Rody v. Doyle

• Court: Maryland Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: MARBURY, Judge.
• Citation: Rody v. Doyle, 181 Md. 195, 29 A.2d 290 (Md. 1942)
• Decision Date: 07 December 1942
• Docket Number: 69.
• Parties: RODY v. DOYLE et al.

29 A.2d 290

181 Md. 195

RODY v. DOYLE et al.

No. 69.

Court of Appeals of Maryland

December 7, 1942

Appeal from Circuit Court, Carroll County; James E. Boylan, Jr. Judge.

Suit by Benjamin F. Rody, administrator of the estate of Matthew T Doyle, deceased, against William F. Doyle, and another, to establish deceased's ownership of two bank accounts and for an injunction. From an order vacating a prior order directing the issuance of a writ of fieri facias, plaintiff appeals.

Reversed with directions.

A Earl Shipley, of Westminster, and Michael J. Manley, of Baltimore (Theodore F. Brown, of Westminster, on the brief), for appellant.

D. Eugene Walsh and F. Neal Parke, both of Westminster, for appellees.

Before SLOAN, JOHNSON, DELAPLAINE, COLLINS, MARBURY, and GRASON, JJ.

MARBURY Judge.

This bill of complaint was filed on January 25, 1940, by the appellant against the two appellees. It alleged that appellant's intestate, Matthew T. Doyle, who died January 8, 1940, had on December 16, 1939 deposited a sum of approximately $12,000 in the appellee bank in an account in the name of Matthew T. Doyle, in trust for himself and William F. Doyle, joint owners, subject to the order of either, the balance at the death of either to belong to the survivor. It claimed that Matthew T. Doyle lacked the capacity to do this. The bill was for the purpose of setting aside the account, of securing to the appellant, as administrator, this money, of enjoining both of the appellees from disposing of it otherwise, and of enjoining its withdrawal from the bank. The appellee Doyle answered on February 17, 1940, admitting the opening of the savings account, claiming that Matthew T. Doyle was entirely competent to open the same, denying that the appellant was entitled to it, and refusing to deliver it. The appellee bank also answered on February 17, 1940, stating that it was a disinterested party any setting up the circumstances under which the account was opened.

Testimony was taken in open court, commencing on March 10, 1941. The cashier of the appellee bank testified as to the circumstances of the transfer and stated that $11,000 was placed in a joint savings account as of November 27, 1939, and $427.71 on a joint checking account. This money had come from the Savings Bank of Baltimore. It was first taken by the appellee bank as a collection item and credited to the transient account when paid. The cashier's testimony in chief seems to be that the transfer from the transient account to these other accounts was made on November 27th, but on cross examination, he said that the transient account was opened on December 18th and the joint accounts on December 22nd. It does not appear from the record that William F. Doyle testified, but his wife, Beulah Doyle, did. The Court below filed an opinion and decree on June 14, 1941, determining that the two accounts were the property and estate of Matthew T. Doyle, deceased, and payable to the appellant as administrator. On August 9, 1941, an appeal was entered to this Court by William F. Doyle. The case was heard here and the decree of the lower Court was affirmed on April 8, 1942, in the case of Doyle, v. Rody, Md., 25 A.2d 457. On July 15, 1942, the appellant filed a petition for a writ of fieri facias against the appellees, stating that in spite of repeated demands, the defendants refused to turn over the funds. On the same day, the Court ordered the writ to issue. On the following day, July 16, 1942, the appellee bank filed a petition or motion to strike out the order for the writ for the reason that it had filed an interpleader proceeding on December 6, 1941, and 'IS THIS DAY PAYING INTO THE HANDS OF THe clerk of this court the sum of $10,219.63 representing the fund.' The appellant answered this petition setting up the fact that he had answered the interpleader in January 1941, but no further proceedings in that case had been taken. The record contains the proceedings in the interpleader case, and from them it appears that on January 12, 1940, thirteen days prior to the filing of the original bill of complaint herein, a deposit account was opened with the appellee bank in the name of William F. Doyle, in trust for himself and Beulah Doyle in the usual form. At the time of the filing of the bill of interpleader, there was $11,229.71 in that account, of which the difference between that sum and $1,332.82, whose origin is not fully explained, came from the Matthew T. Doyle savings and checking accounts heretofore referred to. Although this transfer took place before the bill of complaint was filed in the case before us, it was not disclosed to the Court by either of the appellees in their answers, or in the testimony given by the bank officials or by Beulah Doyle, who was one of the witnesses. The appellant did not know it. The lower Court was not apprised of it, and was permitted to hear the case and file an opinion and decree disposing of an account which was no longer existent. An appeal was then taken to this Court, and we affirmed the original decree, without any information of the change.

Had the facts about this account been brought to the attention of the appellant or of the Court below, Beulah Doyle could have been made a party to the case, and her rights in the fund determined. Now the appellees attempt to render nugatory the action of the lower Court and the action of this Court and to request the appellant to try a new case in the interpleader proceedings because of Beulah Doyle's supposed rights.

The Court below, after taking testimony, by order passed September 15, 1942, struck out the order of July 15, 1942, directing the issuance of the writ of fieri facias. The ground of this decision was that the original decree of June 14, 1941 was not a money decree. From that order of September 15, 1942, this appeal comes here.

The preliminary question which must first be decided is whether the appellees, after permitting the original case to go to a decree against them without disclosing the full facts about the account, can now raise any defense, either technical or substantial, based on these undisclosed facts, to the execution of that decree.

In a case decided by this Court more than fifty years ago, it was said through Chief Judge Alvey: 'The law requires that there should be an end of litigation, and, where a party has had a full and fair opportunity presented of making all the defenses at his command to an asserted right or claim, it is quite immaterial that he has elected to appear and defend in the name of another, who is a party of record, rather than cause himself to be made a co-defendant in the proceeding. * * * At any rate, having had a legal opportunity to make their defenses, they cannot be heard to say that they did not avail themselves of it. The authorities are clear in support of that proposition.' Parr v. State, 71 Md. 220, 17 A. 1020, 1022.

In a later case, this Court spoke of the doctrine so often recognized: 'That persons who are directly interested in the suit, and have knowledge of its pendency, and who refuse or neglect to appear and avail themselves of their rights, are concluded by the proceedings as effectually as if they were parties named on the record.' Albert v. Hamilton, 76 Md. 304, 25 A. 341, 343; Riley v. First National Bank, 81 Md. 14, 31 A. 585. This principle was applied to a witness in a case in which she was not a party and in which her actions were described as follows: 'When she was upon the witness stand she did not mention or allude to any claim of hers upon the property, nor has she at any time in any manner, intervened in the suit, or asked to be made a party thereto, or set up any claim against the estate in controversy.' Williams v. Snebly, 92 Md. 9, 48 A. 43, 48.

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