Rodriquez v. State, Nos. 65-59
| Court | Court of Appeal of Florida (US) |
| Writing for the Court | SWANN; BARKDULL; PEARSON; PER CURIAM |
| Citation | 189 So.2d 656 |
| Docket Number | 65-60,65-257 and 65-258,65-256,Nos. 65-59 |
| Decision Date | 29 June 1966 |
| Parties | Onelio Garcia RODRIQUEZ, Efrain T. Suarez, Julieta Maria Calleiro, Abigail Margarita Calleiro Casanueva and Yolanda Venegas Calleiro, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
Page 656
v.
The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Page 657
Walter E. Gwinn, Miami, for appellants.
Earl Faircloth, Atty. Gen., and Arden M. Siegendorf, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.
Before PEARSON, BARKDULL and SWANN, JJ.
SWANN, Judge.
This is a consolidated appeal from judgments and sentences entered following a jury trial in the Criminal Court of Record of Dade County, Florida.
Essentially, the facts are that two policewomen from Tampa, Florida were enlisted by the City of Miami Police Department and the State Attorney's Office of Dade County, Florida, to try to get into the Ayala Clinic and make arrangements for an abortion. Policewoman Williams called the Ayala Clinic about an abortion and talked to a person who identified himself as Dr. Ayala. The policewoman made an appointment for the following day and was quoted a price of One Thousand Dollars for the operation. On the appointed day, Policewoman Williams and Policewoman Ellison entered the clinic and consulted with a man later identified as the appellant Suarez. At the same time, other police officers were watching the front and back of the clinic. Policewoman Ellison waited in the reception room while Policewoman Williams was taken into an examination room, where a pelvic examination was conducted by the appellant Suarez. There were no instruments used in the examination and there was a conflict in the testimony as to whether there were any instruments in the examining room at the time of the examination. Policewoman Williams remained fully clothed at all times, with the exception of her panties, which were removed during the examination. Following the examination, appellant Suarez explained the procedure by which he was to bring about the abortion. At this point, Policewoman Williams told Suarez that the money required for the operation was in her purse which Policewoman Ellison was holding in the waiting room. Policewoman Ellison brought the money into the examination room and it was given to Suarez. She then left the building and informed the officers outside that Policewoman Williams was supposed 'to get a needle'.
The police officers entered the clinic through the public front door, which was left open by Policewoman Ellison, and proceeded into the clinic. Upon reaching the waiting room door, the officers knocked and announced that they were police officers and from the State Attorney's office. After waiting approximately fifteen to thirty seconds, the officers kicked down the door. They had no search warrant for the premises nor warrants for arrest. No announcement of purpose was made prior to kicking down the door. The officers proceeded down a hallway and came upon another door, which was also kicked down without announcement of authority or purpose. There was testimony that approximately five doors were kicked down without an announcement of their purpose.
The officers met Suarez in the hallway coming toward them from the direction of the first door that was kicked down. He was placed under arrest for conspiracy to
Page 658
commit an abortion and attempted abortion on Policewoman Williams. The other appellants were arrested when found in various parts of the clinic.The appellants were tried for attempted abortion and conspiracy to commit abortion. All of the appellants were convicted of conspiracy to commit abortion, and in addition, Suarez was convicted of attempted abortion. This appeal followed.
Prior to the trial, the appellants moved to suppress the evidence seized in the raid and the trial court denied the motion. The appellants have assigned this as error and assert as authority for reversal Section 901.19(1), Florida Statutes, F.S.A., and Benefield v. State, Fla.1964, 160 So.2d 706.
Section 901.19(1) provides:
'An officer, in order to make an arrest either by virtue of a warrant, or when authorized to make such arrest for a felony without a warrant, may break open a door or window of any building in which the person to be arrested is or is reasonably believed to be, if he is refused admittance After he has announced his authority and purpose.' (Emphasis supplied)
The State concedes that the arresting officers did not announce their purpose before breaking open the doors in the building.
In Benefield, supra, the Supreme Court of Florida set forth the requirements for entry of a building to make an arrest:
'* * * When an officer is authorized to make an arrest in any building, he should first approach the entrance to the building. He should then knock on the door and announce his name and authority, sheriff, deputy sheriff, policeman or other legal authority and What his purpose is in being there. * * * If he is refused admission * * * he may then break open a door or window to gain admission to the building and make the arrest. * * *' (Emphasis supplied.)
'* * * The law forbids the law enforcement officers of the state or the United States to enter before knocking at the door, giving his name and the Purpose of his call. * * *' (Emphasis supplied.)
The appellee counters that the court in Benefield, supra, clearly sets forth four specific exceptions to this rule on page 710 as follows:
'As we interpret the common law authorities in relation to § 901.19(1), Florida Statutes, F.S.A., we conclude that even if probable cause exists for the arrest of a person, Our statute is violated by an unannounced intrusion in the form of a breaking and entering any building, including a private home, except (1) where the person within already knows of the officer's authority and...
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Royer v. State, No. 78-1050
...and intendments reasonably deducible therefrom are to be viewed in the light most favorable to sustain the ruling. Rodriquez v. State, 189 So.2d 656, 610 (Fla. 3d DCA 1966). In this case there is little need to summon to our aid that presumption and that rule. Presented with the totality of......
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Suarez v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, Docket No. 4196-67.
...[58 T.C. 799] Court of Appeals of the State of Florida. That court affirmed the attempted abortion conviction. See Rodriguez v. State, 189 So.2d 656 (Fla. App. 1966). In June of 1966, Efrain filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in the Supreme Court of the State of Florida. On February ......
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Taylor v. State, 76-1611
...inferences and deductions capable of being drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to sustain these conclusions. Rodriquez v. State, 189 So.2d 656, 660 (Fla.3d DCA 1966). Having done this, however, "if a doubt exists as to whether the officer was reasonable in concluding that a search was......
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People v. Abruzzi
...from invalidity when it occurs for the protection of another police officer, as argued by the prosecution (cf. Rodriquez v. State, 189 So.2d 656 (Fla.App.), cert. den. sub nom. Suarez v. Florida, 389 U.S. 848, 88 S.Ct. 66, 19 L.Ed.2d 116; State v. Keefe, 13 Wash.App. 829, 537 P.2d 4. The co......
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Suarez v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, Docket No. 4196-67.
...[58 T.C. 799] Court of Appeals of the State of Florida. That court affirmed the attempted abortion conviction. See Rodriguez v. State, 189 So.2d 656 (Fla. App. 1966). In June of 1966, Efrain filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in the Supreme Court of the State of Florida. On February ......
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Royer v. State, No. 78-1050
...and intendments reasonably deducible therefrom are to be viewed in the light most favorable to sustain the ruling. Rodriquez v. State, 189 So.2d 656, 610 (Fla. 3d DCA 1966). In this case there is little need to summon to our aid that presumption and that rule. Presented with the totality of......
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Taylor v. State, 76-1611
...inferences and deductions capable of being drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to sustain these conclusions. Rodriquez v. State, 189 So.2d 656, 660 (Fla.3d DCA 1966). Having done this, however, "if a doubt exists as to whether the officer was reasonable in concluding that a search was......
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People v. Abruzzi
...from invalidity when it occurs for the protection of another police officer, as argued by the prosecution (cf. Rodriquez v. State, 189 So.2d 656 (Fla.App.), cert. den. sub nom. Suarez v. Florida, 389 U.S. 848, 88 S.Ct. 66, 19 L.Ed.2d 116; State v. Keefe, 13 Wash.App. 829, 537 P.2d 4. The co......