Roe v. Grossmont Union High Sch. Dist.
| Citation | 443 F.Supp.3d 1162 |
| Decision Date | 06 March 2020 |
| Docket Number | Case No.: 19-CV-1966-CAB-BGS |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of California |
| Parties | ROE, a minor, BY AND THROUGH her Guardian ad Litem, Justin SLAGLE, Plaintiff, v. GROSSMONT UNION HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT et al., Defendants. |
Joshua C. Braddock, Braddock Law Group, San Diego, CA, for Plaintiff.
Gil Abed, Artiano Shinoff, San Diego, CA, for Defendants.
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS AND STRIKE PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT
This matter comes before the Court on a motion to dismiss and strike Plaintiff's complaint filed by Defendants Grossmont Union High School District, April Baker, Josh Reiderer, Robin Ballarin, and Michael Falcomer (collectively "Defendants"). [Doc. No. 15.] The motion has been fully briefed, and the Court deems it suitable for determination on the papers submitted and without oral argument. See S.D. Cal. CivLR 7.1(d)(1). For the reasons set forth below, Defendants' motion is granted in part and denied in part.
Plaintiff Roe, a minor and freshman at West Hills High School in Santee, California, by and through her Guardian ad Litem, Justin Slagle, alleges that on January 30, 2018, she was the victim of a gender-based sexual assault and battery committed by Defendant John Doe, also a minor at the same high school. [Doc. No. 1 at ¶ 17.] As alleged in the complaint, at the time of the incident, Defendant Grossmont Union High School District ("GUHSD") and its school administrators Defendants Baker, Reiderer, and Ballarin, exercised substantial control over the high school campus and provided a lack of adequate and appropriate supervision. [Id. at ¶ 18–19.] Among other things, Plaintiff alleges Defendants failed to comply with its own policies and applicable law governing sexual harassment, failed to perform an unbiased investigation of the allegations against Defendant John Doe, failed to interview key witnesses, failed to investigate claims of Defendant John Doe's prior dissemination of nude photos and videos to Plaintiff, and failed to appropriately train its staff and administrators. [Id. at ¶ 20.] Further, Plaintiff alleges Defendants' investigation report concluded the sexual assault allegations were unfounded when the investigation process was incomplete, one-sided, gender-biased and discriminatory on its face. [Id. at ¶ 39.] While no restrictions were placed on Defendant John Doe, Plaintiff had to transfer to Santana High School where she was subjected to a continuing pattern of retaliation, discrimination, and harassment by students and Defendant Falconer, a school administrator there. [Id. at ¶ 44.]
Plaintiff filed her complaint on October 10, 2019, against Defendants Grossmont Union High School District, April Baker, Josh Reiderer, Robin Ballarin, Michael Falcomer, John Doe, and Heidi and Garret Grosch, alleging: (1) Violation of Title IX, 20 U.S.C. § 1681, et seq. ; (2) Violation of California Education Code § 200, et seq. ; (3) Negligent Failure to Perform Mandatory Duties, California Government Code §§ 815.6, 820 ; (4) Violation of Constitutional Rights, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ; (5) Violation of Unruh Civil Rights Act, California Civil Code § 51, et seq. ; (6) Sexual Battery; and (7) Vicarious Liability, California Civil Code § 1714.1.
On January 24, 2020, Defendants GUHSD, April Baker, Josh Reiderer, Robin Ballarin, and Michael Falcomer moved to dismiss and partially strike Plaintiff's complaint. [Doc. No. 15.]
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f), the Court "may strike from a pleading ... any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). A 12(f) motion to strike functions "to avoid the expenditure of time and money that must arise from litigating spurious issues by dispensing with those issues prior to trial." Whittlestone, Inc. v. Handi-Craft Co. , 618 F.3d 970, 973 (9th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Such motions, however, "are generally disfavored because they are often used as delaying tactics and because of the limited importance of pleadings in federal practice." Gottesman v. Santana , 263 F. Supp. 3d 1034, 1038 (S.D. Cal. 2017). In ruling on a motion to strike, the Court "must view the pleading under attack in the light most favorable to the pleader." Id. Matter is "immaterial" if it "has no essential or important relationship to the claim for relief or the defenses being plead." Fantasy, Inc. v. Fogerty , 984 F.2d 1524, 1527 (9th Cir. 1993), rev'd on other grounds by Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc. , 510 U.S. 517, 114 S.Ct. 1023, 127 L.Ed.2d 455 (1994).
