Roe v. Crawford

• Citation: 514 F.3d 789
• Decision Date: 22 January 2008
• Docket Number: No. 06-3108.,06-3108.
• Parties: Jane ROE, Appellee, v. Larry CRAWFORD, Director of the Missouri Department of Corrections; Cyndi Pruden, Acting Superintendent Women's Eastern Reception, Diagnostic and Correctional Center, in her official capacity, Appellants.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (8th Circuit)

514 F.3d 789

Jane ROE, Appellee, v. Larry CRAWFORD, Director of the Missouri Department of Corrections; Cyndi Pruden, Acting Superintendent Women's Eastern Reception, Diagnostic and Correctional Center, in her official capacity, Appellants.

No. 06-3108.

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted: September 24, 2007.

Filed: January 22, 2008.

Michael Pritchett, Assistant Attorney General, argued, Jefferson City, MO, for appellant.

Mailee R. Smith and Denise M. Burke, American United for Life, Chicago, IL, filing a brief amicus curiae on behalf of Senator Chuck Gross and Senator Delbert Scott.

Diana Kasdan, argued, Susan Talcott Camp and Charu A. Chandrasekhar, ACLU Foundation, New York, NY, Thomas Blumenthal, Anthony R. Rothert, and James G. Felakos, St. Louis, MO, on brief, for appellee.

Kimberly A. Parker and Jessica L. Waters, Washington, DC, filing brief amicus curiae on behalf of American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, The American Medical Women's Association and American Public Health Association.

Carl Micarelli, Alison Mikkor and Terrianne Muenzen, New York, NY, filed amicus brief on behalf of Chicago Legal Advocacy for Incarcerated Mothers, John Howard Association of Illinois, Legal Services for Prisoners with Children, National Association of Social Workers Missouri Chapter, Stop Prisoner Rape, and Women's Prison Association.

Before WOLLMAN, HANSEN, and RILEY, Circuit Judges.

RILEY, Circuit Judge.

The Missouri Department of Corrections (MDC) instituted a policy of prohibiting transportation for elective, non-therapeutic abortions (MDC policy). Plaintiff Jane Roe (Roe) requested transportation for an elective abortion, and was denied. The district court granted Roe's request for emergency preliminary injunctive relief, and ordered the MDC to provide Roe with transportation outside of the MDC facility (referred to by the parties as an "outcount"). Roe amended her complaint and sought injunctive relief on behalf of a class consisting of all women in the custody of the MDC who seek elective, non-therapeutic abortions. The district court certified the class (Plaintiffs). Both parties moved for summary judgment, which the district court granted in favor of the Plaintiffs. The district court reasoned the MDC policy is unreasonable under the Fourteenth Amendment using the four-part test established by Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-91, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987) for reviewing the reasonableness of prison regulations impacting constitutional rights. The district court also found the Plaintiffs' Eighth Amendment rights were violated, determining that the desire for an elective abortion constitutes a serious medical need to which the MDC officials were deliberately indifferent. On appeal, the MDC contests both findings. Although we conclude the district court erred in its Eighth Amendment analysis, and on one aspect of the Turner analysis, we affirm the ultimate judgment.

I. BACKGROUND

Before September 5, 2005, the MDC had a policy of providing transportation out-counts for inmates wanting to terminate their pregnancies. On that date, the MDC altered its policy, such that inmates would be transported for abortions only "[i]f [the] abortion is indicated due to threat to the mother's life or health, and if approved by the Medical Director in consultation with the Regional Medical Director." The MDC cited security concerns and cost savings motivating the change in policy. Although treatments for other conditions and injuries may be classified as elective, the attending physician may override the general policy of denying elective medical outcounts and authorize the outcount by determining that the care is in fact medically necessary. However, under the policy regarding abortions, the MDC determined "[o]utcounts for elective abortions will no longer be authorized."

Plaintiff Roe, on behalf of herself and others similarly situated, challenged the legality of this MDC policy in federal district court. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Roe, reasoning that under the Turner four-part reasonableness test, the MDC policy was an unreasonable restriction on inmates' Fourteenth Amendment right to terminate a pregnancy. Roe v. Crawford, 439 F.Supp.2d 942, 949-53 (W.D.Mo.2006). The district court also found Roe's Eighth Amendment rights were violated, determining the desire for an elective abortion constitutes a serious medical need to which the MDC officials were deliberately indifferent. Id. at 953.

