Rodríguez–Reyes v. Molina–Rodríguez

• Decision Date: 22 March 2013
• Docket Number: No. 12–1647.,12–1647.
• Parties: Karen RODRÍGUEZ–REYES et al., Plaintiffs, Appellants, v. Carlos M. MOLINA–RODRÍGUEZ et al., Defendants, Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit

711 F.3d 49

Karen RODRÍGUEZ–REYES et al., Plaintiffs, Appellants,

v.Carlos M. MOLINA–RODRÍGUEZ et al., Defendants, Appellees.

No. 12–1647.

United States Court of Appeals,First Circuit.

March 22, 2013.

Johanna M. Emmanuelli Huertas, with whom Pedro E. Ortiz Álvarez, LLC was on brief, for appellants.

Susana I. Peñagarícano–Brown, Assistant Solicitor General, with whom Luis R. Román–Negrón, Solicitor General, was on brief, for appellees.

Before TORRUELLA, SELYA and LIPEZ, Circuit Judges.

SELYA, Circuit Judge.

We confront today a script that has become all too familiar in Puerto Rico: employees of a government agency decry as political discrimination adverse employment actions taken in the wake of an election that produced a regime change. The court below ruled, among other things, that the complaint failed to state a claim for relief because it did not assert facts sufficient to establish a prima facie case of political discrimination.

The prima facie case is an evidentiary model, not a pleading standard. For this reason, the interaction between the prima facie case and the plausibility standard crafted by the Supreme Court in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009), has created some confusion. We now resolve that confusion and hold that the prima facie case is not the appropriate benchmark for determining whether a complaint has crossed the plausibility threshold. Accordingly, that aspect of the district court's decision must be annulled and the case remanded for further proceedings.

I. BACKGROUND

We sketch the background, reserving salient details for our subsequent discussion of the merits. Inasmuch as this appeal follows the grant of a motion to dismiss, we glean the facts from the plaintiffs' complaint. See Marek v. Rhode Island, 702 F.3d 650, 651–52 (1st Cir.2012).

The plaintiffs—Karen Rodríguez–Reyes, Carmen C. Rivera–Rosado, Maria Torres–Plaza, Liz Katiria Fuentes–Rodríguez, and Pilar Vega—are former employees of the Puerto Rico Administration of Juvenile Institutions (AIJ). SeeP.R. Laws Ann. tit. 8, §§ 551–562. The institutions that fall within the purview of the AIJ provide rehabilitative and educational services to detained minors. Id. § 555. Vega, a member of the Puerto Rico Independence Party, previously served as a teacher and a school director for the AIJ; the remaining plaintiffs, all members of the Popular Democratic Party (PDP), were teachers employed by the AIJ.

From 2001 through 2008, the PDP held the reins of power in Puerto Rico. The PDP lost the 2008 general election; its main rival, the New Progressive Party (NPP), assumed office and took control of the AIJ in January of 2009. At some point thereafter, the new administrators began to “talk about politics” and launched a “witch-hunt” designed to obtain information about employees' political affiliations.

At the earliest practical opportunity, the plaintiffs were ousted from their positions, notwithstanding solid qualifications and positive evaluations. Specifically, Vega was told in 2009 that her position would be eliminated and, although she was promised a more responsible post, that promise never materialized. Torres—who was on a career track as a teacher—was cashiered at the end of the 2009–2010 school year. The other three plaintiffs were so-called “transitory” employees; none of them was asked back to fill her teaching post and no explanations were offered. In every instance, a person affiliated with the NPP was hired as a replacement.

Appalled by these events, the plaintiffs sued Carlos M. Molina–Rodríguez, Secretary of the Puerto Rico Corrections and Rehabilitation Department (CRD) and Administrator of the AIJ (an agency within the CRD); Sonia Ríos, an AIJ hierarch; and two unidentified AIJ officials (sued as “John Doe” defendants), both of whom allegedly participated in the challenged personnel decisions.¹ Their complaint invoked 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and alleged discrimination based on political affiliation in violation of the First Amendment. They also lodged pendent claims under Puerto Rico law. SeeP.R. Const. art. II, § 1; P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31, §§ 5141, 5142.² Both named defendants filed motions to dismiss. The plaintiffs opposed these motions, but the court granted them, dismissing with prejudice all federal claims against all defendants. See Rodríguez–Reyes v. Molina–Rodríguez, 851 F.Supp.2d 375, 383 (D.P.R.2012). The court then declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the pendent claims and dismissed them without prejudice. See id.; see also28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). This timely appeal followed.

