5th Cir. 2003)). Although a "single decision by a [policymaker] may, under certain circumstances, constitute a policy for which a municipality may be liable[,] . . . this 'single incident exception' is extremely narrow and gives rise to municipal liability only if the municipal actor is the final policymaker." Id. (citations, brackets, and some internal quotation marks omitted). A custom is "a persistent, widespread practice of City officials or employees, which, although not authorized by officially adopted and promulgated policy, is so common and well-settled as to constitute a custom that fairly represents municipal policy." Piotrowski, 237 F.3d at 579 (quoting Webster v. City of Houston, 735 F.2d 838, 841 (5th Cir. 1984) (en banc) (per curiam)).
To satisfy the second element, Rodriguez must adequately plead the identity of a policymaker with "final policymaking authority." Rivera v. Hous. Indep. Sch. Dist., 349 F.3d 244, 247 (5th Cir. 2003) (citing City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 127 (1988)). "A 'policymaker' must be one who takes the place of a governing...
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