Rodriguez v. Tallahassee
| Decision Date | 12 April 2021 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 4:20cv210-MW-HTC |
| Parties | VERONICA ZUNIGA RODRIGUEZ, Petitioner, v. WARDEN FCI TALLAHASSEE, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Florida |
This matter is before the Court on Respondent's motion to dismiss Petitioner's amended 28 U.S.C. § 2241 habeas petition for lack of jurisdiction and failure to exhaust. ECF Doc. 17. The Court gave Petitioner an opportunity to file an opposition to the motion. ECF Doc. 18. Petitioner, however, has not filed an opposition and her time for doing so has expired. Indeed, other than filing an amended petition, Petitioner has submitted no other filings in this case.1
The matter was referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge for report and recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 and N.D. Fla. Loc. R. 72.2(B). Uponconsideration, the undersigned recommends the motion be GRANTED because (1) Petitioner has not exhausted her administrative remedies and (2) Petitioner's claim is barred by collateral estoppel.
Petitioner Veronica Rodriguez was arrested by Louisiana state authorities on May 25, 2015 for her participation in a large drug conspiracy and has been in continuous custody - either state or federal since then. ECF Doc. 17-1 at 1. She was charged for that offense by Louisiana state officials (in Bossier Parish Case No. 211962) and by the United States (in United States v. Rodriguez, 5:15-cr-00018-RWS-CMC (E.D. Tex.)). On September 15, 2015, Petitioner was sentenced in state court in Bossier Parish Case No. 211962 to six years' imprisonment. Id.
On November 30, 2015, Petitioner was transferred from Louisiana state custody to federal custody to be prosecuted by federal authorities. Id. On December 15, 2016, Petitioner was sentenced by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas to 84 months' imprisonment. United States v. Rodriguez, 5:15-cr-00018-RWS-CMC, ECF Doc. 872 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 16, 2016). Petitioner's judgment stated the following with respect to time served, which gives rise to the issue in the instant case:
Petitioner was returned to state authorities on January 13, 2017 and served her sentence in Bossier Parish Case No. 211962 until June 18, 2017, when she was paroled from that case. ECF Doc. 17-1 at 2. The next day, Petitioner was turned over to Arkansas state officials to serve a sentence for a parole revocation there. Id. She remained in Arkansas state custody until May 21, 2018, when she was released on parole from Arkansas state custody and returned to federal authorities. Id. She has remained in federal custody since that time.2 Upon her entry into the BOP, the BOP calculated Petitioner's good conduct time release date as August 10, 2022, after giving Petitioner 113 days of presentence credit for time served. Id.
In the instant amended petition, Petitioner challenges the BOP's calculation of her presentence credit. ECF Doc. 2. Specifically, Petitioner argues the BOP is only giving her credit for four months (from May 25, 2015 to September 14, 2015), and ignoring fifteen months of credit for jail time she served while a federal holdwas placed on her. Id. at 1. In other words, Petitioner seeks credit for presentence time served from May 25, 2015 to December 15, 2016.
As an initial matter, Respondent disagrees Petitioner is entitled to any more credit than the 113 days given because the "fifteen months" of additional credit sought had already been applied to reduce Petitioner's state sentences for the Louisiana and Arkansas convictions. ECF Doc. 17 at 4. Regardless, the Respondent has moved to dismiss, not on the merits, but on two other grounds.
First, Respondent argues Petitioner has failed to exhaust her available administrative remedies prior to bringing her petition. Second, Respondent argues Petitioner is not entitled to relief because this issue was previously decided by the Eastern District of Texas and is, thus, barred by res judicata. As set forth below, the undersigned agrees Petitioner has failed to exhaust her administrative remedies and, even if she had exhausted, the petition is nonetheless barred by collateral estoppel.