II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

We review the grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing the record most favorably to the non-moving party. Tipler v. Douglas County, 482 F.3d 1023, 1025 (8th Cir.2007). Summary judgment is appropriate if the record' shows "that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c); accord Knowles v. Citicorp Mortgage, Inc., 142 F.3d 1082, 1085 (8th Cir.1998).

Certain guiding principles come into play when federal courts review policy decisions made by a state's executive branch. Specifically, "[w]here, as here, the exercise of authority by state officials is attacked, federal courts must be constantly mindful of the special delicacy of the adjustment to be preserved between federal equitable power and State administration of its own law." Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 378, 96 S.Ct. 598, 46 L.Ed.2d 561 (1976) (quotation omitted); see also Angela R. v. Clinton, 999 F.2d 320, 326 (8th Cir.1993) ("Federal courts operate according to institutional rules and procedures that are poorly suited to the management of state agencies.").

III. DISCUSSION

A. Turner Supplies the Appropriate Test

The district court found the applicable test for determining the constitutionality of the MDC policy was that articulated by the Supreme Court in Turner. Roe, 439 F.Supp.2d at 947-49. Roe contended, as she did in her opening brief on appeal, that Turner is inapplicable and her Fourteenth Amendment claim should be subjected to the same standard of review that would apply outside of the prison context. See id. at 947 (maintaining that the "undue burden" test should apply).¹ Essentially, Roe argued that the Supreme. Court's decision in Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 125 S.Ct. 1141, 160 L.Ed.2d 949 (2005) should be extended. See Roe, 439 F.Supp.2d at 947-49. In Johnson, the Supreme Court reviewed a policy that separated inmates on the basis of race. 543 U.S. at 507-08, 125 S.Ct. 1141. In so doing, the Court articulated that it had consistently held "that all racial classifications [imposed by government] ... must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny." Id. at 505, 125 S.Ct. 1141 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The Court reasoned the Turner test had never applied to racial classifications, and applied "only to rights that are inconsistent with proper incarceration." Id. at 510, 125 S.Ct. 1141 (quotation marks and citation omitted).

Racial classifications are viewed as immediately suspect, see id. at 509, 125 S.Ct. 1141, and their usage can seriously damage the integrity of a prison system. See id. at 510-11, 125 S.Ct. 1141. On the contrary, Turner applies to prison restrictions relating to rights not typically subject to strict scrutiny. See id. at 510, 125 S.Ct. 1141 (listing First Amendment rights, access to courts, attendance at religious services, and some due process claims such as involuntary medication and restrictions on the right to marry, as remaining subject to Turner). Restrictions on abortion are not subject to strict scrutiny, but are void only when they place an "undue burden" on access to abortion. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 874, 112 S.Ct. 2791, 120 L.Ed.2d 674 (1992). Additionally, like marriage or attendance at religious services, access to abortion involves burdens on the prison system concerning allocation of resources which necessitate either allowing inmates out of the prison setting, or bringing persons into the facilities. Simply refraining from classifying prisoners on the basis of race involves no such burden. Johnson, 543 U.S. at 510, 125 S.Ct. 1141 ("The right not to be discriminated against based on one's race ... is not a right that need necessarily be compromised for the sake of proper prison administration."). The district court thus properly declined to apply the "undue burden" test in this matter, and Turner represents the proper framework for analysis.²

B. Applying Turner

Prison regulations restricting constitutional guarantees are valid only if the regulations are "reasonably related to legitimate penological interests." Turner, 482 U.S. at 89, 107 S.Ct. 2254. To determine whether a prison regulation is reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest, courts consider (1) whether there exists a "valid, rational connection between the prison regulation and the legitimate governmental interest put forward to justify it"; (2) "whether there are alternative means of exercising the right that remain open to prison inmates"; (3) "the impact accommodation of the asserted constitutional right will have on guards and other inmates, and on the allocation of prison resources generally"; and (4) the existence, or absence of "obvious, easy alternatives ... that fully accommodate[ ] the prisoner's rights at de minimis cost to valid penological interests." Id. at 89-91, 107 S.Ct. 2254 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

1. Reasonable Relationship to Legitimate Penological Interests

Roe argues the MDC's claim of security concerns was feigned, and the MDC was not entitled to Turner deference. The district court noted, that, at the summary judgment stage, such a determination would be inappropriate because there existed at least a genuine issue of material fact regarding the sincerity of the MDC's asserted security concerns. Roe, 439 F.Supp.2d at 950. The...