Rodriguez v. Zavala

• Decision Date: 29 June 2017
• Docket Number: No. 93645-5
• Citation: Rodriguez v. Zavala, 398 P.3d 1071, 188 Wash.2d 586 (Wash. 2017)
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: Esmeralda RODRIGUEZ, Appellant, v. Luis Daniel ZAVALA, Respondent.

188 Wash.2d 586

398 P.3d 1071

Esmeralda RODRIGUEZ, Appellant,

v.Luis Daniel ZAVALA, Respondent.

No. 93645-5

Supreme Court of Washington.

Argued May 16, 2017

Filed June 29, 2017

Jacquelyn M. High-Edward, Northwest Justice Project, 1702 W. Broadway Ave., Spokane, WA, 99201-1818, Karla Elizabeth Mary Carlisle, The Northwest Justice Project, 1310 N. 5th Ave., Ste. B, Pasco, WA, 99301-4172, for Appellant.

Luis Zavala(Appearing Pro Se), #391161, Monroe Correctional Complex, Intensive Management Unit, P.O. Box 777, Monroe, WA, 98272, for Respondent.

Holly D. Brauchli, Bullivant Houser Bailey PC, 1700 7th Ave., Ste. 1810, Seattle, WA, 98101-1820, Sara Lyle Ainsworth, Legal Voice, 907 Pine Street, Suite 500, Seattle, WA, 98101, as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Legal Voice.

William H. Block, Attorney at Law, 3002 Cascadia Ave. S., Seattle, WA, 98144-6214, Nancy Lynn Talner, Attorney at Law, 901 5th Ave., Ste. 630, Seattle, WA, 98164-2008, as Amicus Curiae on behalf of ACLU.

Carissa Ann Greenberg, Office of the Attorney General, P.O. Box 40124, Olympia, WA, 98504-0124, as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Department of Social and Health Services.

González, J.¶1 As a community, we have recognized the importance of domestic violence as an offense against our ordered society and we have committed to providing victims the maximum protection from abuse which the law and those who enforce the law can provide.RCW 10.99.010.A victim of abuse may seek this protection by filing a domestic violence protection order.RCW 26.50.020(1);see generallyLAWS OF 1992, ch. 111.Esmeralda Rodriguez petitioned for protection on behalf of her two-year-old son, arguing that Luis Zavala's repeated threats against her son constitute "domestic violence" under the plain language of RCW 26.50.010(3) and that she may petition for a protection order on her son's behalf based on her reasonable fear for him.We agree and reverse.

BACKGROUND

¶2 In addition to an infant child, L.Z.,¹Esmeralda Rodriguez and Luis Zavala shared a history of domestic violence.

Over the course of their relationship, Zavala repeatedly physically and emotionally assaulted Rodriguez.He shoved Rodriguez to the ground while she was pregnant with L.Z., attempted to smother her with a pillow, blamed her for his failings in life, pulled a knife on her and promised to cut her into tiny pieces, threatened to kidnap L.Z., and said he would do something so horrible to Rodriguez's daughters from a prior relationship that she would want to kill herself.He threatened to kill her, her children, and himself.

¶3 Zavala tried to control Rodriguez.He restricted her communication with friends and family members, and he appeared uninvited wherever she was when she failed to return his phone calls.

¶4 Zavala's history of violence against Rodriguez reached its peak one day in June 2015 after the couple had separated.At 2:00 a.m. that morning and in violation of a previous restraining order, Zavala pounded on Rodriguez's door, threatening to break windows unless she let him in.Rodriguez went to the door and opened it enough to tell Zavala to leave.Taking advantage of the opening, Zavala pushed past Rodriguez, cornered her, and began choking her.He told Rodriguez he was going to "end what [he] started."Clerk's Papersat 5.Rodriguez feared Zavala would make good on his past threats and kill her, her daughters, their son, and then kill himself.After Zavala's hands wrapped around her neck, Rodriguez reached out, grasped a kitchen knife, and stabbed Zavala and screamed to her daughter to call for help.The police arrived and arrested Zavala.

¶5 A few days later, Rodriguez petitioned ex parte for a domestic violence protection order for herself and her children, including L.Z.In her petition, Rodriguez described the assault that compelled her to seek the order, as well as Zavala's history of violence.The court issued a temporary order pending a full hearing.The temporary order restrained Zavala from contacting Rodriguez and all four children.

¶6 At the later protection order hearing, Zavala appeared.Rodriguez recounted the choking incident and told the court that L.Z. had been asleep in another room during the most recent attack.She feared Zavala would take their son based on previous threats.Zavala admitted to coming to the house because he wanted to see L.Z. but denied Rodriguez's allegations of abuse.The trial court issued a protective order for Rodriguez and her daughters, but excluded L.Z., explaining that the boy was not "present" during the assault or threatened at all.Report of Proceedingsat 10-11.According to the trial judge, "[L.Z.] wasn't involved in any of this."Id. at 12.The order was effective for one year, expiring on June 26, 2016.