II. ANALYSIS

We review de novo a district court's disposition of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Santiago v. Puerto Rico, 655 F.3d 61, 72 (1st Cir.2011). In conducting this appraisal, “we accept as true all well-pleaded facts alleged in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferencestherefrom in the pleader's favor.” Id. “We may augment these facts and inferences with data points gleaned from documents incorporated by reference into the complaint, matters of public record, and facts susceptible to judicial notice.” Haley v. City of Boston, 657 F.3d 39, 46 (1st Cir.2011).

We start our analysis with the shibboleth that a complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). While detailed factual allegations are not necessary to survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a complaint nonetheless must contain more than a rote recital of the elements of a cause of action. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–79, 129 S.Ct. 1937;Shay v. Walters, 702 F.3d 76, 82 (1st Cir.2012). Rather, it “must contain sufficient factual matter to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Grajales v. P.R. Ports Auth., 682 F.3d 40, 44 (1st Cir.2012).

A plausibility inquiry is “a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937. “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955).

To this end, an inquiry into plausibility necessitates a two-step pavane. See Grajales, 682 F.3d at 45. First, the court must sift through the averments in the complaint, separating conclusory legal allegations (which may be disregarded) from allegations of fact (which must be credited). See Morales–Cruz v. Univ. of P.R., 676 F.3d 220, 224 (1st Cir.2012). Second, the court must consider whether the winnowed residue of factual allegations gives rise to a plausible claim to relief. Id. “If the factual allegations in the complaint are too meager, vague, or conclusory to remove the possibility of relief from the realm of mere conjecture, the complaint is open to dismissal.” SEC v. Tambone, 597 F.3d 436, 442 (1st Cir.2010) (en banc).

In this case, the district court tested the complaint in a crucible hotter than the plausibility standard demands. It repeatedly faulted the complaint for failing to “establish a prima facie case of political discrimination.” Rodríguez–Reyes, 851 F.Supp.2d at 381–82. The plaintiffs argue that this laser-like focus on a prima facie case is misplaced at the pleading stage; that requirement, they say, should be reserved for summary judgment and trial. We agree.

In Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, 534 U.S. 506, 122 S.Ct. 992, 152 L.Ed.2d 1 (2002), the Supreme Court negated any need to plead a prima facie case in the discrimination context and emphasized that the prima facie model is an evidentiary, not a pleading, standard. Id. at 510, 512, 122 S.Ct. 992;cf. Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intell. & Coord. Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168, 113 S.Ct. 1160, 122 L.Ed.2d 517 (1993) (rejecting heightened pleading standard for section 1983 cases). Three years later, we confirmed the applicability of Swierkiewicz to political discrimination cases. See Educadores Puertorriqueños en Acción v. Hernández, 367 F.3d 61, 66 n. 1 (1st Cir.2004).

We recognize that these cases were decided before the Supreme Court effected a sea change in the law of federal pleading in Iqbal and Twombly. This gives rise to two questions. First, does the hegemony of the Swierkiewicz/ Leatherman/Educadores line of cases continue in a post- Iqbal/ Twombly world? Second, what is the role, if any, of the prima facie case in determining plausibility at the pleading stage?

We answer the first question in the affirmative: the Swierkiewicz holding remains good law.³ It is not necessary to plead facts sufficient to establish a prima facie case at the pleading stage. See Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512, 122 S.Ct. 992. This conclusion is bolstered by the fact that the Twombly Court, which first authoritatively articulated the plausibility standard, cited Swierkiewicz with approval. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 569–70, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (discussing how the new pleading standard does not “run[ ] counter to” Swierkiewicz ).

Iqbal does not mention, but is wholly consistent with, Swierkiewicz; there, the Court stressed that, notwithstanding the neoteric plausibility standard, no “detailed factual allegations” are required in a complaint. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677–78, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (internal quotation marks omitted). The prima facie standard is an evidentiary standard, not a pleading standard, and there is no need to set forth a detailed evidentiary proffer in a complaint.

In answering the first question, we do not write on a pristine page. Several other courts of appeals have considered the question and concluded, as we do, that the Swierkiewicz Court's treatment of the prima facie case in the pleading context remains the beacon by which we must steer. See, e.g., Keys v. Humana, Inc., 684 F.3d 605,...