Rodriguez-Vilanova v. Stryker Corp.
| Decision Date | 17 January 2014 |
| Docket Number | Civil No. 11-1153 (FAB) |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico |
| Parties | GLORIA RODRIGUEZ-VILANOVA, Plaintiff, v. STRYKER CORPORATION, Defendant. |
On February 11, 2011, plaintiff Gloria Rodriguez-Vilanova ("Rodriguez") filed a complaint against Stryker Puerto Rico Ltd.1("Stryker"), alleging discrimination and retaliation in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., and supplemental Puerto Rico law claims for discrimination pursuant to Law 44 and retaliation pursuant to Law 115. (Docket No. 1.) Stryker moved for summary judgment on December 11, 2013; plaintiff opposed the motion on December 27, 2013; and Stryker filed a reply on January 3, 2014. (Docket Nos. 30, 41, 42, 44, & 45.) For the reasons stated below, the Court GRANTS defendant Stryker's motion for summary judgment.
Before turning to defendant's motion for summary judgment, the Court first addresses a number of evidentiary matters raised by the parties that affect the summary judgment analysis.
Plaintiff Rodriguez moves to strike exhibits 9, 11, 12, 13-17, 21, 24-26, and 28,2 attached to defendant's proposed statement of uncontested material facts ("SUMF"; Docket No. 30-1), as (1) improperly authenticated and (2) inadmissible hearsay. (Docket No. 43.) Plaintiff also moves to strike numerous paragraphs of the defendant's statement of facts as "self-serving." (Docket No. 43 at pp. 6-13.)
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 requires that affidavits submitted in connection with a motion for summary judgment "be made on personal knowledge, set out facts that would be admissible in evidence, and show that the affiant or declarant is competent to testify on the matters stated." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). "Documents supporting or opposing summary judgment must be properly authenticated." Carmona v. Toledo, 215 F.3d 124, 131 (1st Cir. 2000) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)). In order to be considered at the summary judgment stage, "'documents must be authenticated by and attached to an affidavit that meets the requirements of Rule 56(e)." Orsi v. Kirkwood, 999 F.2d 86, 92 (4th Cir. 1993) (). Authentication is a condition precedent to admissibility, and is satisfied by "evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims." Fed. R. Evid. 901(a). Affidavits that are self-serving but contain first-hand knowledge are "competent to support or defeat summary judgment." Cadle Co. v. Hayes, 116 F.3d 957, 961 n. 5 (1st Cir. 1997).
For the purposes of summary judgment, the Court may not consider evidence that would be inadmissible at trial. Vazquez v. Lopez-Rosario, 134 F.3d 28, 33 (1st Cir. 1998). The proponent of evidence at the summary judgment stage carries the burden of showing that the material is either admissible as presented, orexplaining the admissible form that is anticipated at trial. Annotation, Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3). The Court now turns to the exhibits plaintiff seeks to strike.
Defendant's exhibit 20 to its SUMF, the declaration of Carmen Eunice Vicil Berner, references and relies upon exhibit 28, "November 10, 2010 Memorandum from Carmen Vicil to Gamaliel Malave." (Docket No. 30-22.) Vicil's declaration satisfies the requirements of Rule 56, demonstrates her personal knowledge regarding the contents of exhibit 28, and offers sufficient support to authenticate the exhibit. Relevant statements contained in exhibit 28 would be admissible at trial as opposing party statements pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2). The Court finds no problem with the admissibility or the authentication of exhibits 20 and 28.
Defendant's exhibit 4 to its SUMF, the declaration of Brenda Castillo Ruiz, references and relies upon exhibits 17 and 24-26. (Docket No. 30-6.) Castillo's declaration complies with Rule 56 and demonstrates her personal knowledge regarding the issues stated in her declaration. The declaration provides sufficient basis to authenticate exhibits 24 and 25. It does not, however, provide a basis to authenticate exhibit 26, which details a meeting between the plaintiff and another Stryker employee. Exhibits 24 and 25 could be presented in admissible form as records of a regularly conducted activity pursuant to Federal Rule ofEvidence 803(6). Accordingly, defendant's exhibit 26 is STRICKEN, while exhibits 17, 24, & 25 remain in the record.