¶7 Rodriguez appealed.Among other things, she argued that her son should have been included in the final protection order based on her fear that Zavala would hurt L.Z. Rodriguez v. Zavala , No. 33649-2-III, slip op. at 7-8, 2016 WL 4413274(Wash. Ct. App.Aug. 18, 2016)(unpublished), https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/336492_unp.pdf.The Court of Appeals affirmed, finding that a petitioner may seek relief based only on her fear of imminent harm to herself.Id. at 9.We granted review and now reverse.Rodriguez v. Zavala , 187 Wash.2d 1001, 386 P.3d 1092(2017).

ANALYSIS

1.DEFINITION OF " DOMESTIC VIOLENCE "

¶8 Rodriguez contends that the trial court erred when it did not include L.Z. in the domestic violence protection order.She asserts that the plain meaning of "domestic violence" in RCW 26.50.010(3) allows her to seek a protection order based on her fear for L.Z.We agree.

a. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

¶9 Whether to grant or deny a domestic violence protection order is generally reviewed for abuse of discretion.

Hecker v. Cortinas , 110 Wash.App. 865, 869, 43 P.3d 50(2002)(citingState ex rel. Carroll v. Junker , 79 Wash.2d 12, 26, 482 P.2d 775(1971) ).However, a key question in this case is whether the definition of "domestic violence" in chapter 26.50 RCW contemplates a parent's fear of harm for a child at the hands of another parent.To answer this question we must interpret the definition of "domestic violence" in RCW 26.50.010(3).We review questions of statutory interpretation de novo to give effect to the legislature's intentions.Dep't of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, LLC , 146 Wash.2d 1, 9-10, 43 P.3d 4(2002).

¶10 When possible, we derive legislative intent solely from the plain language enacted by the legislature, considering the text of the provision itself, the context of the statute in which the provision is found, related provisions, and the statutory scheme as a whole.State v . Ervin , 169 Wash.2d 815, 820, 239 P.3d 354(2010);Campbell & Gwinn , 146 Wash.2d at 9-10, 43 P.3d 4.Plain language that is not ambiguous does not require construction.State v. Delgado , 148 Wash.2d 723, 727, 63 P.3d 792(2003)(quotingState v. Wilson , 125 Wash.2d 212, 217, 883 P.2d 320(1994) ).

b. STATUTORY DEFINITION OF "DOMESTIC VIOLENCE"

¶11 To commence a domestic violence protection order action, a person must file a petition "alleging that the person has been the victim of domestic violence committed by the respondent."RCW 26.50.020(1)(a)."Domestic violence" is defined as

(a) physical harm, bodily injury, assault, or the infliction of fear of imminent physical harm, bodily injury or assault, between family or household members ; (b) sexual assault of one family or household member by another; or (c) stalking as defined in RCW 9A.46.110 of one family or household member by another family or household member.

RCW 26.50.010(3)(emphasis added).

¶12 When read together, the relevant provisions explain that any person may petition for protection by alleging that the person has been the victim of "domestic violence"—that is, the infliction of fear of imminent physical harm between family members.RCW 26.50.020(1)(a), .010(3)(a).The Court of Appeals construed "this language to be the fear possessed by the one seeking protection, not fear that another family member has of harm to the one for whom protection is sought."Rodriguez , No. 33649-2-III, slip op. at 9.

¶13The Court of Appeals's interpretation is unnecessarily narrow.By relating the fear of harm back to the petitioner, it ignores the final prepositional phrase "between family or household members."²RCW 26.50.010(3)(a).This phrase demonstrates that the definition of "domestic violence" is not as limited as the Court of Appeals concluded.It is true that a petitioner must allege he or she is a victim of domestic violence and that "domestic violence" is the fear of imminent physical harm between family members.But the definition does not state that this fear must be between a petitioner and a perpetrator.Indeed, the statute's definition lists fear between family or household members without restriction.Because domestic violence includes the infliction of fear of harm between family members generally, the definition includes a mother's fear of harm to her child by that child's father.The language of the definition is plain and unambiguous.

¶14 The context of the statute, related provisions, and statutory scheme as a whole also indicate that "domestic violence" in RCW 26.50.010(3) was intended to cover more than merely a petitioner and a perpetrator.³A person may seek a protection order "on behalf of a minor family or household members" under RCW 26.50.020(l)(a).RCW 26.50.010(6) defines "family or household members" broadly to include an individual's current and former spouses and domestic partners, individuals with a child in common regardless of marital status, adult persons related by blood or marriage, adult persons presently or previously residing together, dating relationships, and those with biological or legal parent-child relationships (including stepparents and stepchildren and grandparents and grandchildren).This definition reflects the legislative recognition that violence in the...