Roe v. Boy Scouts of Am. Corp.

Decision Date21 January 2014
Docket NumberAC 35155
CourtConnecticut Court of Appeals
PartiesJOHN ROE #1 v. BOY SCOUTS OF AMERICA CORPORATION ET AL.

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The syllabus and procedural history accompanying the opinion as it appears on the Commission on Official Legal Publications Electronic Bulletin Board Service and in the Connecticut Law Journal and bound volumes of official reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not be reproduced and distributed without the express written permission of the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut.Lavine, Keller and Schaller, Js.

(Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of

Hartford, Hon. Jerry Wagner, judge trial referee [motion

to determine sufficiency of discovery responses];

Schuman, J. [summary judgment, motions to reargue].)

Frank C. Bartlett, Jr., for the appellant (plaintiff).

Philip T. Newbury, Jr., with whom, on the brief, was Ondi A. Dybowski, for the appellees (named defendant et al.).

Opinion

LAVINE, J. The plaintiff, John Roe #1, appeals from the summary judgment rendered by the trial court in favor of the defendants, Boy Scouts of America Corporation (Boy Scouts) and Connecticut Rivers Council, Inc. (council). On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the trial court (1) abused its discretion by sustaining the defendants' objection to his discovery request and erred by (2) granting the defendants' motion for summary judgment and (3) denying his motions for reconsideration. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The plaintiff served the defendants with a summons and complaint on September 28, 2009. The plaintiff's complaint sounds in six counts. The first three counts allege corporate negligence, breach of duty on the basis of a fiduciary or confidential relationship, and breach of special duty of care owed to children, respectively against the defendants. At all times relevant, the plaintiff was a minor living in Connecticut.

The plaintiff also alleged that that the defendant James W. Harris III1 was an agent of the defendants, acting as a troop leader and campmaster who supervised and participated in camping trips with members of the Boy Scouts such as the plaintiff. The plaintiff further alleged that Harris took the plaintiff on numerous camping trips sponsored by the defendants during which he subjected the plaintiff to sexual abuse, molestation, and assault.2

As a result of Harris' sexual abuse, the plaintiff alleged that he suffered physical pain, humiliation, degradation, fear, extreme emotional distress, anger, confusion, among other negative emotions, and was deprived of the opportunity to enjoy his childhood and adolescence. Consequently, the plaintiff alleged that he was required to expend considerable sums for medical and psychiatric care in the past and may do so in the future. The defendants denied the material allegations of the complaint and asserted the special defense that each count of the complaint failed to state a cause of action for which relief can be granted.

On or about August 12, 2010, the plaintiff served interrogatories and requests for production on the defendants. On or about December 20, 2010, the Boy Scouts filed responses and objections to the discovery requests. The parties appeared before the court, Hon. Jerry Wagner, judge trial referee, to resolve their discovery dispute.

On April 30, 2012, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment as to the three counts of the complaint alleged against them. The plaintiff filed an objection to the motion, and the parties thereafter presented arguments to the court, Schuman, J. Judge Schuman granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment in a memorandum of decision filed on August 16, 2012.3The plaintiff filed motions to reargue, which Judge Schuman denied. Thereafter, the plaintiff appealed.

I

The plaintiff first claims that the court improperly sustained the defendants' objection to his "request for documents maintained by the defendants evidencing their knowledge of the pervasiveness of sexual abuse within scouting for the time prior to the plaintiff's abuse." We conclude that Judge Wagner properly exercised his discretion with regard to discovery by limiting the scope of the plaintiff's initial discovery request.

The plaintiff's claim centers on interrogatory 14 of the plaintiff's discovery requests. The plaintiff's request and the defendants' December 20, 2012 response to the discovery follow:

"14. Please state whether [the Boy Scouts have], at any time, conducted or requested any reports, surveys, studies, analyses, research or other similar work regarding sexual abuse in the Boy Scouts. If so, as to each report, survey, study, analysis, research or other similar work (collectively, 'report'), please state:

"(a) the title or designation of the report;
"(b) the author or authors of the report;
"(c) the date or dates of the report;
"(d) to whom the report was given or distributed; and
"(e) a description of the content of the report.

"RESPONSE: The defendant objects to this interrogatory on the ground that it is overly broad, unduly burdensome, vague, ambiguous and not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. The defendant further objects to this interrogatory insofar as it seeks materials protected by personal privacy rights, the attorney-client privilege, attorney work-product and materials prepared in anticipation of litigation.

"Without waiving this objection, the defendant responds that it has funded national conferences and studies regarding sexual abuse and has produced literature and other information aimed at educating adults, scouts and their parents as to the warning signs of sexual abuse and how to minimize the risk." (Emphasis added.)

The parties appeared before Judge Wagner on November 18, 2011, to resolve their discovery disputes. In response to the argument of the plaintiff's counsel, the court stated with regard to interrogatory 14: "What do you want, the history of the . . . beginning of the Boy Scouts?" Counsel for the plaintiff responded: "If they have it, yes, Your Honor." Counsel for the plaintiff further stated that "we are asking for defendants to turn over their knowledge about sexual abuse, the verysubject of this lawsuit. I don't think that's overly broad or unreasonable, Your Honor." The court thought that the request was overly broad and instructed the plaintiff's counsel to narrow his approach.

Three times the court stated that interrogatory 14, in asking for the history of the Boy Scouts' knowledge of sexual abuse, was overly broad and that the plaintiff should narrow his approach "to what might be considered responsive and competent evidence in the case."4 The plaintiff's counsel did not voluntarily narrow the scope of interrogatory 14. The court therefore ordered that if the Boy Scouts "have an archive in Connecticut dealing with their experiences . . . for the last ten years, because it goes back to [the] seventies or so on, and it's in written form on their experiences with sexual complaints and how it's been handled or so on. Protocol, I guess you're entitled to have it. If he hasn't got it, you're . . . not entitled to have it. You'll get it on deposition."5 During the course of argument, the defendants made clear what information they had and what information they specifically had disclosed to the plaintiff, particularly with respect to Harris.

Our Supreme Court has "long recognized that the granting or denial of a discovery request rests in the sound discretion of the [trial] court, and is subject to reversal only if such an order constitutes an abuse of that discretion. . . . [I]t is only in rare instances that the trial court's decision will be disturbed. . . . Therefore, we must discern whether the court could [have] reasonably conclude[d] as it did." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Blumenthal v. Kimber Mfg., Inc., 265 Conn. 1, 7, 826 A.2d 1088 (2003).

"In any civil action . . . where the judicial authority finds it reasonably probable that evidence outside the record will be required, a party may obtain in accordance with the provisions of this chapter discovery of information or disclosure, production and inspection of papers, books or documents material to the subject matter involved in the pending action, which are not privileged, whether the discovery or disclosure relates to the claim . . . of the party seeking discovery . . . and which are within the knowledge, possession or power of the party or person to whom the discovery is addressed. Discovery shall be permitted if the disclosure sought would be of assistance in the prosecution . . . of the action and if it can be provided by the disclosing party . . . with substantially greater facility than it could otherwise be obtained by the party seeking disclosure. . . ." Practice Book (2011) § 13-2.

In his appellate brief, the plaintiff claims that a plaintiff in a negligence action has the right to inquire as to what the defendant knew or should have known regarding the...

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