Under Rule 12(b)(6), a party may bring a motion to dismiss based on the failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. A Rule 12(b)(6) motion challenges the sufficiency of a complaint as failing to allege "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). For purposes of ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court "accept[s] factual allegations in the complaint as true and construe[s] the pleadings in the light most favorable to the non-moving party." Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. , 519 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2008).
Even under the liberal pleading standard of Rule 8(a)(2), which requires only that a party make "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief," a "pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ). "[C]onclusory allegations of law and unwarranted inferences are insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss." Adams v. Johnson , 355 F.3d 1179, 1183 (9th Cir. 2004) ; see also Starr v. Baca , 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011) (). "Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief ... [is] a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937.
Defendants move to partially strike Plaintiff's third cause of action for negligent failure to perform mandatory duties, move to dismiss Plaintiff's fourth cause of action for violation of constitutional rights, and move to dismiss Plaintiff's fifth cause of action for violation of California's Unruh Act. [Doc. No. 15.]
Defendants seek to strike a portion of Plaintiff's third cause of action, specifically identifying paragraphs 94–95 of the complaint. [Doc. No. 15-1 at 11–12.] Plaintiff's third cause of action consists of three separate theories of negligence: 1) failure to supervise students; 2) failure to train staff; and 3) failure to train students. Defendants seek to strike the third theory of failure to train students contending that no such duty exists under Title IX or the California Education Code. Plaintiff argues that California Education Code Sections 200 and 201 when read together creates this mandatory duty.
Plaintiff's third cause of action for negligence is brought under California Government Code Sections 815.6 and 820. Section 815.6 has three distinct requirements which "must be met before governmental entity liability may be imposed ...: (1) an enactment must impose a mandatory duty; (2) the enactment must be meant to protect against the kind of risk of injury suffered by the party asserting section 815.6 as a basis for liability; and (3) breach of the mandatory duty must be a proximate cause of the injury suffered." San Mateo Union High Sch. Dist. v. Cty. of San Mateo , 213 Cal. App. 4th 418, 428, 152 Cal.Rptr.3d 530 (2013). "The first requirement, which is ultimately dispositive here, is that the enactment at issue be obligatory, rather than merely discretionary or permissive, in its directions to the public entity; it must require, rather than merely authorize or permit, that a particular action be taken or not taken." Id. at 428, 152 Cal.Rptr.3d 530. "Whether a particular statute is intended to impose a mandatory duty, rather than a mere obligation to perform a discretionary function, is a question of statutory interpretation for the courts." Id. at 428–29, 152 Cal.Rptr.3d 530.
While the dividing line between a discretionary and mandatory duty is not always definitive, the California Supreme Court has articulated "rigid requirements for imposition of governmental liability under Government Code section 815.6." Ellerbee v. County of Los Angeles , 187 Cal. App. 4th 1206, 1215, 114 Cal.Rptr.3d 756 (2010). Lockhart v. County of Los Angeles , 155 Cal. App. 4th 289, 308, 66 Cal.Rptr.3d 62 (2007) (internal citation omitted). "Courts have construed this first prong rather strictly, finding a mandatory duty only if the enactment ‘affirmatively imposes the duty and provides implementing guidelines.’ " Guzman v. County of Monterey , 46 Cal. 4th 887, 898, 95 Cal.Rptr.3d 183, 209 P.3d 89 (2009) (internal citation omitted).
Plaintiff alleges that her third cause of action incorporates by reference California Education Code Section 200 et seq. , which creates a mandatory affirmative duty for California public schools to address...
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