Defendant's exhibit 3, the declaration of Omar Lopez-Vazquez, references and relies upon defendant's exhibits 9, 11, 12-17, 19, and 21. (Docket No. 30-5.) Lopez's declaration satisfies Rule 56, demonstrates his personal knowledge of the exhibits attached to his statement, and provides a sufficient basis to conclude that the exhibits are what defendant claims them to be. In its opposition to plaintiff's motion to strike, defendant also included the declaration of Nayda Melendez Gonzalez attesting to her and Lopez's capacities as records custodians of these challenged exhibits. (Docket No. 46-2.) This declaration provides a sufficient explanation for the exhibits' admissibility at trial as records of a regularly conducted activity. See Fed. R. Evid. 803(6). Because the Court finds no issue with exhibits 9, 11, 12-17, 19, and 21, they accordingly remain in the record.
The Court declines to engage plaintiff's attempt to strike numerous paragraphs of defendant's SUMF as self-serving and/or unsupported by factually specific affidavits. (Docket No. 43 at pp. 6-13.) The more appropriate forum for raising these qualms is in the plaintiff's objections to the defendant's SUMF, rather than in a separate motion to strike. In keeping with its duties pursuant to Rule 56(e), the Court will not consider facts unsupported by the record.
For these reasons, plaintiff's motion to strike is GRANTED as to defendant's exhibit 26, DENIED with respect to exhibits 9, 11, 12, 13-17, 19, 21, 24, 25 and 28, and DENIED with respect to numerous paragraphs in defendant's SUMF.
Defendant moves to strike plaintiff's December 26, 2013 statement as contradictory to her October 22, 2013 deposition testimony, as well as certain attached exhibits because they were not produced prior to the discovery deadline. (Docket No. 47.3) "When an interested witness has given clear answers to unambiguous questions, [she] cannot create a conflict and resist summary judgment with an affidavit that is clearly contradictory, but does not give a satisfactory explanation of why the testimony is changed." Colantuoni v. Alfred Calcagni & Sons, Inc., 44 F.3d 1, 4-5 (1st Cir. 1994) (internal citations omitted). When presented with those circumstances, a district court may disregard the latter statement in ruling on summary judgment. Id. at 5. Afterreviewing the contested paragraphs in plaintiff's December 26, 2013 statement and comparing them to plaintiff's deposition testimony, the Court does not find that the statements completely contradict one another.
Defendant further moves to strike several exhibits attached to plaintiff's statement because they were not produced prior to the discovery cutoff. If a party fails to provide information prior to the end of discovery, the party cannot use the information to support a motion or at trial "unless the failure was substantially justified or is harmless." Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1). Plaintiff has not had the opportunity to explain or justify the delay in its disclosure of these documents. See Samaan v. St. Joseph Hosp., 670 F.3d 21, 36-7 (1st Cir. 2012)(taking into account a number of factors when determining sanctions for discovery violations, such as "the history of the litigation, the proponent's need for the challenged evidence, the justification (if any) for the late disclosure, and the opponent's ability to overcome its adverse effects," including "[s]urprise and prejudice."). Because the Court finds that defendants were neither unduly surprised nor prejudiced by plaintiff's tardy production of the exhibits, and that plaintiff's exhibits are relevant to her ability to overcome summary judgment, the Court will not strike the exhibits.
Defendant further moves to strike several paragraphs of plaintiff's statement because they were not raised in herdeposition testimony. Because defendant fails to demonstrate the truth of this assertion, the Court declines defendant's request to strike these paragraphs. For these reasons, defendant's motion to strike is DENIED.
Summary judgment serves to assess the evidence and determine if there is a genuine need for trial. Garside v. Osco Drug, Inc., 895 F.2d 46, 50 (1st Cir. 1990). The Court may grant a motion for summary judgment "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is "material" if it has the potential to "affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law." Id. A dispute is "genuine" when it "could be resolved in favor of either party." Calero-Cerezo v. U.S. Dep't. of Justice, 355 F.3d 6, 19 (1st Cir. 2004). The party moving for summary judgment has the initial burden of "demonstrat[ing] the absence of a genuine issue of material fact" with definite and competent evidence. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); Maldonado-Denis v. Castillo-Rodriguez, 23 F.3d 576, 581 (1st Cir. 1994). It must identify "portions of 'the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any'" which support its motion. Id. (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). Once a properlysupported motion has been presented, the burden shifts to the non-moving party "to demonstrate that a trier of fact reasonably could find in [its] favor."...
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