A petitioner seeking relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 must first exhaust available administrative remedies. See Santiago-Lugo v. Warden, 785 F.3d 467, 474-75 (11th Cir. 2015); Davis v. Warden, FCC Coleman-USP I, 661 F. App'x 561, 562 (11th Cir. 2016). Although exhaustion is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit, it is still a requirement. See Skinner v. Wiley, 355 F.3d 1293, 1295 (11th Cir. 2004) (per curiam), abrogated by Santiago-Lugo, 785 F.3d at 471, 474-75, 474 n.5. Indeed, "the exhaustion requirement applies to the computation of sentence credit awards," such as at issue here. Barron v. Adduci, No. 7:15cv1258/AKK-TMP, 2016 WL 3958729 at *1 (N.D. Ala. June 14, 2016) ().
To properly exhaust administrative remedies, a petitioner must comply with the applicable agency's deadlines and procedural rules. See Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90-91(2006) (). The BOP provides an internal grievance procedure for its inmates. See 28 C.F.R. § 542.10, et seq. A federal inmate must "first present an issue of concern informally to staff" who must "attempt to informally resolve the issue before an inmate submits a Request for Administrative Remedy." See 28 C.F.R. § 542.13(a). If the informal resolution procedures fail to resolve the issue, generally a prisoner must complete a formal, three-step sequential process.
As to the formal grievance procedures, an inmate first must submit a Request for Administrative Remedy on the BP-9 form to the Warden within twenty days of the incident. See 28 C.F.R. § 542.14(a). If the inmate is not satisfied with the Warden's response, she may submit an appeal on the BP-10 form to the Regional Director within twenty days of the Warden's response. See 28 C.F.R. § 542.15(a). If the inmate is dissatisfied with the Regional Director's response, she may submit an appeal on the BP-11 form to the General Counsel within thirty days of the Regional Director's response. See id.
Exhaustion allows "'the agency [to] develop the necessary factual background upon which decisions should be based' and giv[es] 'the agency a chance to discover and correct its own errors.'" Green v. Sec'y for Dep't of Corr., 212 F. App'x 869, 871 (11th Cir. 2006) (). Requiring exhaustion also "eliminate[s] unwarranted federal-court interference with the administration of prisons" and allows "corrections officials time and opportunity to address complaints internally before allowing the initiation of a federal case." Woodford, 548 U.S. at 93.
While Petitioner filed a grievance at the facility level to the Warden, she failed to file a BP-10 form with the Regional Director or a BP-11 form with the General Counsel's office. ECF Doc. 17-1 at 2 & 17-2 at 67. Petitioner has sidestepped two important levels of internal BOP review by failing to appeal the initial denial of her grievance by the Warden. Her petition should, therefore, be dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
As discussed above, Respondent also moves for dismissal based on res judicata. "Although in a broad, general sense the term 'res judicata' encompasses the concept of collateral estoppel, strictly speaking they do have distinct meanings." Precision Air Parts, Inc. v. Avco Corp., 736 F.2d 1499, 1501 (11th Cir. 1984); Community State Bank v. Strong, 651 F.3d 1241, 1263 (11th Cir. 2011), (citing Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 598 (1948) (). "In its narrower sense res judicata bars a second suit involving the same parties and same cause of action on all matters that were part of the first suit and all issues that could have been litigated." Precision Air Parts, Inc., 736 F.2d at 1501.
"Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, bars relitigation of an issue previously decided in judicial or administrative proceedings if the party against whom the prior decision is asserted had a 'full and fair opportunity' to litigate that issue in an earlier case." St. Laurent v. Ambrose (In re St. Laurent), 991 F.2d 672, 675 (11th Cir. 1993). "Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, 'has the dual purpose of protecting litigants from the burden of relitigating an identical issue with the same party or his privy and of promoting judicial economy by preventing needless litigation.'" Allen v. Sch. Bd. for Santa Rosa Cty., Fla., 782 F. Supp. 2d 1304, 1325 (N.D. Fla. 2011), on reconsideration, No. 3:10CV142/MCR/CJK, 2011 WL 13112091 (N.D. Fla. May 12, 2011), citing Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326, 99 S.Ct. 645, 58 L.Ed.2d 552 (1979) (emphasis added).
"The prerequisites to issue preclusion are: (1) the issue at stake must be identical to the one involved in the prior litigation; (2) the issue must have been actually...
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