Rodriguez v. Saul
Decision Date | 01 September 2020 |
Docket Number | 18-CV-01401 MJP |
Parties | ANGEL L. RODRIGUEZ, Plaintiff, v. ANDREW SAUL, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of New York |
Pedersen, M.J. Angel L. Rodriguez ("Plaintiff") brings this action pursuant to Section 205(g) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security ("Commissioner") finding that he is no longer disabled and cannot continue to receive Supplemental Security Income benefits ("SSI"). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), the parties have consented to the disposition of this case by a United States magistrate judge. (Consent to Jurisdiction, ECF No. 21.)
Presently before the Court are cross-motions for summary judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (ECF Nos. 16 & 22.) For the reasons stated below, this matter must be remanded for a rehearing.
Plaintiff filed an application for SSI on April 11, 2007. (R.1 223-32.) On December 23, 2009, the Commissioner found Plaintiff disabled as of March 13, 2007, and awarded him SSI benefits. (R. 120-26.) The Commissioner terminated Plaintiff's benefits on January 2, 2015, when the Commissioner's Continuing Disability Review ("CDR")2 found Plaintiff had experienced medical improvement3 that would permit him to perform substantial gainful activity. (R. 18-21, 108-09, 136-52.) Plaintiff contested this decision and appeared for a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge ("A.L.J.") on August 8, 2017. (R. 64-107.) On October 31, 2017, the A.L.J. issued a decision confirming the initial finding that Plaintiff was no longer disabled. (R. 15-28.)
In her decision, the A.L.J. followed the required seven-step analysis for evaluating a CDR. 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.994(b)(5)(i)-(vii). Under step one of the analysis, the A.L.J. found that, since January 2, 2015, Plaintiff had "not had an impairment or combination of impairments [that] meets or medically equals the severity of an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1." (R. 17.) At step two, the A.L.J. concluded that Plaintiff had experienced medical improvement in his condition. (R. 18.) At step three, the A.L.J. determined that Plaintiff's medical improvement was related to his ability to work, increasing his residual functional capacity ("RFC") when compared to the impairment(s) present when the Commissioner found him disabled in 2007. (R. 21-22.) Since the Commissioner determined that Plaintiff had medically improved, the A.L.J. did not need to address step four of the seven step analysis. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.994(b)(5)(iii)-(iv). At step five, the A.L.J. determined that Plaintiff continued to have "a severe impairment or combination of impairments."5 (R. 22.) The A.L.J. then noted Plaintiff's lack of past relevant work. (R. 27.) At step six, the A.L.J. determined that as of January 2, 2015, Plaintiff had the following RFC :
[the] capacity to perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 416.967(b) except he could only occasionally work at unprotected heights, around moving, mechanical parts, in extreme cold, heat humidity or wetness, or in concentrated exposure to dust, odors, fumes, or other pulmonary irritants. (R. 22.) The A.L.J. proceeded to step seven and found that jobs exist in the national and regional economy that Plaintiff could perform.
(R. 27-28.)
Plaintiff timely filed a request for review by the Appeals Council that the Commissioner acknowledged on August 23, 2018. (R. 34-36.) The Appeals Council denied the request for review on October 5, 2018, thereby making the A.L.J.'s decision the final decision of the Commissioner. (R. 1-8.) Plaintiff timely filed this civil action on December 4, 2018, seeking judicial review of the A.L.J.'s decision. (Compl., ECF No. 1.)
Title 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) grants jurisdiction to district courts to hear claims based on the denial of Social Security benefits. Section 405(g) provides that the district court "shall have the power to enter, upon the pleadings and transcript of the record, a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security, with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing." 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (2007). It directs that when considering a claim, the Court must accept the findings of fact made by the Commissioner, provided that such findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record. Substantial evidence is defined as "" Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389 (1971) (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)); Metro. Stevedore Co. v. Rambo, 521 U.S. 121, 149 (1997).
To determine whether substantial evidence supports the Commissioner's findings, the Court must "examine the entire record, including contradictory evidence and evidence from which conflicting inferences can be drawn." Brown v. Apfel, 174 F.3d 59, 62 (2d Cir. 1999) (quoting Mongeur v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 1033, 1038 (2d Cir. 1983) (per curiam)). Section 405(g) limits the scope of the Court's review to two inquiries: whether the Commissioner's findings were supported by substantial evidence in the record, and whether the Commissioner's conclusions are based upon an erroneous legal standard. Green-Younger v. Barnhart, 335 F.3d 99, 105-06 (2d Cir. 2003); Mongeur, 722 F.2d at 1038 ( ).
As set forth above, this case involves the Commissioner terminating Plaintiff's extant Social Security benefits. Pursuant to the Act, "[t]he Commissioner may terminate a . . . recipient's benefits if a review reveals substantial evidence that the recipient's condition has improved in a manner relevant to the recipient's ability to work, and that the recipient can now engage in substantial gainful activity." Daif v. Astrue, No. 07-CV-5400 (JG), 2008 WL 2622930, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. July 1, 2008); Williams v. Barnhart, No. 01 CIV. 353(SAS), 2002 WL 618605, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 18, 2002) () "In assessing whether or not a medical improvement has occurred, the Commissioner must compare the current medical severity of the impairment with the medical severity of the impairment at the time of the most recent favorable medical decision finding the claimant was disabled." Daif, 2008 WL 2622930, at *5 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 416.994(b)(1)(vii)).
In reviewing the CDR to determine whether the claimant remains disabled and able to receive SSI, the A.L.J. is required to utilize a seven-step sequential analysis as follows:
O'Connor v. Astrue, No. 07-CV-141, 2009 WL 3273887, at *3-4 (W.D.N.Y. Oct. 9, 2009); 20 C.F.R. § 416.994(b)(5)(i)-(vii). "The plaintiff bears the initial burden of showing that the impairment prevents the plaintiff from returning to his or her previous type of employment." Fears v. Saul, No. 18-CV-1078, 2020 WL 562681, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. Feb. 5, 2020) (citing Berry v. Schweiker, 675 F.2d 464, 467 (2d Cir. 1982)). If the plaintiff meets this burden, the Commissioner then has the burden "to prove the existence of alternative substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy and which the claimant could perform." Id. (quoting Berry, 675 F.2d at 467).
Plaintiff presents three primary arguments with numerous and duplicative sub-arguments for analysis. (Pl.'s Mem. of Law at 3, ECF No. 16-1.) First, Plaintiff asserts that the A.L.J. "improperly concluded that Plaintiff 'medically improved'" within the meaning of 20 C.F.R. § 416.994(b)(1)(i). (Id. at 16.) To support this argument, Plaintiff adds that the A.L.J. "selectively ignore[d]...
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